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## Caro-Kann: Smyslov System 4… ��d7

by

Eduard Gufeld and Oleg Stetsko

Translated and Edited by Ken Neat

**CADOGAN CHESS** 

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### **Conventional Signs**


!	good move
!!	excellent move
!?	move deserving consideration
?!	dubious move
?	incorrect move
??	blunder
±	clear advantage for White
<del>T</del>	clear advantage for Black
±	slight advantage for White
<del>-</del>	slight advantage for Black
=	equal position
1-0	White wins
0-1	Black wins
1/2-1/2	draw
Ch	Championship
corr.	correspondence game
CT	Candidates Tournament
IZ	Interzonal Tournament
OL	Olympiad
WC	World Championship

### Introduction

The popular branch of the Caro-Kann Defence, characterised after 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2 c3 dxe4 4 2 xe4 by the developing move 4... 2d7, enjoys the reputation of having been a favourite defence of the classic World Champions. Introduced by the famous chess researcher of the first third of our century, Aron Nimzowitsch, this continuation forms the basis of a promising system of play, in which Black, despite his somewhat passive position, avoids serious positional concessions and can gradually hope for equality, which is fully in accordance with the classical views on playing the opening.

Therefore it is no accident that in the 1940s it drew the attention of one of the pre-war World Championship contenders Salo Flohr, and that in the 1950s and 1960s it was actively developed by two excellent 'defenders', seventh and ninth World the Vasily Smyslov Champions and Tigran Petrosian. The variation could well have been named after them both (in fact Petrosian's claim is perhaps played stronger, as he throughout his career), but in the West the name of the Smyslov System has become customary.

In recent years this variation has become a major weapon in the black repertoire of the twelfth World Champion Anatoly Karpov.



With ... Dgf6 (or ... Ddf6) Black plans to drive away or exchange the centralised white knight, avoiding the doubled pawns after 4... Df6, as well as the positional concessions that arise after the bishop development 4... 2f5. Then ... e7-e6 leads to a pawn structure where Black's main way of freeing his game is by preparing the advance ... c6-c5, which can lead to White gaining a queenside pawn majority and the long-term prospect of obtaining an outside passed pawn in the endgame.

One drawback to the system is the delay in the development of Black's light-square bishop, which he often has to fianchetto in analogy with the Rubinstein Variation in the French Defence, an operation that takes time and allows White a persistent initiative, based on his occupation of e5 with a knight. However, despite the


outward passivity of Black's position, the absence of pawn weaknesses enables him, with accurate play, to maintain the balance, as though confirming the philosophical thesis, that drawbacks are sometimes the consequence of virtues. This was sensed most subtly by the World Champions, and in the years when the variation was being established, in the games of Smyslov and Petrosian their opponents' attempts to gain an advantage by simple means were equally simply parried by Black, as he imperceptibly eroded White's initiative. With the development of more complicated variations, Black was also able to find counter-actions. Here are a few examples from the early experience of the World Champions.

## Game 1 Matanovic-Petrosian USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	<b>DB</b>	Øgf6
6	②xf6+	<b>包xf6</b>
7	êc4	<b>≜</b> £5
8	₩e2	

Matanovic carries out the plan with queenside castling (nowadays 8 0-0, to support the knight at e5, is more usual), being under no doubt that Petrosian would have prepared for 8 \$\overline{2}\$e5, where in the analogous 1957 match he had an unfortunate

experience in his game with Gligoric: 8...e6 9 \( \text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex



10 ... ≜g4!

Simplicity is the basis of beauty, and the outwardly simple means, with which Petrosian outplays his opponent, allow his play to be compared with the strategic masterpieces of Capablanca, the third World Champion. With this exchange of White's most important piece – the knight, which was aiming for e5 – he demonstrates a subtle understanding of the position.

13 Axe7

After 13 2d2 Black can launch a counterattack: 13...b5 14 2b3 a5.

Even Bobby Fischer himself was unable to shake Petrosian's position (Bled 1961): 14 \$\displaystyle{2}\$b1 \$\overline{\textit{Z}}\$d8 15 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$e4 b5 16 \$\overline{\text{Q}}\$d3 a5 17 c3 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$d6 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \$\overline{\text{Q}}\$f6, and Black maintained the balance.


14 ... 0-0 15 含b1 <u>Lad8</u> 16 **含b3** 數f6 17 we2?

White is labouring under an illusion. Had he appreciated the change in the situation, he would have exchanged queens by 17 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xf6 \(\infty\)xf6, with prospects of a draw. But he is still thinking about the initiative, as indicated by his pawn offensive on the kingside.

17 ... **Id**7
18 c3 b5
19 g3 **I**fd8
20 f4

It was not yet too late to think about equalising with 20 \( \text{\( \text{\( \text{a}\)}\) xd5.

20 ... b4



21 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)f3?!

For the sake of his illusory

x 0003

initiative, White allows a weakening of his queenside pawns. Of course, 21 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\text{xd5}\) \(\text{\text{\text{2}}}\text{xd5}\) \(\text{2}\) \(\text{cxb4}\) was necessary.

21 ... bxc3 22 bxc3 c5!


Now Black firmly seizes the initiative. If 23 c4 he was intending 23... (2) b4! 24 dxc5 (2)d3.

23 **E**e5 cxd4 24 **2**xd5 **E**xd5 25 **E**xd5 exd5!

A further subtlety. Here the isolated pawn is not a weakness, whereas after 25... Ixd5 26 Ixd4 White can successfully defend.

26 **基xd4** h6 27 g4 27 **基**xd5 loses to 27...**基**b8+ 28 全c2 **数**b6.

27 ... 響e7 28 響位 里b8+ 29 拿a1 響a3 30 響c2 里e8 31 里b4



31 ... d4!

Again a simple solution. By exchanging his d5 pawn for the pawn at

h3, Black takes play into a won queen ending.

32	<b>¤</b> xd4	<b>≖</b> e1+
33	<b>Z</b> d1	≖xd1-
34	₩xd1	₩xc3-
35	<b>\$</b> b1	₩xh3
36	a4	h5
<b>37</b>	gxh5	₩f5+
38	⇔b2	₩xf4
39	<b>Ġ</b> b3	₩f5
40	<b>\$</b> c4	<b>\$</b> h7
41	₩d2	0–1


Game 2	
Simagin-Smyslov	
Moscow 1963	

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Дс3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	êc4	<b>夕gf6</b>
6	<b>2</b> 0g5	<b>e6</b>
7	(1)e2	

Fully in the manner of Vladimir Simagin, who was a grandmaster with an original style of play. The main continuation is 7 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}} e2.\)

9 全f4 is also not dangerous: 9...全xf4 10 ②xf4 豐c7 11 ②d3 b5 12 全b3 c5 with complete equality.

Usually this knight is played to g3. At c3 it as though provokes Black into trying to seize the initiative, which Smyslov immediately does.



10		<b>b5</b>
11	⊈d3	b4
12	<b>De4</b>	②xe4
13	≜xe4	<b>Ð</b> f6
14	<b>∳</b> d3	

Obviously, without good reason White cannot concede the advantage of the two bishops (14 We2 2)xe4 15 Wxe4 2b7). But now Black implements ...c6-c5, the main strategic idea of the variation.

14		0-0
15	₩e2	<b>≜b</b> 7
16	ı⊈d2	<b>c5</b>
17	dxc5	₩xc5
18	h3	

Preventing the transition into an endgame after 18 \( \Delta e3 \) \( \Whits h5, \) with the threat of exchanges on f3.


If 20 ②d2 there would have followed 20...e4! 21 ②c4 (or 21 ②c4 \\ \$\delta\$=5) 21...\delta\$d5 22 ②xd6 exd3 23 \delta\$f3 \delta\$xd6 24 \delta\$xb7 dxc2 with advantage to Black.

11

20		<b>Z</b> ac8
21	<b>≝</b> fd1	<b>≜</b> .b8
22	Ø142	

If 22 ♠b3 Black has the good reply 22... ₩c7 with the threat of 23...c4.

22		<b>₩c7</b>
23	<b>≜b3</b>	₩c6
24	ß	



24 ... e4!

A decision opening of the position, clearing the a8-h1 diagonal.

### 25 fxe4

After 25 f4 there could have followed 25...a5 26 a4 2a6 27 \( \frac{1}{2} \)fd 28 \( \frac{1}{2} \)fd 1 (28 \( \frac{1}{2} \)b6 \( \frac{1}{2} \)d6 29 \( \frac{1}{2} \)xa5 e3 30 \( \frac{1}{2} \)xe3 \( \frac{1}{2} \)e3 31 \( \frac{1}{2} \)fd 2 \( \frac{1}{2} \)e2 is crushing) 28...\( \frac{1}{2} \)d5 with a positional advantage for Black (Smyslov).

It is important to retain control of d5.

If 29 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\)f2, then 29...a4 is decisive, since after 30 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\)d5 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\)xd5 31 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd5

₩xc2 White cannot play 32 ♠c5 on account of 32... ♣xc5!

29	• • •	₩xf3
30	gxf3	<b>_e</b> e2
31	<b>≖</b> e1	<b>≜xf</b> 3
32	ı⊈a4	<b>≜e</b> 5
33	<b></b> ■d2	ı⊈xb2
34	IIf2	<b>≜</b> c6
35	<b>≜</b> xc6	<b>E</b> xc6
36	<b>夕g3</b>	<b>≖</b> e8
37	<b>Df5</b>	<b>Ġ</b> h7
38	<b>T</b> ef1	<b> ■</b> xe3
39	②xe3	<b>≜</b> d4
40	<b>Z</b> e1	<b>≖</b> e6
	0–1	


## Game 3 Bronstein-Petrosian Moscow 1967

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	c3	Øgf6
6	<b>∳</b> )g3	<b>e6</b>
7	<b>Df3</b>	<b>c5</b>
8	<b>≜d3</b>	cxd4
9	②xd4	<b>≜</b> e7

Nowadays the more active development 9... 2c5 is normally preferred.

10	0-0	42e5
11	<b>£c2</b>	<b>≜</b> d7
12	<b>E</b> e1	<b>Dc6</b>
13	<b>D</b> 13	<b>₩</b> c7
14	₩e2	h6
15	<b>≜</b> d2	g5!?

One of Petrosian's favourite stratagems was to delay castling, with the aim of saving as much time as possible for carrying out a concrete plan. Here, with his king for the moment out of reach, he begins an attack on the kingside, but on this occasion, as they say, it is a case of diamond cut diamond. Bronstein cleverly finds a way of keeping the opponent's king in the centre.



### 16 Hac1!

In Nimzowitsch's terminology, a 'mysterious' rook move: in the event of 16...g4 17 公d4 公xd4 18 cxd4 it comes alive.


16		<b>包d5</b>
17	<b>b4</b>	<b>Df4</b>
18	<b>≜</b> xf4	gxf4
10	a 1512	<b>\$</b>

Petrosian believes in the impregnability of his position, and the exchange 19...exf5 20 b5 \( \mathbb{L} \) g8 21 bxc6 \( \mathbb{L} \) xc6 22 \( \mathbb{L} \) xf5, which breaks up his pawn structure, does not suit him.

21 (a) xe7

21 2e5! is more energetic.

21		ı xe7
22	De5	<b>≜</b> d6



### 23 ②xf7!

White begins a sudden attack, but in surprising fashion Black finds defensive resources.

Observing these optimistic king manoeuvres, one gains the feeling that hovering over the position is the spirit of the first World Champion Wilhelm Steinitz, who used to assert that the king was capable of defending itself. Black parries the threat of 25 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xe6+\(\text{\text{\text{\text{27}}}}\)27 \(\text{\tex{

25	<b></b> acd1	<b></b>
26	₩g4	<b>¤</b> hg8
27	Wh5	<b>⊈g7</b>
28	Q vo6	<b>₫</b>

After 28...2xe6 29 Exe6 the linear attack of the heavy pieces is decisive.

29	<b>Wf5</b> +	<b>ℤ</b> g6
<b>30</b>	<b>₩f7</b> +	<b></b> Ig7
24	Will com.	_

31 **W**f5+


By repeating moves Bronstein acknowledges the brilliance of Petrosian's defence.

31		<b></b> g6
32	₩f7+	<b></b> Ig7
33	₩f5+	<b></b> Ig6
34	₩f7+	1/2-1/2

### Game 4 Parma-Smyslov

Lugano Olympiad 1968

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>4</b> 0c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>Dg</b> 5	e6
7	₩e2	<b>એb6</b>
8	<b>⊈d3</b>	h6
9	<b>2</b> 5f3	<b>c5</b>
10	dxc5	



10 ... **包bd7**!

The exclamation mark is for Smyslov's invention. Before this only 10... \( \hat{\alpha} \) xc5 had been played.


### 11 包e5

On encountering a new idea, Parma avoids the critical move 11 b4.

12	₩xe5	₩a5+
13	<b>⊈</b> d2	wxc5
14	<b>D</b> f3	₩xe5+
15	②xe5	<b>≜c5</b>
16	<b>≜</b> b5+?!	

This assists Black's development. The immediate 16 \( \Delta e2 \) is better.

16		<b>⊈</b> e7
17	<b>⊈</b> e2 -	②e4
18	<b><b>Ød3</b></b>	<b>⊈</b> d6
19	≜e3	<b>≜d7</b>



The lost tempo has also cost White the initiative. The game is equal.

itiative.	The game	is equal.
20	<b>≜</b> d4	f6
21	<b>≜</b> f3	<b>≜</b> c6
22	0-0-0	Thc8

**b6** 

If 23...e5 there would have followed 24 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)he1.

24	<b>T</b> he1	<b>②c5</b>
25	⊈g4	<b>≜.d7</b>

26 **\$\dip b1** 

23 h4


In the event of 26 \( \Delta b4 \) Black maintains the balance by 26...\( \Delta b3+. \)

26		②xd.
27	<b>xd</b> 3	e5
28	<b>≜xd7</b>	<b>\$</b> xd′

29 <b>≜</b> c3 <b>⊈</b> c7	32	<b> ■</b> d5	<b>≗</b> e7
30 Zed1 Zd8	33	c4	<b>Exd5</b>
31 <b>≜</b> e1 e4!?	34	<b>xd5</b>	<b>≜</b> d6
Black is already fighting for the	35	h5	<b>ℤe8</b>
initiative. If 32 \(\mathbb{I}\)d4 there follows	36	<b>≜</b> .d2	<b>≜</b> c5
32e5!		1/2-1/2	

### PART I: 5 **②**g5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	9)05	




This paradoxical move was first suggested by Igor Zaitsev during preparations with Karpov for the 1980 World Championship Match against Korchnoi. The idea is to regroup the forces with the aim of occupying e5 with a knight, the bishop being developed at d3, and without the loss of time (that occurs after 5 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\)c4). The point is that Black cannot tolerate for long the knight on its aggressive post at g5, and is forced to assist the manoeuvre \(\textit{\textit{2}}\)g5-f3-e5, where it will be supported by the other knight.

The solidity of this manoeuvre is reinforced tactically. Black cannot immediately drive the knight away with 5...h6? on account of the

possible sacrifice 6 De6! Wa5+ 7 2d2 Wb6 8 2d3, and now 8...fxe6? fails to 9 Wh5+ 2d8 10 2a5, winning the queen (Nunn-Kir.Georgiev, Linares 1988), while if 8... Dgf6 White has the promising piece sacrifice 9 Df3 fxe6 10 2g6+ 2d8 11 De5 with a strong attacking position, since it is not easy for Black to develop his pieces.

Black's main replies are 5... 2gf6 (Chapters 1-3) and 5... 2df6 (Chapter 4).

After 5... 6b6 the knight does not participate in the battle for the centre, and this allows White to gain control of the central squares: 6 61f3 g6, and now:



(a) 7 c3 单g7 8 豐b3 ②h6 9 单e2 0-0 10 0-0 ②f5 11 單d1 豐c7 12 g3 ②d6 with an equal game (Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988);


₩c7 10 c3 ዿf5 (or 10...0-0 11 ᡚe5! ᡚd5 12 ₩f3 ᡚf5 13 ₩h3±) 11 ᡚe4 ᡚg4 12 h3 ዿxe4 13 ဋxe4 ᡚf6 14 ዿf4 ₩d8 15 ဋe2 ᡚbd5 16 ዿe5 with a clear positional advantage (Britton-Arkell, British Ch 1992);

(c) 7 h4 (this flank attack is also possible) 7...\( \overline{\Delta}\) h6 (7...\( \overline{h}\) is risky: 8

②xf7!? \$\pixf7 9 \Qe5+ \$\pig7 10 h5!\) 8
h5 \$\Qinfty g4 9 hxg6 hxg6 10 \$\pixh6! \$\Qinfty kh6\$
(10...\$\pixh6? is bad on account of 11
\$\Qinfty f7! \$\pixf7 12 \Qe5+\) 11 \$\Qinfty kf7 \$\pixf7\$
12 \$\Qinfty e5+ \$\pig7 13 \$\pix xg4 \$\pid6 14 f4!\$
\$\piaf8 15 \$\Qinfty d2 \$\pif6 16 0-0-0\$ with a dangerous attack for the sacrificed exchange (Ulibin-Lokotar, USSR 1988).

### 1: 5... 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 0-0

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	9)95	Dgf6



The main and most natural reply.

6 **≜**d3

6 **2c4** is considered in Chapters 5-8 under the move order 5 **2c4** ②gf6 6 ②g5.

6 ②163 e6 7 ②d3 transposes into the main line. It should be mentioned that, as in many other instances examined below, here too 6...h6 is risky. For example, Demarre-Andruet, France 1989, continued 7 ②e6 fxe6 8 ②d3 ¥a5+9 ②d2 ¥h5 10 ¥e2 g5 11 g4! ②xg4 12 ②e5 ②dxe5 13 dxe5 ■g8 14 0-0-0 with a very strong attack for White

6 ... e6

Without first completing his development, it is practically imposs-

ible for Black to drive the knight away painlessly, since White is able to develop a dangerous attack by sacrificing his knight on e6:

6...h6?! 7 ②e6! ₩a5+ 8 \( \) d2 ₩b6
9 \( \) f3 fxe6 10 \( \) g6+ \( \) d8 11 0-0
c5?! (more cautious is 11...\( \) wc7 12
\( \) le1 b6 13 c4 \( \) b7 14 \( \) e5 \( \) xe5 15
dxe5 \( \) d7 16 \( \) f4±, Malinin,
Poleschuk) 12 c4 cxd4 13 \( \) xd4 e5
(13...\( \) xd4 14 \( \) a5+) 14 c5! \( \) xc5 15
\( \) a5 and White won (Tall-Oll, Riga 1986).

6...c5?! 7 ②1f3 cxd4 (7...\bar{w}b6 8 ②e5!) 8 0-0 h6?! (the drawbacks to 8...\bar{w}b6 were revealed by Tal-Meduna, Germany 1989: 9 \( \text{2c4} \) e6 10 \( \text{2e7}?! \) 11 \( \text{2c7}! \) \( \text{wc7} \) 12 \( \text{2c6} \) \( \text{2c5} \) 13 \( \text{2c4} \) with a clear advantage to White, but even after the superior 10...\( \text{2b4} \) 11 \( \text{2c4} \) xf7! \( \text{2c1} \) 12 \( \text{2c3} \) xh8 \( \text{2b4} \) 13 \( \text{2c3} \) xd4 he still has the advantage) 9 \( \text{2e6}! \) \( \text{2b6} \) 10 \( \text{2e1} \) \( \text{2c5} \) 11 \( \text{2c5} \) \( \text{2c5} \) 12 \( \text{2c3} \) xd4 a6 13 c3 e6 14 \( \text{2f4} \) \( \text{2e7} \) 15 \( \text{2c2} \) \( \text{2d7} \) 16 \( \text{2f5}! \) with a strong attack (Tseshkovsky-Khalifman, Tashkent 1987).


6... C7 7 21f3 (7 2e2 is insufficient for an advantage: 7...e6 8 2f4 2d6 9 2d2 2xf4 10 2xf4 0-0 11 0-0-0 e5=, Nunn-Tal, Skelleftea 1989, although 9...e5! was more vigorous) 7...h6 8 2e6 fxe6 9 2g6+2d8 10 0-0 2d6! (10...b6? 11 g3! 2b7 12 2f4±, De Firmian) 11 2e2 (interesting is 11 c4 c5 12 2e5 2xe5

13 dxe5 \width xd1 14 \width xd1+ \width c7 15 \width f4!, when it is not apparent how Black can complete his development without losing material, Malinin, Poleschuk) 11...\width d5 12 \width e5 \width xe5 13 dxe5 \width b4 14 c4 \width b6 15 \width d1+ \width d7 16 \width e3 with advantage to White (Lauk-Lokotar, Eesti 1992).

6... 2b6 7 21f3 h6?! (7... 2g4 is better: 8 h3 2xf3 9 2xf3±) 8 2xf7! 2xf7 9 2e5+ 2g8 10 2g6 2e6 11 0-0 2c4 12 f4 2d6 13 f5 with an attack.

The fianchetto plan 6...g6 weakens the kingside, allowing White to make use of his knight at g5, e.g. 7 21f3 2g7 8 2e2 0-0 9 h4 h6 (the attack is also unpleasant after 9...h5 10 2e5 2xe5 11 dxe5 2d5 12 e6 f5 13 g4!) 10 h5! 2xh5 11 g4 2hf6 12 2e6! fxe6 13 xe6+ 17 14 xg6 f8 15 g5 2d5 16 gxh6 2e5 17 2h7+ 1-0 (W.Watson-Meduna, Prague 1992).

7 21f3 2d6




Black must keep a close watch on the attacking mechanism of the \( \Delta d3 \) and \( \Delta g5 \), which may go into operation in the event of the weakening move ... h7-h6:

7...h6 8 2 xe6, and now:

(a) 8...fxe6 9 \( \frac{1}{2}\)g6+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)e7, when all the same the king has go pass through the d8 square, and White develops his forces, maintaining an attack with 10 £f4 (also possible is 10 0-0 \(\mathbb{\mod}\mod}\max\mod ව්e5! ව්xe5 12 \$f4 ව්fd7 13 Wh5 \$\d8 14 dxe5 \&e7 15 \alpha ad1 \alpha f8 16 £f7±, Malinin, Poleschuk, but if White plays 11 Ze1, then after 11...\$d8! Black can defend - cf. Game 5, Wolff-Granda Zuniga, New York 1992) 10...\#a5+ 11 c3 \dd d8 12 0-0 e7 13 Ie1 2f8 14 ed3 ed7 15 ②e5 \$c8 16 b4 \$\displayb6 17 \$\overline{2}\$f7 and White's initiative fully compensates for the sacrificed piece (McDonald-Summerscale, London 1994);

(b) 8...₩e7 9 0–0 fxe6 10 \(\delta\)g6+ \(\delta\)d8. when we consider:



(b1) 11 **\$**f4, when:

(b11) 11... ₩b4 12 a3 ₩xb2? 13 ₩e2 ②d5 14 ②d2 and Black was in difficulties (Geller-Meduna, Sochi 1986), but 12... ₩b6 13 c4 ②e7 14 c5 ₩xb2 was more accurate, and therefore 12 ₩e2!± would have been stronger (Rogers);

(b12) 11...b5 (to prevent c2-c4) was played by Kasparov in his famous game with the computer *Deep Blue* (New York 1997), but after 12 a4! 鱼b7 13 單e1 包d5 14 鱼g3 鱼c8 15 axb5 cxb5 16 營d3 鱼c6 17 鱼f5 exf5 18 基xe7 鱼xe7 19 c4 he resigned;

(b13) 11... 2d5! 12 2g3 \$\ b4 13\$ \$\ 2e1 (or 13 \$\ e2 2e7 14 c4 25b6 15\$ \$\ 2e5 \$\ 2f8 16 a3 \$\ e4 17 2f7 + \$\ 2xf7 18\$ \$\ 2xf7 \$\ exc4 and Black defends, Gallagher-Miralles, Geneva 1988) 13... 2e7 14 \$\ e2 2f6 15 c4 2e7 16 a3! \$\ exf5 17 2d3 2f5? (correct was 17... 2f8 18 \$\ 2ad1 2d7 19 2e5 2e8, successfully defending) 18 2xf5! exf5 19 \$\ e6! \$\ e6! \$\ e6! \$\ e56 20 c5 2xc5 21 \$\ exf6 d+! with a winning position (Chandler-Hübner, Biel 1987);


(b2) 11 c4! ₩d6 12 ₩e2 ₩c7 13 Id1! \( \text{\text{\text{d}}} \) 6 14 \( \text{\text{\text{De5}}} \) If8 15 \( \text{\text{c}} \) f4 with a complete bind (Leko-Bakhtadze, Las Palmas 1995) – Game 6.

7...堂c7?! 8 營e2 h6 9 童g6! (a hint that Black's f7 is inadequately defended) 9...hxg5 10 鱼xf7+ 堂d8 (after 10...全xf7 11 包xg5+ 堂g6 12 營d3+ the king is drawn out of its shelter) 11 包xg5 包b6 12 g3! (weaker is 12 鱼xe6?! 墨xh2! 13 0-0 墨h5 as in Vander Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1987) 12...鱼d7 13 鱼xe6 鱼e8 14 鱼f5 鱼f7 15 鱼f4 營e7 16 營xe7+ 含xe7 17 0-0 鱼g8 18 b3! and White creates dangerous threats (Van der Wiel).

 consideration: 8...\$xf7 9 \(\tilde{D}g5+\frac{\pi}{2}g8\)
10 \(\tilde{D}xe6\) \(\tilde{D}b4+11\) \(\pi f1!\) \(\pi e7\) 12 \(\tilde{D}c7\)
\(\tilde{D}b6\) 13 \(\tilde{D}xa8\) \(\tilde{D}xa8\) 14 \(\cilde{C}\) with the better chances for White) 8...h6 9
\(\tilde{D}xe6\) fxe6 10 \(\tilde{Q}g6+\pi f8\) 11 0-0 (not 11 \(\pi xe6?\) \(\pi a5+12\) \(\tilde{D}d2\) \(\pi d5\) 11...\(\tilde{D}b6\) (or 11...\(\tilde{D}d6\) 12 \(\tilde{D}e5\) \(\pi e7\) 13 f4 \(\pi g8\) 14 \(\tilde{D}d2\) \(\tilde{D}f8\) 15 \(\tilde{D}f7+\) with a strong attack, Nadanian-Sedrakian, Armenia 1992) 12 \(\tilde{D}e5!\) with a dangerous initiative for White:

(a) 12... 🗷 g8 13 c4! (13 a4?! 🙎 d7 14 a5 🖾 bd5=, Z.Almasi-Kumaran, Kopavogur 1994) 13... 🚉 d7 14 🚉 e3 🚉 e8 15 🚉 c2 with dangerous threats (Z.Almasi);

8 0-0



This move restricts White's possibilities, although even here

accurate play is demanded of Black. The main continuation 8 We2 is considered in Chapters 2 and 3.

8 ... h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ♠xe4 0-0


The plan with queenside castling comes seriously into consideration:

10... ②f6 11 单d3 b6 12 里e1 单b7 13 b3 豐c7 14 单b2 c5 15 dxc5 豐xc5 16 单xf6 gxf6 17 单e4 0-0-0 with equal chances (Emms-Tisdall, Gausdal 1996).

10...豐c7 11 單e1 b6 12 b3 单b7 13 单b2 0-0-0 14 豐e2 曾b8 15 单d3?! c5 16 dxc5 ②xc5 and Black stands better (Emms-Speelman, Britain 1996).

11 c3 e5

White also retains a solid initiative after 11...c5 12 全c2 豐c7 13 里e1 里d8 14 h3 公f6 15 豐e2 cxd4 16 公xd4 全h2+ 17 全h1 全f4 18 公b5 豐b8 19 a4! (Kamsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1991).



Although the position looks quiet, Black has a hard job to equalise, since he is behind in development. Thus if 15... 22 White has the unpleasant manoeuvre 16 2d2! 2c5 17 4h4 2f7 18 2g5, while after 15... 2c5 Black has to reckon with an attack on h6: 16 4h4 2f8 17 2xh6! gxh6 18 2e1 (Gallagher-Huss, Switzerland 1994).

16 **≜**f4 **≜**xf4 17 **₩**xf4 **②**f8

Weaker is 17... **2 f6?!** 18 **2 e**1 **2 e**6 19 **2 b**3.

18 **≡**e1 **≜**e6 19 **②**d4 **≡**e8

Or 19... d8 20 h4 with the initiative for White (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) – Game 7.

Smirin-Khalifman (Moscow 1989) now continued 20 g3 \dd 21 \dd 1 \d

More energetic was 20 ②xe6!? ②xe6 21 ₩e4 with a slight but enduring advantage for White (Khalifman).

## Game 5 Wolff-Granda Zuniga New York 1992

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \$\d2

In recent years this move has been played much more often that 3 2 c3. Since all the same Black has no better reply than 3...dxe4, White effectively excludes the plan with 3...g6,

followed (after e4-e5) by the attack on his centre by ...c6-c5, which can now he neutralised by c2-c3. It is worth mentioning that this plan, introduced by grandmaster Gurgenidze, was nuccessfully employed by Petrosian against Fischer in the 1970 'Match of the Century'.

3		dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	<b>≜d3</b>	Øgf6
6	<b> ②g5</b>	e6
7	Ø113	h6

A committing move, provoking the following knight sacrifice.


8	②xe6	fxe6
9	<b>≙g6</b> +	<b>⊈</b> e7
10	مَـم	

10 \( \Delta f4, \) controlling the h2-b8 diagonal, is stronger – cf. the analysis.

White is aiming for a complete bind. After 12 基xe6 单d6 Black threatens 13...包f8 and so White is forced to retreat.

12		ı⊈b4
13	<b>ℤe2</b>	<b>2)18</b>
14	②e5	<b>②xg6</b>
15	②xg6	<b>Ze8</b>
16	c5	<b>≜a5?</b>

As Granda Zuniga rightly indicated, Black should have cleared his own pieces that were obstructing his king: 16... #f7! 17 De5 #h5 18 Dc4 b5 19 De5 2d7 20 a4 bxa4 21 Ixa4 a5 22 f3 Ie7, and White's attack does not compensate for the sacrificed piece.



17	₩a4	<b>4</b> 0d5
18	De5	<b>⊈d</b> 7
19	a3	<b>b5</b>
20	₩c2	₩b8
21	<b>₩</b> h7	<b>⊈c</b> 7
22	₩xg7	≜xe5
23	<b>E</b> xe5	<b>\$</b> c8
24	<b>≜</b> xh6	<b>₩</b> c7
25	<b>≜</b> d2	<b>\$</b> b7
26	2421	

The three pawns fully compensate for the knight, and their rapid advance by 26 h4!? would have given White very real chances.

26		a5
27	₩g3	<b></b> Ig8
28	₩d3	<b>b4</b>
29	<b>Z</b> ae1	¤h8
30	<u> </u>	<b></b>
31	h4	₩c8
32	g3	<b>₩f8</b>
33	f4	<b>¥f7</b>
34	<b>∲</b> f2	<b>De7</b>
35	≜xe7	₩xe7
36	₩f3	₩f6
37	<b>1</b> 1e3	<b></b> Ig7
38	<b>¤</b> d3	<b>∲</b> e8

39 **\( \text{de3} \) \( \text{de3} \) \( \text{df7} \)** 

An oversight in time trouble. After 40 d5! cxd5 41 we2 White would have broken through to the enemy king.

40 ... **≜**h5 41 **X**xe6

White has to reconcile himself to the loss of the exchange, since 41 #f4? fails to 41... #g4.

41 ₩xe6 42 **¤**xe6 **≜**xf3 43 ⊈xf3 **Zhg8** ¤xg3+ 44 f6 **⊈**f4 45 **X8g4+** 46 **⇔**e5 **¤**xh4 47 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}\)e7+ **\$**2a6 48 f7 **II**f3 49 **ℤ**e6 ¤xf7 ¤xc6+ 50 **\$a7 ¤e7+** 51 d552 **\$**d6 **¤eh7** 0-1


## Game 6 Leko-Bakhatdze Las Palmas 1995

1 **e4 c6** 2 d4d53 9 c3 dxe4 9)xe4 **包d7** 5 \( \Delta \)g5 2)gf6 6 ⊈d3 **e6 €**113 h6 ₩e7 8 **€**)xe6 9 0 - 0fxe6 10 **≜**g6+ &pd8 11 c4!?

A new move. Before this 11 \(\hat{2}\)f4 used to be played.

11 ... ₩d6

It is not easy for Black to develop his pieces. After the more 'active' 11... b4 Leko was intending 12 we2 2d6 13 2e5 x68 14 2d2!, including his bishop in the attack with gain of time.



15 ... ≜xe5?!

After this it is not possible to free the king.

15...b6 was better, not fearing 16 c5 全xe5, while 16 公f7+ can be met by 16... 工xf7 17 全xd6 豐xd6 18 全xf7 公f8 or 18... 全e7.

Or 18...\$c7 19 \$\text{\text{\text{w}}} \text{xe6 c5, when 20}\$\$\text{\text{\text{Zd6}}} is again decisive.

19 **ℤ**d6 **灃**xb2 20 **ℤ**ad1 **ஜ**c7 

## Game 7 Kasparov-Karpov Amsterdam 1988

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	<b>d5</b>
3	<b>€</b> )d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>∮</b> )g5	<b>Dgf6</b>
6	⊈d3	e6
7	<b>آ1</b> 13	<b>≜</b> d6
8	0-0	

One of the first famous clashes between the twelfth and the thirteenth World Champions takes place on a reserve field. The main continuation is 8 We2.

8		h6
9	<b>De4</b>	②xe4
10	⊈xe4	0-0


As shown in the analysis, the plan with queenside castling can also be considered.

11	c3!	e5
12	ı⊈.c2	<b>ℤe8</b>
13	<b>≖</b> e1	exd4
14	<b></b> xe8+	₩xe8
15	₩xd4	<b>₩e</b> 7
16	<b>⊈</b> f4	≜xf4
17	₩xf4	<b>€</b> )f8
18	<b>ℤ</b> e1	<b>≜e</b> 6
19	<b>Ød4</b>	<b>Zd8</b>

After 19... **Ze8** White can maintain a slight advantage by 20 ②xe6!? ⊙xe6 21 **Ze4**.

20	h4	₩c5
21	<b>ℤe</b> 3	₩d6

### 22 Dxe6



22 ... fxe6?!

White's symbolic advantage now assumes real proportions, and it is instructive to follow the World Champion's technique in capitalising on it. After the natural 22...②xe6 23 We4 ②f8 Black would have maintained the status quo.

23	₩g4	₩d2
24	<b>⊉</b> b3	Ġh8
25	<b>ℤe2</b>	₩d6
26	g3	a6
27	₩g2	≖e8
28	<b>≖e3</b>	<b>∐</b> e7
29	<b></b> If3	<b>∡d</b> 7
30	₩h5	₩e7
31	W45	

The key to Black's position is now apparent – it is the f7 square, and by subtle manoeuvring Kasparov has added a spatial advantage to his positional one. The invasion on f7 is yet to come.

31		≖d8
32	a4	b5
33	₩e4	₩c7

First

34	IIf4	<b>c5</b>
35	₩f3	<b>₩</b> d6
<b>36</b>	axb5	axb5
37	<b>I</b> f7	<b></b> ■b8
38	<b>¤</b> a7	<b>b4</b>
39	ı⊈c2	bxc3
40	bxc3	₩e5
41	<b></b> 17	
41 c	4!? is als	o useful.
41	• • •	�h7
42	₩g4	<b>⊈g8</b>
43	<b>ℤe</b> 7	<b>Df8</b>
44	₩f3	c4

⊈e4


**\$**c6!

45

46

\$h8

**多h7** 



47 **\\$17**The decisive queen invasion. After ne exchange of rooks the difference

in the strength of the minor pieces becomes more apparent in view of the e6 pawn.

47		<b>2)18</b>
48	<b>ℤ</b> e8	<b>E</b> xe8
49	<b>≜</b> xe8	<b>�h7</b>
50	⊈d7	<b>Ðf6</b>
51	<b>≜</b> xe6	h5
52	Ŷ vc4	₩e4+

After 52... wxc3 53 wf8+ wh7 54 wc5! in view of the threat of 55 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} + Black is again forced to concede space.} \)

### 53 \$\psi h2 \$\psi h7?!


53...\dotsf3 is more active, although after 54 \dotsf8+ \dotsh7 55 \dotsc5 the defence would have merely been prolonged.

Now, however, White combines threats to the enemy king with the advance of his c-pawn.

54	₩e6	<b>Wf3</b>
55	₩e1	<b> ②g4</b> +
<b>56</b>	<b>⊈g1</b>	₩c6
57	<b>≜</b> d3+	<b>g6</b>
<b>58</b>	₩e7+	<b>\$</b> h6
59	êe4	₩b6
60	₩f8+	<b>Ġ</b> h7
61	<b>₩</b> f7+	<b>\$</b> h6
62	c4	<b>₩</b> a6
63	c5	1-0

### 2: 8 \wedge e2 h6 9 \@e4 @xe4 10 \wedge xe4 @f6

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> ∆d7
5	<b> Ø</b> g5	Øgf6
6	ı£d3	e6
7	<b>2</b> 1f3	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	



White prepares queenside castling and takes control of the e5 square, restricting the possibility of Black freeing his queen's bishop by means of ...e6-e5.

Here the knight sacrifice no longer works: 9 ②xe6?! fxe6 10 ②g6+ ③e7 11 0-0 ②f8 12 ②d3 ②d7 13 ②e5 ④e8 14 f4 ③d8 15 c4 ⑤c7 16 ②d2 ⑤c8, and Black successfully evacuates his king (Arnason-Ostenstad, Torshavn 1987).

9 ... Dxe4

### 10 ₩xe4


After the capture on e4 with the queen Black is no longer able to carry out the freeing move ...e6-e5 and is obliged to switch to ...c6-c5.

10 **xe4** is harmless: 10...**v**c7 11 **2**d2 b6 12 0-0-0 **2**b7 13 c4 0-0-0 14 **2**c3 **x**he8 15 **x**he1 **2**f6 16 **2**c2 c5 with equal chances (Roiz-Speelman, Oviedo 1992).

10 ... **包f6** 

The other fashionable continuation 10... #c7 is considered in Chapter 3.

Also deserving of a special mention is 10...c5, a move which Karpov, keenly seeking defensive resources, has recently employed several times:



 3 \( \text{2xb7} \) \( \text{Zab8!} \) 19 \( \text{2f4} \) \( \text{Wb5} \) 20 \( \text{xb8} \) \( \text{Zxb8} \) 21 \( \text{2f3} \) \( \text{Wxb2} \) Black's tivity fully compensates for his ight material deficit (Z.Almasiarpov, Tilburg 1996);

(b) 11 0-0 2 f6 (11... C7 12 Wg4 f8, Illescas-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 997, leads to a position considered in hapter 3, p.43), and now:

(b1) 12 \(\textit{2}\)b5+ \(\textit{2}\)e7 13 \(\textit{w}\)e2 \(\textit{w}\)c7 14 \(\cop{15}\) \(\textit{w}\)c5 \(\textit{w}\)c5 (14...\(\textit{2}\)xc5 15 \(\textit{D}\)e5±) 15 \(\textit{e3}\) \(\textit{w}\)c7 16 \(\textit{2}\)d4 \(\textit{d}\)d8 (Topalovarpov, Dos Hermanas 1997), and though in the end Black managed to fend himself, White's chances look etter;


(b2) 12 Wh4 (a more natural move, actically ruling out the possibility of lack castling kingside in view of the reatened bishop sacrifice at h6) 2...cxd4 (at the tournament in Dortund, 1997, Karpov played 12... #c7 ainst Ivanchuk, and although after 3 Lel 2d7 14 2g5 2e7 15 dxc5 xc5 16 De5± he eventually gained a aw, his position was very dubious) | Iel! 单d7 14 ②xd4 (we must also ention the game Shabalov-Gulko, SA Ch 1996, where after 14 2d2 c7 15 \( \mathbb{Z}\) ad1 0-0-0 16 \( \mathbb{W}\) xd4 \( \mathbb{W}\) c5 17 e3 \wxd4 18 \alphaxd4 White obtained e better ending) 14... Wa5 15 \( \hat{\text{\text{\text{\$a}}}} \) e3, id Black was unable to cope with the sulting problems (Lautier-Karpov, iel 1997) - Game 8.

### 11 We2

The aggressive 11 \text{\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}h4} is also metimes played:

(a) attempts to simply - 11... ₩a5+ r 11... \(\Delta\)d5 12 \(\Psi\)xd8+ \(\Psi\)xd8 13 c3 \$e7) 12 \$\alpha\$d2 \$\bar{\text{wh5}}\$ 13 \$\bar{\text{wxh5}}\$ \$\alpha\$xh5 14 \$\alpha\$e5 0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 g4 \$\alpha\$f6 17 g5! give White the better ending (Hector-Hodgson, London 1991);

(b) 11...\$e7!, when the threat of ...g7-g5 forced White to sacrifice a pawn by 12 ②e5 (nothing is achieved by 12 ②d2 g5 13 ₩h3 e5 or 12 ②f4 ③b4+) 12...\$xe5 13 dxe5 ₩a5+ 14 c3 ₩xe5+ 15 ②e3 b6 (15...c5 16 0-0-0 g5 17 ₩g3! ₩xg3 18 hxg3±) 16 0-0-0 g5 with sharp play (Kamsky-Karpov, Dortmund 1993) – Game 9.



11 ... b6

Black mobilises his queenside, preparing for the possibility of removing his king there. After kingside castling he risks coming under an attack in view of the weakening h6, with the white g-pawn being assigned the role of a battering-ram:

 (14...b5 15 g4 ②d5 16 單hg1 豐c7 17 ②e5 b4 18 g5 hxg5 19 罩xg5 f5 20 Idg1±, Benjamin-Arkell, Reykjavik 1990) 15 g4 e5 (15...②xg4 16 Idf1±) 16 g5 hxg5 17 ②xg5 e4! 18 ③xe4 Ie8 19 ②xf6 豐f4+ 20 ②d2 豐xf6 21 豐h5 ②d4 22 c3 Ixe4! 23 ②xe4 豐f4+ with a double-edged game (Smirin-Kharitonov, Svedlovsk 1987).

In this last variation Black can also consider a fashionable method of defence, whereby he 'sacrifices' castling for the sake of activity in the centre: 11... #c7 12 \(\delta\)d2 b6, and now:


- (b) 13 0-0-0 **2**b7 14 **2**e5, transposing into variation 2.1.

White can also consider the preparatory 13 ②e5 ₩c7 (13...c5 14 dxc5 ≜xc5 15 f4±) 14 f4!, deferring castling:

(a) 14...c5 15 dxc5 (if 15 鱼b5+?! �e7=) 15...豐xc5 (the alternatives 15...鱼xc5 16 0-0-0 and 15...鱼xe5 16 fxe5 ②d7 17 cxb6 axb6 18 鱼c3 favour White) 16 0-0-0 0-0 17 �b1 If d8 18 I he I I ac 8 19 g4 2xe 5 20 fxe 5 De 4! 21 2c1! (White loses after 21 2xe 4? 2xe 4 22 1xe 4 I d4 23 1xe 2 1xe 2 1xe 2 1xe 4 2xe 4 2xe

- (c) 14...0-0 15 0-0-0 c5 16 **\(\mathbb{L}\)**hgl cxd4 17 g4 with an attack.

13 ... ₩c7




The two sides have almost completed the mobilisation of their forces, although Black has not yet determined the position of his king. Here three practically equivalent continuations are encountered: 14 2e5 (2.1), 14 Zhe1 (2.2) and 14 2b1 (2.3).

2.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②gf6 6 ②d3 e6 7 ②1f3 ②d6 8 We2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 Wxe4 ②f6 11 We2 b6 12 ②d2 ②b7 13 0-0-0 Wc7)

#### 14 De5

White immediately occupies e5, nd if he should succeed in consollating the position of his knight, he hay be able to develop an unpleasant nitiative.



For example: 14...0-0-0 15 f4! c5 6 dxc5 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}}} \) 2 \( \text{\text{\$\xitit{\$\xitit{\$\text{\$\xitilt{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\tex{

### 14 ... c5

An equally energetic reply. Black islodges the support from under the night and hopes to slip away with his ing via f8.

15 **≜**b5+ **\$**e7

16 dxc5

Maintaining the momentum. After 16 \(\tilde{2}\)f4 \(\beta\)hd8 17 \(\beta\)he1 \(\tilde{2}\)d5 the game is level.


### 16 ... ₩xc5

After 16... 2xe5? 17 cxb6 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)c5 18 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xe5! \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xe5 19 \(\mathbb{\text{2}}\)b4+ the king succumbs.

#### 17 a3

Again a pseudo-sacrifice of the knight (17... \*\*xe5? 18 \*\*xe5 \*\*xe5 19 \*\*xe5 10 \*\*xe5 1

The tactical 17 2c6 (17...2xc6? 18 2b4!) is parried by 17... 2ac8! 18 2e3 2xe5 19 2xb7 2c7 20 2a6 2c5 21 2xc5+ 2xc5 (Leko).



17 ... ₩c7

17...a5 weakens Black's queenside pawn pair: 18 单c3 單hd8 (18...单d5 19 單he1 單hc8 20 f3 学f8 21 学b1

₩c7 22 \(\textit{L}\)d4 \(\textit{Z}\)d8 23 \(\textit{W}\)f2±, Ivanchuk-Karpov, Monaco 1996) 19 \(\textit{L}\)d4 \(\textit{W}\)c7 20 \(\textit{L}\)c4 \(\textit{L}\)c5 21 \(\textit{L}\)e5 with strong pressure for White (Anand-Karpov, Monaco Blind 1996).

### 18 ⊈f4 5\d5

The reinforcement 18... Ind8 is too late: 19 Id4 全d5 (19... 全f8 20 全b1 a6 21 Ixd6! Ixd6 22 公c4 e5 23 Wxe5 axb5 24 Wxd6+ Wxd6 25 公xd6 全xg2 26 Ig1 全h3 27 公xb5 and White wins a pawn, Ye Jiangchuan-Schlosser, Groningen 1996) 20 Ihd1 全f8 21 全b1 with advantage to White — 22 c4 followed by 公xf7 is threatened (Sutovsky-Nisipeanu, Columbia 1996).


But in the recent game Istratescu-Nisipeanu (Bucharest 1997) after 18... ad5!? 19 ac6+ (doubling rooks on the d-file should perhaps have been considered) 19... after 20 axd6+ axd6 21 ac5 ac 22 f4 g6 23 acf1 h5 (to prevent g2-g4) Black gained equal chances.

The eighth game of the Kamsky-Karpov match (Elista 1996) now continued 19 \(\text{\Delta}g3\) \(\text{\Delta}hd8\) 20 \(\text{\Delta}d4!\) with active piece play for White – cf. Game 10.

2.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②gf6 6 ②d3 e6 7 ②1f3 ②d6 8 We2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 Wxe4 ②f6 11 We2 b6 12 ②d2 ②b7 13 0-0-0 Wc7)

#### 14 The1

White calmly strengthens his position.



14 ... 0-0-0

14...0-0 looks risky, but in Game 11 (Kamsky-Karpov, 12th Match Game, Elista 1996) Black succeeded in parrying White's attack: 15 g4 c5 16 g5 hxg5 17 \( \Delta xg5 \) \( \Delta f4! \) 18 h4?! \( \Delta ad8! \) with a good game. Ftacnik recommends as better 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 \( \Delta g1, \) and if 19...\( \Delta xh2 \) 20 f4! \( \Delta xg1 \) 21 \( \Delta xg1 \) \( \Delta fd8 22 \) Wh2 with an attack for White.

### 15 **≜**a6 b5!

Forestalling White's possible activity associated with c2-c4 after 15... axa6 16 wxa6+ b8 17 we2, although even here Black's defensive resources are quite adequate:

- (a) 17...2d5 18 c4 2f4 19 #f1 and White's chances are only slightly preferable (A.Sokolov-Karpov, Belfort 1988) Game 12;
- (b) 17... Ihe8 18 \$\delta\$b1 \$\overline{\Omega}\$d7 19 c4 e5 20 dxe5 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xe5 and Black equalises (Kuczynski-Sapis, Polish Ch 1989).

15... ■he8 16 De5 Axe5 17 dxe5 Dd5 18 Axb7+ Wxb7 is more passive, and here in Woda-Sapis

(Polish Ch 1989) White could have maintained his initiative with 19 ₩g4!


And now:

18 **里c1 里b8** 19 c4 bxc4 20 **里**xc4 **里b5** 21 **署d3 里hb8** with counterplay for Black (McDonald-Hodgson, British Ch 1990);

18 **2c1** ₩b7 19 ②d2 **2b4** 20 c3 **2d6** 21 ②b3 ②d5 with equal chances (Chandler-Adams, Blackpool 1990).

2.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②gf6 6 ②d3 e6 7 ②1f3 ②d6 8 ₩e2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ₩xe4 ②f6 11 ₩e2 b6 12 ②d2 ②b7 13 0-0-0 ₩c7)

### 14 **\$b1**



White is not in a hurry to disclose his plans, since it is not easy for Black to free himself

#### 14 ... 0-0-0

Recently 14... 2d8, whereby Black does not hurry with castling, has become fashionable. He can success-

fully oppose the plan of positional pressure:

- (a) 15 c4 0-0, and now:
- (a1) 16 g4, when the open nature of the position allows Black counterplay: 16...皇f4! 17 ②e5 皇xd2 18 罩xd2 (18 豐xd2 罩xd4 19 皇h7+ ②xh7 20 豐xd4 c5于) 18...罩xd4 19 罩g1 c5 20 g5 ②e4 with a complicated game (Z.Almasi);
- (a2) 16 \( \hat{\text{ac3}} \) \( \frac{1}{2} \) fe8 (if 16...\( \hat{\text{w}} = 7?! \) White attacks with 17 g4 c5 18 ■hg1!, Z.Almasi-Adams, Groningen 1995, but 16...c5 is possible - 17 ■he1 ■fe8 18 dxc5 单xc5 19 ⑤e5. Aseev-Epishin, Russia 1997, and now Aseev suggests 19... \$18!? 20 \$294 ②xg4 21 \wxg4 f5 22 \wxg6 \wxg7 with an equal position) 17 De5 (here too 17 g4 is premature: 17...c5 18 **Z**hg1 êxf3 19 ₩xf3 cxd4 20 êd2 2d7 21 ₩e4 g6! with a sound position for Black - Karpov) 17...c5 18 dxc5 axc5 19 f3 a5 20 ac2 aa6 with a double-edged game (Z.Almasi-Karpov, Groningen 1995);
- (b) 15 \( \frac{1}{2}\)hell 10-0 16 \( \Quad \text{De5} \) (16 g4?! \\ \Quad \text{L} 4 17 \( \Quad \text{De5} \) \( \quad \text{L} 4 18 \) \( \quad \text{L} 4 \) \( \quad \text{L} 4 \) 18 \( \quad \text{L} 4 \) 19 h4? c5∓, Adams-Speelman, New York 1995) 16...c5 17 f4 cxd4 18 g4 \( \Quad \text{L} 4 \) 19 g5 hxg5 20 \( \quad \text{H} 5 \) f5 21 \( \Quad \text{L} 6 \) 22 \( \quad \text{L} x g5 \) \( \Quad \text{L} h7 23 \) \( \quad \text{H} 5 \) \( \quad \text{L} 6 24 \) \( \quad \text{L} g1 \) \( \quad \text{L} e4 \) with equal chances (Kasparov-Epishin, Moscow 1995);
- (c) but after 15 \( \mathbb{I}\) hg1! (preparing an attack in the event of Black castling) 15...c5 16 dxc5 \( \mathbb{I}\) xc5 17 a3 Black encounters serious difficulties:
- (c1) 17...0-0?! 18 g4 營d5 19 g5! 營xf3 (19...hxg5? 20 鱼xg5 營xf3 21 營xf3 鱼xf3 22 鱼xf6 g6 23 罩de1±) 20

gxf6 g6 (if 20... wxf6 White attacks with 21 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} \) e5 22 f4!) 21 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}}} \) exh2 22 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}}} \) wxe2 23 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}}} \) exh2 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}} \) with an attack for White (Topalov-Ivanchuk, Las Palmas 1996);

(c2) 17...a5 18 全e3 豐c7 19 全b5+ 全e7 20 包d4! with the better game for White (Timman-Leko, Groningen 1996) – Game 13.

A practically unexplored alternative is 14... Ic8!? 15 Ingl c5 16 dxc5 Ingl c5 17 Ingl c6 17 Ingl c7 19 Ingl c7 19 Ingl c7 19 Ingl c7 19 Ingl c8 Ingl

### 15 🙎 a 6

15 c4 can be met by 15...c5, although here too after 16 ♠c3 White's chances are better:


- (b) 16... ■hg8 17 ■he1 \$\displays 8 18 \$\displays c2 \cxd4 19 \$\displays xd4 \displays 20 \displays 3 \text{ (Svidler-Vyzhmanavin, Novgorod 1995).}

### 15 ... **ℤ**d7

Here (with the c-file already cleared for White's rook) 15...b5?! is too weakening: 16 全xb7+ 全xb7 17 c4 bxc4 18 單c1 單b8 19 單xc4 全a8 20 單hc1 單hc8 21 包e5 全xe5 22 豐xe5 豐d7 23 f3 單b6 24 全a5 單b7 25 b3 and White's chances are better (Chandler-Speelman, Hastings 1988/9).

16 单xb7+ Ψxb7 17 ②e5

If 17 c4 Ind8 18 2c3 2b8 19 In Ind c5 with equal chances (Kudrin-Kamsky, New York 1989).



Now after 17...全xe5 18 dxe5 包g8 19 c4 包e7 20 全c3 單hd8 21 罩xd7 罩xd7 22 罩d1 罩xd1+ 23 豐xd1 c5 24 豐d6 White has a significant advantage in the ending (Thorsteinsson-Kamsky, Reykjavik 1990).

## Game 8 Lautier-Karpov Biel 1997


1	e4	c6
_	• •	
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>ᡚd7</b>
5	<b> ②g</b> 5	②gf6
6	ıd3	e6
7	<b>4113</b>	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>②e4</b>	②xe4
10	Wve4	c5

This basically thematic attack on the centre has the drawback that Black remains behind in development, and it is not easy for him to secure the position of his king.

11 0-0 **②**f6

12 Wh4 cxd4
13 He1!

A useful developing move, putting the black king under 'X-ray' (White gains the possibility of 2044-f5).



### 15 ... **☆**f8?!

It would have been more natural to expect of Karpov his 'patent' 15...\$e7, but here this loses outright to 16 ②f5+.

Since later Black's defence involves trying to exchange queens, it would have been simpler to do this immediately by 15... \$\text{Wh5}\$ 16 \$\text{Wxh5}\$ \text{2xh5}\$ 17 \$\text{2f5}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ f8 18 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ also interesting, threatening 20...exf5 as well as to cut off the bishop's retreat by 20...b6) 19 \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$ f4 0-0-0 20 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ d6 21 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ d7 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{a}{2}\$}\$}\$ is also interesting, threatening 20...exf5 as well as to cut off the bishop's retreat by 20...b6) 19 \$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{

Castling immediately 15...0-0-0?! 16 ②b3 ₩c7 17 ②xa7 g5 18 ₩h3 e5 19 ∰f3 or after 15...g5 16 ∰h3 0-0-0 17 ②b3 ∰a4 18 Åd4 e5 19 ∰f3 leaves his kingside irreparably weakened.


### 16 &f4 &xf4

16...e5 can be met by the simple 17 ②b3 ₩b4 18 ②g5 ₩xh4 19 ③xh4, with an obvious advantage in the endgame.

The main theme of White's strategy is occupation of e5.

18 ... 含e7 19 **豐g3 豐b4** Or 19...公h5? 20 罩e5!

20 **包e5** 



20 ... g5?!

There was no justification for such an optimistic sortie. 20... hg8, avoiding weakening the kingside, was more solid.


### 21 c4! **Zhd8**?!

If Black is going to suffer, then he might at least have some material in compensation: 21... \$\times\$ xb2 22 \$\times\$ ab1 \$\times\$ xa2 23 \$\times\$ xb7 \$\times\$ hd8 24 \$\times\$ h3! \$\times\$ a6

### 22 Wh3 h5?

This leads to loss of material. It was essential to return with 22... Th8, although after 23 b3 White has a clear advantage.

The initiative is more important than a pawn; 24 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\) xa7 b6 would have left Black with some hopes.



### 26 Dxf7!

By the threat of a discovered check (26... \$\delta xf7 27 \delta g6+)\$ White exposes the enemy king. Black's attempt to buy him off by giving up the exchange proves fruitless.

26		₩c5
27	<b>②xd8</b>	₩xe3
28	<b>Exe3</b>	&xd8
29	<b>x</b> b7	a5
30	<b>¤</b> a7	Ic5


31	f4	gxf3
32	<b>Exf3</b>	<b>De8</b>
33	<b>I</b> f7	<b>②c7</b>
34	<b>∐</b> h7	êe8
35	<b>∲</b> 12	<b>⊈</b> c8
36	<b>¤</b> h8	<b>⊈</b> d7

37	<b>⊈e3</b>	e5
38	ı⊈e2	⊈g6
39	😩 xh5	<b>≜</b> f5
40	ê_e2	<b>⊈</b> e6
41	h4	фс6
42	<b>¤</b> h6	<b>⊈</b> d7
43	h5	1-0

## Game 9 **Kamsky-Karpov** *Dortmund 1993*

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	<b>Dg</b> 5	Dgf6
6	<b>≜d3</b>	<b>e6</b>
7	<b>113</b>	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>包f6</b>
11	₩h4	<b>œ</b> e7!

Nowadays the appearance of Karpov's king at e7 is nothing unusual, but at the time this move created the impression of an exploding bomb. All the participants in the tournament left their games and gathered around the board where the future finalists of the FIDE World Championship in Elista were playing.



12	<b>De5</b>	ı£xe5
13	dxe5	₩a5+
14	c3	₩xe5+
15	♠e3	<b>b6</b>
16	000	g5
17	₩a4	c5
18	<b>¤</b> he1	

White has a strong initiative for the sacrificed pawn, but Karpov is accustomed to defending such situations.


18		<b>⊈</b> d7
19	₩a3	<b>¤</b> hd8
20	g3	

If 20 f4 gxf4 21 2d4 Black holds he position by 21... #g5 22 Ze5 Wh4.

Karpov considers the strongest to be 22...\(\alpha\)c6! 23 \(\alpha\)e5 \(\boxdot{\wavefill}\)d7 24 \(\alpha\)c2 \(\boxdot{\wavefill}\)b7 when the initiative passes to 3lack. Now, however, Kamsky finds to way of adding fuel to the fire.

The outcome of the game is

decided to a certain extent on the d-file, Black's control of which assists his king, as is seen in the following variation: 24 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 6! 25 c4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 5 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec 4 \( \)ec 25 \( \)ec




24		<b>■</b> 5d6
25	<b>≜</b> xf6+	<b>\$</b> xf6
26	fxg5+	hxg5
27	<b>Exd6</b>	<b>¤</b> xd6
28	c4	<b>⊈</b> e7
29	₩e3	f6
<b>30</b>	h4	gxh4
31	gxh4	<b>₩d7</b>
32	₩h6	e5?

33	h5	₩g4
34	<b>₩h7</b> +	<b>\$</b> d8
35	h6	<b>Ľ</b> d2
36	WESI	

This is where the difference in the placing of the queens tells. In view of

the threat of the h-pawn's further advance, Black has to agree to their exchange.

36 ... ₩xf5 37 ♠xf5 ♠d7



38 **≜**g6?

After 38 \$\circ\$c1! in view of the threatened pin Black would have nothing better than 38...\$\times\$d4, but then after 39 \$\times\$xd7 he would have to give up a piece, since 39...\$\times\$xd7 40 \$\times\$d1 or 39...\$\times\$xd7 40 \$\times\$h1 allows the h-pawn to queen. Now, however, it comes under the firm control of the rook, and matters are decided by Black's pair of connected pawns.

38 ≌h2 . . . 39 **h**7 **⊈e7** 40 **⊈d3 ≜e6** 41 g1 f5 **■ 97**+ 42 **\$**f6 **X**xa7 43 **e4** 44 **≜**.e2 f4 45 b3 f3**≜**d1 **⊈** f5 46 47 œc1 **≜**xh7 48 ¤b7 фe5


49 **Xxb6 Xxa2** 0-1

Game 10

Kamsky-Karpov

Match (8), Elista 1996

1	<b>e4</b>	c6
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>∕</b> 2)d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	<b><b><b>②g5</b></b></b>	Øgf6
6	<b>≜</b> d3	e6
7	<b>D113</b>	<b>≜d</b> 6
8	₩e2	h6
9	De4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>Df6</b>
11	₩e2	<b>₩</b> c7
12	<b>≜</b> .d2	<b>b6</b>
13	000	<b>≜</b> b7
14	<b>De5</b>	<b>c5</b>
15	<b>≜</b> b5+	<b>⊈</b> e7
16	dxc5	₩xc5
17	a3	




The knight offer is a pseudo-sacrifice: 17... \*\*xe5? 18 \*\*xe5 \*\* xe5 19 \*\*b4+.

As mentioned in the analysis, after 18... Ind8 19 Id4 2d5 (19... 18 20 Ixd6) 20 Ind1 18 21 Ind1 Index Index

However, 18... 2d5!? (Istratescu-Nisipeanu, Bucharest 1997) is a possible improvement.

A subtle manoeuvre. White not only threatens to double rooks, but also eyes the weak c6 square.

Continuing the battle for c6, whereas after the retreat of the bishop Black would have consolidated the position of his knight at d5 by 22...b5.



Black has to agree to an isolated pawn, since if he interposes 25... \( \text{\text{\text{2}}} \) xg3? White too can interpose 26 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}} \) xf2 27 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}} \) \( \text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}} \) \( \text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}} \) \( \text{\text{\text{2}}} \) \( \text{\text{2}} \) \( \text{\t

26	<b>≜</b> xd6	₩xd6
27	<b> ■ d4</b>	<b>b5</b>
28	₩d3	<b>⊈g8</b>
29	g3	₩e6
<b>30</b>	Ĭd1	<b>Z</b> ad7
31	h4	<b> ■ d</b> 6
32	<b>2</b> d2	

One is unlikely to outplay Karpov with prophylaxis, and therefore the vigorous 32 g4!? \(\mathbb{w}\)f6 33 \(\mathbb{w}\)g3 should have been considered, with some initiative.


32		₩e1+
33	🕸a2	₩e7
34	<b>₩f3</b>	₩e6
35	<b>∐</b> e2	₩c8
<b>36</b>	₩d3	Ic6
37	<b>∲</b> b1	<b></b> ■e6
38	<b>ℤe3</b>	₩c6
39	₩d2	<b></b> Ixe3
40	Wye3	

Nothing is promised by 40 fxe3  $\blacksquare$ e8 41  $\blacksquare$ xd5  $\blacksquare$ xe3 42  $\blacksquare$ d8+  $\blacksquare$ e8.

40		₩e
41	₩d2	≖de
42	g4	₩f6
43	g5	₩f3
44	<b>⇔</b> a2	

After the exchanges 44 gxh6 \( \frac{1}{2}\)xh6 45 \( \frac{1}{2}\)xh4 46 \( \frac{1}{2}\)d8+ \( \frac{1}{2}\)h7 the game is equal.

44		₩f:
45	c3	₩f3
46	IIf4	₩h
47	oyh6	



47 ... ₩e6! 48 ₩d4

If 48 hxg7 White has to reckon with 48...d4+ 49 \$\displaystyle{\phacestar} b1 \dixc3, when 50 \$\displaystyle{\psi} xc3\$ fails to 50...\$\displaystyle{\psi} d1+ 51 \$\displaystyle{\psi} c2\$ \$\displaystyle{\psi} b3 \$\displaystyle{\psi} d3\$, winning the queen.

48	• • •	₩xh6
49	<b>I</b> f5	₩e6
<b>50</b>	<b>ℤe</b> 5	<b>₩</b> d7
51	🕸a1	f6
<b>52</b>	<b>ℤe3</b>	<b>E</b> c6
53	h5	Ic4
54	₩b6	<b>d4</b>
55	<b>Z</b> d3	<b>W</b> f5
<b>56</b>	<b> x d 4</b>	<b>xd4</b>
57	cxd4	

57 \widetilde{\pi}xd4 \widetilde{\pi}xh5 58 \widetilde{\pi}d6 \widetilde{\pi}f3 59 \widetilde{\pi}xa6 \widetilde{\pi}d1+ 60 \widetilde{\pi}a2 \widetilde{\pi}d5+ would have led to equality.

	9	
57	•••	₩xf2
<b>58</b>	₩e6+	<b>\$1</b> \$€
<b>59</b>	₩d6+	<b>⊈f7</b>
60	<b>₩</b> d7+	<b>⊈18</b>
61	₩d6+	<b>⊈</b> f7
62	₩d7+	
	1/2-1/2	

## Game 11 Kamsky-Karpov Match (12), Elista 1996

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>包d2</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	<b>∕</b> 2g5	②gf6
6	⊈d3	<b>e6</b>
7	<b>2</b> 113	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>②e4</b>	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>Ð</b> f6
11	₩e2	₩c7
12	<b>⊈</b> d2	<b>b6</b>
13	000	<b>⊈b</b> 7
14	<b>¤</b> he1	

Kamsky switches to another of the three main alternatives.

14 ... 0-0

This is considered risky, as White's attack has something to latch on to – the h6 pawn. The main continuation is 14...0-0-0.

15 g4 c5


One is unlikely to find volunteers willing to play 15... 2xg4? 16 Ig1 f5 17 h3 2 f6 18 2xh6.

16	g5	hxg5
<b>17</b>	2xg5	⊈f4!
18	h421	

This natural move in fact reduces the potential of White's attack, as Black is able to make an energetic counterattack in the centre. 18 dxc5 bxc5 19 \( \frac{1}{2}g1! \) was stronger.

18	• • •	<b>≖</b> ad8!
19	dxc5	bxc5
20	e3	

Now if 20 Ig1 Black has 20...c4 21 Ixc4 Ixd2 22 Ixd2 Ixd2+ 23 Ixd2 Id8+ 24 In Implement the better chances.



20 ... **I**d4!

A pretty move, indirectly attacking the h4 pawn, and if 21 h5 Black was planning to seize the initiative by 21... #e5 22 Ig1 c4!

21	<b></b> g1	<b>≜</b> xe3+
22	fxe3	<b> x</b> h4
23	<b>E</b> df1	₩e5
24	Wf7	₩h6


Karpov defends, but it was already the time to launch a counterattack: 24... Lh2! Now 25 wxf6? fails to 25... wxe3+! 26 wb1 gxf6, 25 we1 d8 with the threat of 26... xd3 is unpleasant for White, while after 25 wg3 wxg3 26 xg3 dd7 Black is a pawn up in the endgame.

25	<b></b> g3	≗e4
26	<b>E</b> fg1	g6
27	Hfi	⊈g7

27... In 1 28 In 1 2xh1 came into consideration, with the better chances.

White's attack has petered out, and he considers it best to go into a slightly inferior ending.

28	•••	₩xf6
29	<b>E</b> xf6	<b>≜xd3</b>
30	<b></b>	<b></b> Ixf7
31	<b>②xf7</b>	<b>Z</b> h1+!
32	<b>d</b> d2	♠xc2
33	<b>Ød8</b>	



33 ... **国h2+**33...全f5! 34 e4 **国h8!** was stronger, and now in the event of 35 **②b7** 全xe4
36 **②xc5 国h2+!** 37 全c3 **国c2+** Black has real winning chances (Vasyukov).

34 堂c3 堂f6 35 约b7 单f5?!

36	2xc5	<b>Ec2+</b>
37	<b>⊈</b> d4	<b></b>
38	<b>⊈</b> c3	<b> □</b> c2+
39	<b>∲</b> d4	e5+
40	<b>\$</b> d5	<b></b>
41	<b>\$</b> c4	<b></b> ⊈c2+
42	<b>⊈</b> d5	<b></b>

## 43 \$\docume{c}\$c4 g5 44 e4!


This move, restricting the bishop, saves the game, since the win of the e4 pawn by 44... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \delta \delta

44		<b>≗c8</b>
45	<b>\$</b> c3!	<b>X</b> d1
46	<b> 1 1 3 +</b>	<b>⊈g</b> 7
47	<b>∕</b> 2\d3	g4
48	<b>ℤ</b> g3	<b>∲</b> f6
49	D12!	<b>Zc1</b> +
<b>50</b>	<b>d</b> 2	<b></b> a1
51	<b>②xg4</b> +	⊈xg4
52	<b></b> Ixg4	Exa2
53	<b>\$</b> c3	<b>E</b> a4
54	<b>b4</b>	1/2-1/2

# Game 12 A.Sokolov-Karpov Belfort 1988

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>∕</b> 2)d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>4</b> 2d7
5	<b>包g5</b>	Øgf6
6	≜d3	e6
7	<b>4</b> ك1f3	<b>⊈</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>De4</b>	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>Ð</b> f6
11	₩e2	<b>b6</b>
12	<b>≜</b> .d2	<b>≜</b> b7
13	0-0-0	₩c7
14	<b>H</b> he1	0-0-0
15	<b>2</b> a6	

15 c4 is considered more promising.



15 ... \(\hat{\pmaxa6}\)
Here 15...b5 is better, hindering
White's play with c2-c4.

16	₩xa6+	<b>\$</b> b8
17	₩e2	<b>包d5</b>
18	c4	<b>②f4</b>
19	₩f1	Ø26

This retreat is forced, as 19...g5 20 g3 g4 21 \( \frac{1}{2} \)eq gxf3 22 \( \frac{1}{2} \)xf4! leads to an advantage for White.


20	g3	<b>⊈</b> e7
21	h4	h5
22	₩e2	<b>≖</b> d7
23	<u> </u>	<b>₫</b> f6
24	<b>I</b> d2	<b>Z</b> hd8
25	<b>Z</b> ed1	₩b7
26	<b>\$</b> b1	<b>\$</b> a8
27	a3	₩a6

27...b5 28 cxb5 \( \mathbb{W}\)xb5 29 \( \mathbb{W}\)e4 has its drawbacks in the form of the weak c6 pawn, but now all Black's kingside pawns are weak, and the one at h5 is virtually doomed.

28	🕰 xf6	gxf6
29	De1	₹\e7

Preparing ...b6-b5, which was not good immediately because of 30 d5.

30 ②c2 b5 31 ②b4 ₩b7



32 d5!

This breakthrough gives the game a new turn!

32 ... cxd5

White has the advantage after both 12...c5 33 dxe6 Ixd2 34 Ixd2 Ixd2 15 Ixd2 cxb4 36 exf7 Ixd2 Ixd2 Ixc2+ 38 Ixc2+ 38 Ixc2 Ixd6 39 cxb5, and 12...exd5 33 cxd5 Ixd5 34 Ixd5 xd5 35 Ixd4 (Sokolov).


33 cxb5 **\(\mathbb{L}**c8?\)

Now White wins a pawn for free, out also after 33... 20g6 34 a4 the h5 nawn causes concern.

34	₩xh5	<b>∕</b> Dg6
35	₩e2	De5
<b>36</b>	<b>b3</b>	<b>∡</b> dc7
<b>37</b>	ℤc2	<b>Exc2</b>
38	②xc2	a6
<b>39</b>	<b>2</b> )d4	axb5
<b>40</b>	2xb5	₩b6
41	a4	₩c5
42	₩d2	<b>D</b> 13
43	₩c1	₩xc1+
44	<b>E</b> xc1	<b>Z</b> d8

As shown by Sokolov, Black could have regained the pawn by 44...\(\Delta\)d2+ 45 \(\Delta\)b2 \(\Delta\)xc1 46 \(\Delta\)xc1 \(\Delta\)xb3+ 47 \(\Delta\)c2 \(\Delta\)c5, but only at the cost of allowing the h-pawn to advance – 48 h5 \(\Delta\)d7 49 h6 \(\Delta\)f8 50 \(\Delta\)d6, and the f7 pawn is lost.

45	<b>≖</b> c7	d4
46	<b></b> Ixf7	d3
47	<b>⊈c1</b>	d2+
48	<b>മ</b> 41	<b>2</b> 43



Black has done everything possible, but the pawn has been firmly blockaded, and if necessary White's rook can control it from the rear.

	49	②c7+	<b>&amp;</b> b8
	<b>50</b>	<b>②a6+</b>	<b>⊈</b> a8
	51	②c7+	<b>\$</b> b8
	52	<b>Dxe6</b>	<b> x</b> b3
	53	<b></b> #18+	<b>⊈a</b> 7
	54	<b>Zd8</b>	<b></b> ■b1+
	55	<b>⊈</b> e2	<b>≖</b> e1+
	56	<b>\$</b> xf3	d1₩+
	57	<b>xd1</b>	<b>xd1</b>
_			_

Despite winning the exchange, the ending is hopeless for Black.


58 **\$**f4 **I**f1

59	f3	<b>⊈</b> b6
60	<b>包g7</b>	<b>\$</b> c6
61	<b>Dh5</b>	<b>Ġ</b> d6
62	<b>Dxf6</b>	<b>⊈</b> e7
63	包h5	<b>⊈1</b> 7
64	g4	<b>⊈</b> g6
65	Øg3	<b>Z</b> a1
66	h5+	<b>⊈f</b> 7
67	g5	IIxa4
68	<b>∳</b> f5	<b>¤</b> a5+
69	<b>⊈g4</b>	<b>Z</b> a4+
70	f4	<b></b> □b4
71	<b>包f5</b>	<b></b> □b1
72	h6	<b></b> g1+
73	\$h5	Ξ'n
74	Ød6+	<b>\$</b> e6
75	<b>⊈</b> g6	1-0

# Game 13 **Timman-Leko** *Groningen 1996*

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>∕</b> 2)d2	dxe4
4	<b>Dxe4</b>	<b>ව</b> d7
5	<b>Ø</b> g5	Øgf6
6	ı⊈d3	e6
7	<b>D113</b>	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>De4</b>	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>Ðf6</b>
11	₩e2	<b>b6</b>
12	<b>≜</b> d2	<b>≜b</b> 7
13	0-0-0	<b>₩</b> c7
14	\$b1	<b>Zd8</b>


In recent times this move has become fashionable, as after 14...0-0-0 15 № a6 White is guaranteed a slight but enduring advantage.



## 15 Mhg1!

Deterring Black from castling kingside.

In the game Topalov-Ivanchuk (Las Palmas 1996) Black risked castling, but after 17...0-0?! 18 g4 \ddot d5 19 g5 \ddot xf3 20 gxf6 he ended up in a difficult position.



### 20 ... **≜**xh2?

Over-optimistic, but White also has he advantage after 20... 2e5 21 f4.

21 夕f5+ \$f8

22 **Xxd8**+ **Wxd8** 

23 **≝**d1 **₩**c7

24 \( \text{\text{d}} \) d4!

Now all of White's pieces join the ttack, and he is also threatening to tut off the retreat of the black bishop it h2.


#### 24 ... e5

If 24...exf5 there follows 25 2xf6 3xf6 26 Id7 We5 27 Ixb7 with the hreats of 2c4 and Wh5.

25 \( \text{\text{\$\pi}} \text{xb6}! \) \( \text{\$\pi} \text{xb6} \) \( \text{\$\pi} \text{c7} \)

27 Wc4!


After this diverting move there ollows a decisive infiltration by the ook.



27		₩Ъ8
28	<b>ℤ</b> b6	₩c8
29	<b>¤</b> xb7	₩xb7
<b>30</b>	<b>Ød6</b>	<b>₩</b> e7
31	₩c8+	<b>De8</b>
32	<b>包f5</b>	h5
33	②xe7	<b>⊈</b> xe7
34	<b>₩</b> d7+	10

## 3: 10... **營**c7


1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>②</b> g5	Øgf6
6	<b>≜d3</b>	e6
7	<b>D113</b>	<b>≜.d6</b>
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>包e4</b>	②xe4
10	₩xe4	₩c7



A fashionable move. By developing his queen at this natural post, Black prepares ...c6-c5. However, here he has to reckon with #g4.

White's main replies are 11  $\frac{1}{2}$ g4 (3.1), 11  $\frac{1}{2}$ d2 (3.2) and 11 0–0 (3.3).

3.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ③gf6 6 ②d3 e6 7 ②1f3 ②d6 8 ₩e2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ₩xe4 ₩c7)



The most critical move. By attacking the g7 pawn, White prevents Black from castling, but at the same time his queen is insecurely placed.

## 11 ... **⊈**f8

11...g5?! is a risky alternative: 12 ₩h3! **\( \mathbb{Z}**g8 13 **\( \Delta\)**d2!, and now:


- (a) 13...\$\frac{6}{2}!\$ 14 \$\overline{\infty}\$e4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g7 (after 14...f5?! both 15 0-0 and 15 \$\overline{\infty}\$h5+favour White) 15 0-0! \$\overline{\infty}\$xd4 16 \$\overline{\infty}\$e3!, and the weakening of Black's kingside causes him problems (Kasparov-Kamsky, Linares 1994) Game 14:
- (b) 13...g4!? (the immediate 13...c5!? is also possible) 14 We3 (14 Wxh6 \( \text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{

Here the topical continuations are 13 **Ze1** (3.11) and 13 c3 (3.12).

After 13 b3 e5 Black gains good counterplay (Gelfand-Speelman, Munich 1992) – Game 15.

3.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②gf6 6 ②d3 e6 7 ②1f3 ②d6 8 ¥e2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ¥xe4 ¥c7 11 ¥g4 \$f8 12 0-0 c5)

### 13 **H**e1



White intensifies the piece pressure n the centre.

13 ... b6

Removing the central pawn tension avours White: 13...c4 14 \( \) f1 b5 15 14 b4 16 b3! c3 17 \( \) e5 \( \) xe5 18 1xe5 \( \) e7 19 \( \) e3 \( \) b7 20 \( \) ad1 g6 11 h4 h5 22 \( \) f4 \( \) g7 23 \( \) d6! with a lecisive invasion by the rook (De irmian-Gulko, USA Ch 1994).

14 b3

If 14 ②e5?! Black sacrifices the exchange: 14...cxd4! 15 ¥f3 (15 \( \Delta 6 + fxg6 \) 16 ¥f3+ ②f6 17 ¥xa8 \(\textit{\textit{exh2} + 18 \textit{\textit{eh1}} \textit{\textit{ehf}} \textit{\texti


14 ... ②f6 15 ₩h4 ②b7 16 Øe5

> 16 ... cxd4 17 \wxd4 \wc5

The chances are equal (Leko-Adams, Dortmund 1996).

3.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2g5 2gf6 6 2d3 e6 7 21f3 2d6 8 We2 h6 9 2e4 2xe4 10 Wxe4 Wc7 11 Wg4 \$18 12 0-0 c5)

## 13 c3



Since Black's plans include the fianchetto of his light-square bishop, White intends to exchange it, for which he reinforces his centre.

13 ... b6 14 Wh4 &b7 15 &e4 &xe4 Or 15... e7 16 &g5!?±.

16 \wxe4 \wx

It is important to intensify the pressure in the centre.

The alternatives are more passive:

17 h3 \$\dot{\pi}g8 18 \$\dot{\pi}d1 \$\dot{\pi}f6 19 \$\dot{\pi}c2\$ c4!= (Z.Almasi-Palac, Vienna 1996);

17 dxc5 ②xc5 18 ₩e2 �e7 19 h3 ℤhe8 20 ₩c2 (20 ②d4!?) 20...②d3!∓ (Illescas-Karpov, Dos Hermanas 1997).

17 ... **包f6** 

17...cxd4 is risky: 18 ②xd4 ②xh2+ 19 ③h1 ②f6 20 ∰f3.


This is better than  $20... \triangle xc5$  21 2 d4±.

Z.Almasi-Speelman (Erevan OL 1996) now continued 21 2d2 h5 22 2c4 2f4 23 g3 2xc1 24 2axc1 h4 25 2c5! with the initiative for White.

3.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q} \)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 \( \tilde{Q} \)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q} \)g5 \( \tilde{Q} \)g6 6 \( \tilde{Q} \)d3 e6 7 \( \tilde{Q} \)1f3 \( \tilde{Q} \)d6 8 \( \tilde{W} \)e2 h6 9 \( \tilde{Q} \)e4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 10 \( \tilde{W} \)xe4 \( \tilde{W} \)c7)

## 11 &d2

A useful developing move, preparing queenside castling.



### 11 ... c5

This is the most critical reply, but 11...b6 has also been played:

(b) 12 c4 \$\(\Delta\)b7 13 \$\cong 2 c5 14 d5 \$\(\Delta\)c5 15 dxe6 \$\(\Delta\)xd3+ 16 \$\(\overline{\text{w}}\)xd3 0-0-0 17 0-0-0 \$\(\Delta\)he8 18 \$\(\Delta\)he1 fxe6 19 \$\(\overline{\text{w}}\)g6 with the better game for White (Spangenberg-Servat, Argentine Ch 1994).

## 12 Wg4

Or 12 c3 2)f6 13 we2 0-0 14 2e5 d8 15 0-0 2d7 16 fe1 2c6 with equal chances (Wittmann-Podgaets, Moscow 1996).

12 ... \$\psi f8\$
13 0-0

13 0-0-0?! is weaker on account of 13...c4 14 \( \Delta e2 \) b5 15 \( \Delta he1 \) \( \Delta b7 \), when Black stands better (Rogic-


Arlandi, Makarska 1996).

13 **业e4** is a loss of time: 13...c4 14 全引 **型b8** 15 a4 b6 16 **业e2 全a6** 17 g3 **全b7** 18 **全g2 全d5** with equal chances (Ehlvest-Gulko, Novgorod 1995).

If 13...e5?! there follows 14 dxc5 ②xc5 15 ♠f5! with the better game for White.

15...b4 can be met by 16 ②e5.

16 Wh3




And now:

16... \$\dot\colon g8\colon 17 \text{ axb5 e5 18 \dot\colon a5!, and} \text{White gained the advantage (Tiviakov-Shabalov, Amsterdam 1996);}

16... \$\delta g7 17 axb5 e5 18 \$\delta a5 \$\delta b8 19 \$\oldows d2 \$\oldows f6 20 \$\delta c3 exd4 with a complicated game (Tiviakov).

3.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q} \)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 \( \tilde{Q} \)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q} \)g5 \( \tilde{Q} \)gf6 6 \( \tilde{Q} \)d3 e6 7 \( \tilde{Q} \)1f3 \( \tilde{Q} \)d6 8 \( \tilde{W} \)e2 h6 9 \( \tilde{Q} \)e4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 10 \( \tilde{W} \)xe4 \( \tilde{W} \)c7)

11 0-0



A new plan. White hopes to use his heavy pieces more productively.

11 ... b6

11...c5 12 ₩g4 �f8 transposes into variation 3.1.

12 **E**e1

If 12 ₩g4 Black has the good reply 12...g5 13 ₩h3 ℤg8 14 ②d2 ŵb7 15 ②c4 0-0-0! 16 c3 (16 ℤe1!?) 16...c5 17 ②xd6+ (weaker is 17 ŵe3?! ŵf4! 18 ℤfd1 ②f6!록, Topalov-Tukmakov, Tilburg 1994) 17...₩xd6 18 ŵe3 cxd4 19 cxd4 ②f6 with a double-edged game (Tukmakov).

12 ... **2**b7
13 **4**h4 c5
14 **4**g5 **4**f6

14...0—0 would also seem to be possible, since 15 ②h7 Ife8 16 ♣xh6 gxh6 17 ₩xh6 fails to 17...♠xh2+ 18 ♣h1 ♠f4.

15 dxc5 ₩xc5 16 ②e4 ②xe4 17 ②xe4 ③xe4

18 ₩xe4 0-0

If 18... **Zc8?!**, as played in Z.Almasi-Lalic, Croatia 1996, White


*10...***₩***c7* 47

could have gained an advantage by 19  $\frac{19}{94}$ !

19 2e3 wc7
The chances are equal.

# Game 14 Kasparov-Kamsky Linares 1994

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>包d2</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>ପ</b> d7
5	<b>ᡚg</b> 5	Øgf6
6	<b>≜d3</b>	<b>e</b> 6
7	<b>4</b> 1f3	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>De4</b>	<b>Dxe4</b>
10	₩xe4	₩c7
11	₩g4	



11 ... g5?!

An unjustified weakening of the position, as the World Champion subtly emphasises. Here 11... \$\pm\$f8 is better.

12 ₩h3! **Z**g8 13 ②d2!

Not 13 ₩xh6? ♠f8 14 ₩h7 ᡚf6 15 ₩h3 g4 16 ₩h4 gxf3 17 ₩xf6 fxg2 18 ℤg1 ₩xh2.

13 ... \(\textit{\Omega}\_{\textit{f8}?!}\)

Black sounds the retreat, yet 13...c5!? (or first 13...g4) was possible.

14 ②e4 **≜**g7

If 14...f5?!, then both 15 0-0 fxe4?!


16 \(\psi \text{xe6+} \psi \delta \text{8} 17 \) \(\psi \text{xg8} \) exd3 18 h4

and the simple 15 \(\psi \hat{h5+} \psi \text{e7} 16 \lefta \text{g3} \)

favour White.

If 16... 全xb2 White sacrifices the exchange: 17 c3! 全xa1 18 里xa1 里g6, and develops a strong attack after 19 里d1! f5 20 豐h5 全f7 21 全c2! fxe4 22 全xe4 全f8 23 全xg6+ 全xg6 24 豐xh6 豐e5 25 全d4 (Kasparov).

17 Zadl Øf6 18 Øxf6+ &xf6



19 ♣h7! ℤh8 20 Ψxh6 ♣e7

If 20... #e7 there is the pretty variation 21 \( \( \Delta \) c5! \( \Delta \) kh7 22 \( \Delta \) d8+! \( \W \) xd8 23 \( \W \) f8+ with a mating attack.

21	₩g7	<b></b> IIf8
22	<b>Z</b> d3	<b>≜</b> d7
23	≜xg5	≜xg5
24	₩xg5	₩d8
25	₩e5	<b>₩e</b> 7
26	<b>₩</b> e7	<b>≜c8</b>
27	₩a5	

Despite White's extra pawn, he has so need to go into an ending, as long s the black king is insecure.

27		b6
28	₩e5	<b>≜</b> a6
29	ı⊈e4	<b>Ec8</b>
<b>30</b>	c4	<b>I</b> g8
31	<b>b3</b>	<b>≜b</b> 7
32	<b></b> Ifd1	🕰a8
33	c5!	bxc5
34	<b>∡</b> d6	c4
35	bxc4	<b>c5</b>
<b>36</b>	🕰 xa8	<b></b>
37	₩xc5	<b></b> ■b8
38	g3	<b>₩b</b> 7
39	₩d4	<b>\$</b> 18
40	Wf6	1_0

## Game 15 Gelfand-Speelman Munich 1992

1	e4	c6
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>Ød2</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> 2d7
5	<b>Dg</b> 5	Øgf6
6	<b>≜d3</b>	e6
7	<b>4113</b>	<b>≜</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	<b>De4</b>	②xe4
10	₩xe4	<b>₩</b> c7
11	₩g4	81 <b>*</b>
	_	

12 0-0 c5 13 b3

Here 13 Ze1 is more energetic.

13 ... e5


After 13...cxd4 14 wxd4 De5 15 bb2 Dxf3+ 16 gxf3 xh2+ 17 wg2 the destruction of White's kingside is more than compensated for by his initiative (Speelman).

## 14 dxc5

14 c3 cxd4 15 cxd4 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)c3 16 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)h4! is possible.

14 ... 2xc5
15 2f5 h5

15... ♠xf5 16 ₩xf5 e4 17 ②h4 ♣g8= is safer. 16 ₩h3 ②e6




## 17 Wh4

A loss of time, leading to a simplification of the position. More active was 17 單d1! 单e7 18 豐g3! 单f6 19 单a3+ 单g8 20 单d6 分f4 21 争h1 with the better chances for White (Speelman).

1 <b>7</b>	• • •	<b>≜</b> e7
18	₩g3	<b>Df4</b>
10	<b>∳ vf4</b>	evf4

20	₩h3	g6
21	<b>≜</b> xc8	<b>Exc8</b>
22	c4	<b>⊈g</b> 7
23	<b>€</b> )d4	<b>⊈</b> f6
24	<b>4</b> 0b5	



24 ... **數c5**24...**數a**5 25 **I** ad1 **I** cd8 26 **I** d7 **1 I** xa2 27 **2** d6 **I** hf8 28 c5 **2** d4! 29 **2** xb7 **I** fe8! is a reliable alternative (Speelman).

25 **Z**ad1 **Zcd8** 26 ₩f3 ≝he8 27 **Zxd8** Xxd8 ₩xb7 ¤d2 28 ₩f3 29 **a**5 30 G)c3 1/2-1/2

# Game 16 Sion Castro-Karpov Leon 1993

1	64	CO
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>2</b> )d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> ]d7
5	<b></b> 2∫g5	Øgf6
6	⊈d3	e6


~6

7	<b>D113</b>	<b>⊈</b> d6
8	₩e2	h6
9	②e4	②xe4
10	₩xe4	₩c7
11	⊈d2	<b>b6</b>
~F :-		

49

11...c5 is more energetic.

12	₩g4	g5!
13	₩h3	<b> ■</b> g8!



'À la Kamsky' in a superior version! Now over the course of several moves the capture of the h6 pawn allows Black to develop an enduring initiative, e.g. 14 wxh6 2f8 15 wh7 \$\infty\$)f6!

14 g4 **k**b7 15 0-0-0

And here 15 wxh6 is dangerous in view of 15...c5 16 2xg5 xg5! 17 xg5 xh1 18 0-0-0 c4 with a clear advantage to Black (Karpov).

15 ... 0-0-0 16 **\( \) he1** \( \) \( \) f4 17 \( \) b1


Once again 17 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\) xh6 \(\mathbb{\text{x}}\) xd2 + 18 \(\mathbb{\text{x}}\) xd2 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\) f4 19 \(\mathbb{\text{z}}\) e4 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\) f6! 20 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\) h3 c5 gives Black the initiative (Karpov).

17 ... Ih8

## 18 &c3?!

It was time for White to think of implifying: 18 ≜xf4 ₩xf4 19 ₩g3 ¥xg3 20 hxg3 c5∓.

18 ... **\$**b8 19 d5




Initiating a series of moves typical

of a game between an amateur and a professional.

19		cxd5!
20	<b>≜</b> xh8	<b> Xxh8</b>
21	<b>Ød4</b>	a6
22	②xe6	fxe6
23	<b>E</b> xe6	<b>වe5!</b>
24	<u> </u>	<b>Dc4</b>
25	<b>E</b> xh6	<b></b> xh6
26	₩xh6	₩e5
27	<b>₩f8</b> +	🕸a7
28	₩b4	<b>ن</b> اd2+!
29	🕸a1	₩e2
30	<b></b> g1	₩xf2
31	<b>Z</b> d1	₩e2
32	<b></b> g1	₩xh2
33	Äd1	₩e2
34	<b>X</b> h1	a5
35	₩c3	<b>d4</b>
	0-1	

## 4: 5...4 df6

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>⊉</b> g5	<b>Ddf6</b>



This move is an attempt to refute 5 \$\overline{2}\$g5. With his unusual knight move Black tries to release his bishop to take up an active position.


As in the main variations, White's basic plans involve 6 2d3 (4.1), 6 2c4 (4.2) and 6 21f3 (4.3).

## 6 ≜d3

With this move White does not prevent the active development of the black bishop.

**6...h6** would appear to be possible, although it has hardly been studied: 7

②xf7!? (the critical reply, since if 7 ⑤5f3 Black simplifies the position by 7...②f5! 8 ②e5 ②xd3 9 Wxd3 e6 or 9...Wd5 followed by ...②d7) 7...③xf7 8 ②f3. Shirazi-Burger (Saint John 1988) continued 8...g5 9 h4 g4 10 ②e5+ ⑤g7 11 c3 h5? (11...②e6 was essential) 12 Wd2 ②h7 13 ②xh7 □xh7 14 Wg5+ ⑤h8 15 ②g6+ ⑥g7 16 ②xe7+1-0.



## 7 ᡚ1f3 **L**h5

A practically forced loss of tempo, since if 7...e6 (7...h6? loses to 8 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)xf7! \( \tilde{\Delta}\)xf3 9 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)g6!) 8 h3 (here 8 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)xf7? does not work because of 8...\( \tilde{\Delta}\)xf3 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)d6 10 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)c7 11 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)e2 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)f4 12 \( \tilde{\Delta}\)xf4 \( \tilde{\De

#### 8 c3

Weaker is 8 h3? h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4

10 ≜xe4 ②f6 11 ≜d3 ≜xf3 12 ₩xf3 ₩xd4, when White loses a pawn.

8 ... e6

Also interesting is 8... C7 9 C2 h6 10 De6 (10 De4 Dxf3 11 gxf3 Dd5=) 10... d6 11 Dxf8 Dxf3 12 Dg6! Dxg2 13 Jg1 Wxh2 14 Jxg2 xg2 15 Dxh8 Wh1+, and here, instead of 16 Df1? We4+! with advantage to Black (Riemersma-Van der Wiel, Dutch Ch 1987), 16 Dd2 Jf3 17 Wb3 maintains equality.

9 ₩b3 ₩c7

9...h6 can be met by 10 ₩xb7 hxg5 11 ₩xc6+ 2\d7 12 2\e5 \(\mathbb{L}c8\) 13 ₩a4 with the threats of 14 \(\mathbb{L}b5\) and 14 \(\mathbb{L}xg5\).

Weaker is 11 ②c4 ♣e7 (11...♠xh2? 12 ℤxh2!±) 12 ②e5 ②d7 13 ②xd7 灃xd7 14 0-0 ②f6 15 ℤe1 ℤd8 with equal chances (Van der Wiel-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

11 ... **②e7** 

11... **2d5?!** 12 **2**g3 f6 13 **2**c4! favours White.

12 **≜**g3 0-0

The chances are equal (Van der Wiel).


4.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q}\)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q}\)xe4 \( \tilde{Q}\)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q}\)g5 \( \tilde{Q}\)df6)

6 \( \hat{\omega} \)c4

This move forces Black to block the a2-g8 diagonal.

6 ... e6

Other ways of defending f7 lead to difficulties:



6... 2d5 7 21f3 g6 8 0-0 2g7 9 Le1 h6 10 2e4 2g4 11 a4 (or 11 c3 2gf6 12 2c5 with the initiative for White, Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez, Sochi 1988 – Game 17) 11... 2gf6 12 2xf6+2xf6 13 La3 2xf3 15 Lxf3 2g7 16 c3 2d7 17 2d3, and White's two bishops give him a slight advantage (Spassky-Karpov, Belfort 1988).

6... 2h6 7 c3 \$\mathbb{C}\$ c7 8 2\lf3 \text{2g4} 9 \$\mathbb{D}\$ b3 e6 10 2\text{e5} \text{2d6} 11 2\text{xg4} \$\text{2hxg4}\$ 12 h3 2\text{h6} 13 2\text{xe6}!? 0-0 (after 13...fxe6 14 2\text{xe6} \mathbb{W}\$e7 15 2\text{xh6} gxh6 16 0-0-0 the threat of 17 2\text{he1} puts the black king in danger) 14 2\text{2c4} 2\text{fe8} + 15 2\text{ef1} and White is a pawn up (Benjamin-A.Fernandes, New York 1993).

7 21f3

Also possible is 7 ②e2 c5 (or 7...\$\,\text{\text{\text{c}}}66 \, 8 \, 0\text{-0} \, \text{h6} \, 9 \,\text{\text{\text{c}}}\, 3 \,\text{\text{\text{w}}}\, c7 \, 10 \,\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}\, 3 \,\text{\text{c}}\, 0\text{-0} \, \text{h6} \, 9 \,\text{\text{\text{c}}}\, 13 \,\text{\text{a6}} \, 12 \,\text{\text{w}}\, c2 \,\text{\text{\text{c}}}\, c7 \,\text{with a complicated game (De Firmian-Karpov, Biel 1990) - \, \text{Game 18}.

7 ... h6

#### 8 **名h3**


8 ②xf7 would appear to be insufficient for an advantage: 8...\$xf7 9 ②e5+ \$\div e8\$ 10 \$\div d3\$ ②e7 11 0-0 \$\div f5\$ 12 c3 \$\div d6\$ 13 ②g6 \$\div d7\$ 14 \$\div xh8\$ \$\div xh8\$ with equal chances (Sherzer-Hill, Mamaia 1991).

8 ... 单d6 9 **Ψe2 ②e7** 10 单d2

Hübner-Karpov (Belfort 1988) now continued 10... \$\mathbb{W}\$c7 11 0-0-0 b5 12 \$\alpha\$d3 a6 13 \$\mathbb{Z}\$he1 \$\alpha\$b7 14 g3 c5 15 dxc5 \$\mathbb{W}\$xc5, and here White could have retained somewhat the better chances by 16 \$\alpha\$f4!?.

4.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②g5 ②df6)

## 6 包1的



With this natural move White prevents 6...h6? in view of 7 ፟ ∆xf7!

\$\preceq\$xf7 8 \Qe5+ \$\preceq\$e6 (8...\$\preceq\$e8 9 \preceq\$d3±)
9 \preceq\$c4+ \Qd5 10 \preceq\$g4+.

6 ... e6

Other possibilities must also be considered:

6... № h6 7 c3 g6 8 \( \) c4 \( \) g7 9 0-0
0-0 10 \( \) le1 \( \) lf5 11 \( \) le5 \( \) d5 12
\( \) lgf3 \( \) c7 13 \( \) ls 6?! (13... ls \( \) ls 14
c4 \( \) lf6 15 g4 \( \) le7 16 \( \) lf4 \( \) ls 17
\( \) lc1! with a spatial advantage for White (Smirin-Smyslov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) - Game 19.

6... \( \) \

### 7 De5

In A.Sokolov-Spraggett (match (8), Saint John 1988) White played 7 **增d3** 全d6 8 户e5 户h6?! 9 全d2 a5 and here after 10 户e4! 户xe4 11 **增**xe4 户f5 12 0—0—0 he could have gained the advantage. However, even after 8...全xe5 9 dxe5 **增**a5+ 10 全d1! **增**xe5 11 **增**d8+! he can transpose into a superior ending.

7 ... \( \Delta\)h6 \( \mathbb{k}\)d6 \( \mathbb{k}\)d6

Or 8... wxd4 9 ②gxf7 ②xf7 10 ②xf7 ②b4+! 11 c3 If8 (11... ②xc3+ 12 bxc3 wxc3+ 13 ②d2 wxd3 14 ③xh8 we4+ 15 we2±) 12 0-0 wd5 13 cxb4 Ixf7 14 we2 and White's chances are better (Nunn).

Also good is 10 ②gf3 ②f5 11 We2 ②e7 12 ②g5 ②xe5 13 dxe5 ②d7 14 f4 ②c5 15 ②c2 h6 16 Wh5 with an attacking position (Watson-Pedersen, Herning 1991).

10 ... c5

Or **10...0–0** 11 **2** gf3 **2** f5 12 g4 **2** e7 13 h4 with an attack.

11 **≜**b5+ **\$**e7

**11... 2d7?** loses by force to 12 ②xd7 ②xd7 13 dxc5 **2**xc5 14 ②xe6!

12 0-0

White has the better chances (Nunn-Tal, Brussels 1988) – Game 20.

# Game 17 **Psakhis-Am.Rodriguez**Sochi 1988


1 e4 **c6** 2 d4d53 **€**)d2 dxe4 4 Øxe4 Ø\d7 5 ②g5 2)df6 **\$**c4 9)d5

6...e6 is sounder and more natural.

**4)1f3 g6** 0 - 0≜g7 8 9 **¤**e1 h6 10 De4 ₫g4 11 **c3** 2)gf6 12 9)c5! ₩c7 13 h3 **≜xf3?!** 

A few moves later Black comes to regret this exchange. Stronger was 13...\$\delta\$ f5 14 \$\overline{\Omega}\$e5\$\ddots\$.

14 ₩xf3 0-0 15 ♠b3 b6 16 ᡚd3 b5 17 a4 a6




18 **≜**f4!

A highly concrete move, based on the weakening of the a2-g8 diagonal, and in particular the g6 square.

Against 19...e6 Psakhis had prepared a whole cascade of sacrifices: 20 罩xe6! fxe6 21 毫xe6+! 堂h7 22 ②xg6! 罩fe8 23 豐f5 罩xe6 24 ②e5+ 堂h8 25 豐xe6. But this theme is not yet exhausted.

20 axb5 cxb5



21 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$} \)

5....€\df6 55

## 22 ②xg6! **Id8**If 22... \$\preceq\$xg6 there follows 23

₩d3+ \$g5 24 **Z**e5+.

## 23 **X**xa6 **№**g8

The knight is still taboo in view of a mating attack: 23...\$\text{\$\text{\$\pi}\$} 24 \$\text{\$\pi\$} e4+!\$\$\$ \$\pi\$ 25 h4+ \$\pi\$ h5 26 \$\text{\$\pi}\$ f5+ \$\pi\$ xh4 27 g3+.


Ø)e5 IIff8 24 25 9)c6 9)d5 ₩e2 26 ¤d6 ₩xb5 27 ¤c8 28 9)e5 **ℤb8** ₩a4 29 Exb2 30 **¤**xd6 ₩xd6 31 €)c4 1-0

## Game 18 De Firmian-Karpov Biel 1990

1 e4 **c6** 2 d4d53 **Ød2** dxe4 4 ②xe4 4)d7 5 ②g5 **4**2df6 6 ı⊈c4 **e6** 7 Ø)e2 **c5** 8 0-0 h6 9 9)f3 **a6** 10 **a4** cxd4 11 ②exd4 **≜**d6 ₩e2 12 **9**کe7 13 2)e5 ₩c7 14 **Ddf3** 0-0 15 b<sub>3</sub>

15 ♣f4 can be met by 15... Ded5 16 ♣g3 b6 17 ♣ad1 ♠b7. A similar manoeuvre is also possible after 15 a5 -15... Ded5 16 c3 b5.

15	• • •	<b>b6</b>
16	<b>≜</b> .b2	<b>≜</b> b7
17	<b>¤</b> ad1	Øed5
10	<b>177.4</b>	



18 ... b5!

The position is ripe for active measures. With this pawn sacrifice Karpov aims to take the initiative: 19 axb5 axb5 20 \( \text{\text{\text{\$axb5\$}}} \) \( \text{\text{\$axb5\$}} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$axb5\$}} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$axb5\$}} \) \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$axb5\$}}} \) \( \text{\$\text

**∳** vd5

	-Au	
20	2)g4	<b>⊈e</b> 7
21	<b>Dfe5</b>	₩b7
22	<b>②xf6+</b>	<b>≜</b> xf6
23	<b></b> g4	<b>\$</b> h8
24	c4	bxc4
25	⁄2)d7?	

**∳** xd5

An unjustified loss of time. 25 bxc4 \( \alpha \)c6 26 a5 was essential.


25		≜xb2
26	₩xb2	<b>I</b> g8
27	<b>∐</b> h4	<b>⊈h7</b>
28	<b>એe5</b>	cxb3
29	<b>≖</b> e1	<b>Z</b> ac8
30	₩d2	f5
31	g4	g5
32	<b>≖</b> h3	Ic2
	0–1	

Game 19
Smirin-Smyslov
55th USSR Ch 1988

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>包d2</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>⊘d7</b>
5	<b>4</b> 0g5	Ødf6
6	<b>DI</b> 13	<b>એh6</b>

Here 6...e6 is considered the main continuation, but in his later years smyslov does not think it advisable to engage in theoretical discussions with young players, and prefers paths that are little-explored.

7	c3	g6
8	⊈c4	⊈g7
9	0-0	0-0
10	<b>≖</b> e1	<b>包f5</b>
11	②e5	<b>4</b> 2d5
12	<b>Dgf</b> 3	<b>₩c7</b>
13	<b>≙</b> b3	e6?!



Illogical. Black should have thought about developing his second bishop by 13...b6. Now White gains a great spatial advantage by force.


14	c4	<b>Df6</b>
15	g4	<b>De7</b>
16	<u>≗</u> f4	₩a5

16... ₩d8 was more circumspect.

17 **Zc1!** b5?!
And here 17...c5 was more natural.
18 2d2 **Wd8** 

18	ı⊈d2	<b>₩</b> d8
19	<b>≜</b> b4	bxc4
20	♠xc4	a5
21	<u> </u>	





Black underestimates the threats posed by the white bishops on adjacent diagonals. It is true that he was unable to block one of them by 21... 2fd5 on account of 22 2xd5 cxd5 23 2c6 2xc6 24 2xf8, when he has no compensation for the exchange, but with the 'ugly' 21... 2d7 he could have held on.

5...42df6 57

22	<b>②xf7!</b>	<b>E</b> xf7
23	<b>≜</b> xe6	Ded5
24	<b>De5</b>	<b>Z</b> aa7
25	<b>X</b> xc6	

The simple 25 ②xc6 was also good enough to win.

25		4)f4
26	<b>X</b> xa6	<b>E</b> xa6
27	<b>≜xf7</b> +	<b>⋭</b> h8
28	Wf3	1_0

Game 20
Nunn-Tal
Brussels 1988

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	<b>d5</b>
3	<b>包d2</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> 2d7
5	<b>Dg</b> 5	Ødf6
6	<b>D113</b>	<b>e6</b>
7	<b>包e5</b>	<b>⊘h6</b>
8	<b>⊈d</b> 3	⊈d6
9	c3	₩c7
10	₩e2	<b>c5</b>
11	<b>∲</b> h5+	фе7

As mentioned in the analysis, 11... 2d7? loses to 12 2xd7 2xd7 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 2xe6!


12 0-0 cxd4?! 12...a6 13 2d3 b6 14 f4± would have been better.

13 cxd4 ②f5 14 &e3! ②xe3 15 fxe3?

White has a spatial advantage and

the more active pieces, but with this one move he makes the position obscure. As shown by Nunn, he should have activated his queen: 15 wxe3 dd5 16 wg3 f6 17 de4! wg8 18 wh4 exe5 19 dxe5 wxe5 20 wxh7.

15		≜xe5
16	dxe5	₩xe5
17	₩d3	



## 17 ... ₩xg5?


Suicidal, whereas after 17...a6! 18 Wa3+ Wd6 19 Wxd6+ &xd6 20 Axf7+ &e7 21 Axh8 axb5 22 g4 Ad7 23 g5 Xxh8 24 gxf6+ gxf6 Black had the chance to go into a sound enough ending (Nunn). But 'on the way' he could also have considered 22...g5!? 23 h4 Xa4, not losing hope of winning the errant knight.

18	₩a3+	₩d8
19	<b>¤</b> ad1+	⊈d7
20	<b>∳</b> √47	1_0

## 'ART II: 5 &c4

## 5... ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ₩e2 ②b6)

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>⊘d7</b>
5	<b>₫ c4</b>	



An active development of this ishop, by which White retains a hoice of deploying it on the a2-g8 nd b1-h7 diagonals.


5 ... **Dgf6** 

5... 2df6 transposes after 6 2g5 to a variation examined in the revious chapter.

6 **Dg5** 

The main continuation. Black annot get by without playing ... \Db6, hich removes his control of e5, and, 1 contrast to the variations examined 1 Chapters 1-4, the white knight aims 3 occupy this square, where it will be upported by the other knight.

But the modest exchange 6 2xf6+ 2xf6 is also not so harmless. Now the developing 7 2f3 leads to positions examined in Chapter 9 after 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2xf6+ 2xf6 7 2c4. Of independent significance is 7 c3, a continuation with which it is useful to be familiar.



(a) 7...\#c7, and now:

(a1) 8 h3 \$\(\text{2f5}\) 9 \$\(\text{2f3}\) e6 10 0-0 \$\(\text{2d6}\) 11 \$\(\text{2e1}\) h6 12 \$\(\text{2e2}\) 0-0-0 13 a4 g5 14 \$\(\text{2e5}\) \$\(\text{2d5}\) 15 a5 f6 16 \$\(\text{2d3}\) h5, and Black's action on the kingside proved more effective than his opponent's on the other side of the board (Short-Adams, Groningen WC 1997);


(a2) 8 ₩b3 e6 9 ②f3 ûd6 10 0-0 (10 ûg5 allows Black to seize the initiative: 10...ûd7 11 0-0 ②e4! 12 ûh4 g5 13 ûg3 g4 14 ûxd6 ₩xd6 15 (a3) 8 We2 2g4 9 f3 2f5 10 g4! 2g6 11 f4 2e4 12 2f3 2d5 (or 12...e6 13 0-0 2xf3 14 Wxf3 2d6 15 a4! 2d5 16 2d2 h5 17 g5 g6 18 a5 a6 19 2d3! with a great spatial advantage for White, Kostyra-Sapis, Poland 1990) 13 Zg1 h5 14 g5 2xc4 15 Wxc4 2d5 16 2e5 and White's chances are preferable (Iruzubieta-F.Garcia, Spanish Ch 1991);

(b) 7...e6 8 **②**f3 **≜**e7 9 0−0 0−0 (here Smyslov has tried 9...b5!? 10 2d3 2b7 11 We2 0-0 12 2g5 a6 13 Øe5 Ød5 14 **Q**d2 c5 15 dxc5 **Q**xc5 with a double-edged game, Zhukovitsky-Smyslov, 37th USSR Ch 1969) 10 ₩e2 ₩c7 11 \( \mathbb{q} \)g5 (11 \( \infty \)e5 b6 12 £f4 £d6 13 £g3 £b7 14 Zad1 c5 15 dxc5 ₩xc5 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6\(\pm\) is also good. Wittmann-Danner, Graz 1991 11...c5 (weaker is 11... 2d5?! 12 ≜xe7 \ xe7 13 ②e5 ₩c7 14 ₩e4!±, Balashov-Smagin, Voronezh 1987) 12 Zad1, and here in Dimitrov-Guerra (Olot 1992), instead of 12...cxd4?! 13 \(\maxrt{\pi}\)xd4 ⊈d7 14 Øe5 with advantage to White, Black should have played 12...b6±:

(c) 7...g6 8 ②f3 ②g7 9 0-0 0-0 10 Iel (10 ②f4 ②g4 11 h3 ③xf3 12 Wxf3 ②d5 13 ②g3 b5 14 ②d3 e6 15 Ifel Wd7 16 h4 h5 17 ②e5±, Boe-Arkell, Ostende 1991) 10...②d5 11 ②g5 Ie8 12 Wd2 ②g4 13 ②e5 ②e6 14 Ah6 Wd6 15 Axg7 Axg7 16 Lad1. White's chances are preferable (J.Fernandez-Epishin, Logrono 1991).

6 ... e6

Blocking the diagonal by 6... 2d5 involves a delay in development and allows White to build up a persistent initiative: 7 21f3 h6 (7...e6?! 8 2e5 ව්xe5 9 dxe5±) 8 ව්e4 ව්7b6 9 ම්b3 (also possible is 9 ad3 ab4 10 ae2 £f5 11 a3 £xe4 12 axb4 e6 13 c3 åd6 14 0-0 ₩f6 15 Ød2 åf5 16 f4 0-0 17 2 f3±, Rychagov-Meduna, Manila OL 1992) 9.... 15 10 €23 \$\frac{1}{2}h7 11 0-0 e6 12 \$\frac{1}{2}\$\text{ (Pe5 }\frac{1}{2})d7 13 f4!? (also good is 13 c4 25f6 14 2f4 2e7 15 We2 0-0 16 Wad1 We8 17 2h5 ②xh5 18 ₩xh5±, Salai-Meduna. Stary Smokovec 1992) 13... #c7 14 c4 ②5f6 15 \$\disph1 \displae7 16 \displae2 \displaexc2 17 Wxc2 h5 18 f5 with the better chances for White (Gazik-Meduna, Stary Smokovec 1992).



7 We2

White prevents his knight from being driven away (7...h6? 8 (2)xf7!) and takes control of e5.


Developing by 7 ②163 allows Black to drive back the other knight to 13, which assists his attack on the entre: 7...h6 8 ②h3 b5 9 ②e2 c5 10 10 a6 11 a4 b4 12 ②f4 ③d6 13 dxc5 14 ②d3 ②xd3 15 Wxd3 Wc7 and Black's position is preferable Schmittdiel-Podgaets, Dortmund 1993).

7 ②e2 h6 8 ②f3 has the same lrawbacks:

(b) 8...c5 9 0-0 \( \Delta \)b6 10 \( \Delta \)b5+ \( \Delta \)d7 11 a4 a6 12 \( \Delta \)xd7+ \( \Delta \)bxd7 13 \( \text{24} \) cxd4 14 \( \Delta \)cxd4 \( \Delta \)c5 with equal chances (Coupet-Spiridonov, Cannes 1992).

## 7 ... **包b6**


7... #e7?! (preparing queenside castling) was tried in the game Stein-Flohr (Ukrainian Ch 1957). After 8 dd2 b6 9 0-0-0 db7 10 d1f3 h6 (if 10...0-0-0 11 de5 with a strong initiative), instead of 11 db4!? c5! with great complications, White could have retained a positional advantage by 11 de4.



Now White's main replies are 8 **2d3** (Chapters 5 and 6) and 8 **2b3** (Chapters 7 and 8).

## 5: 8 &d3 h6 9 4 5f3 c5 10 dxc5 &xc5

_		_
1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>Dg5</b>	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	<b>�b6</b>
8	<b>≜d3</b>	



This bishop retreat has a tactical basis: 8... wxd4? 9 21f3 wd5 10 2e5! wxg2 11 If 2e7 12 2ef3 wg4 13 2xf7 with a dangerous attack for White (Arnason-Helmers, Reykjavik 1982).

#### 8 ... h6

It is best to drive away the active knight as soon as possible. Risky is 8...c5?! 9 dxc5 &xc5 10 21f3 h6 (or 10...\$c7 11 2e5 0-0 12 &f4 &b4+13 &f1 2bd5 14 &g3 &d6 15 c4 2b4 16 2g4±, Kupreichik-Tamme, Parnu 1975) 11 2e4 2xe4 12 \$xe4\$ d5 13 \$ye4 g6 14 0-0 2d7 15 \$\frac{1}{2}d1\$

②f6 16 Wh4 Le7 17 Lg5 ②g8 18 Lxe7 ②xe7 19 Wf6 Lf8 20 ②e5 Wc5 21 ②xg6 ②d5 22 Lb5+ 1-0 (Rublevsky-Tataev, Azov 1991).

### 9 45f3 c5

9...\$\&\delta \text{7} 10 \$\alpha \d2 \$\alpha \text{bd5} 11 0-0-0\$\$\$\$\$\dot{\text{Dd7}} is passive. However, if White tries to force matters by 12 \$\alpha \text{c5}\$, then after 12...\$\alpha \text{xc5} 13 dxe5 \$\boxdot{\text{wc7}} c7 14 f4 \$\alpha \text{d7} 15 \$\alpha \text{f3} 0-0-0 16 a3 c5 17 c4 \$\alpha \text{b6} 18 \$\alpha \text{a5} \$\alpha \text{a4}\$ Black equalises (Kupreichik-Smyslov, Moscow 1972). More subtle is 12 a3!, and after 13 c4 White gains an enduring advantage.

### 10 dxc5

The main continuation.

The attempt to defend the pawn by 10 \( \tilde{a}e3 \) allows Black to exchange this bishop: 10...a6 11 c3 \( \tilde{a}\) bd5 12 \( \tilde{a}e5 \) \( \tilde{a}c7 \) (or 12...cxd4 13 \( \tilde{a}xd4 \) \( \tilde{a}f4 \) 14 \( \tilde{a}f3 \) \( \tilde{a}xd3 + 15 \) \( \tilde{a}xd3 \) b5?! 16 \( \tilde{a}e2 \) \( \tilde{a}b7 \) 17 \( \tilde{a}f4\) + Hellers-Rogers, Malme 1993; 15...\( \tilde{a}d6 \) 16 \( \tilde{a}gf3\) \( \tilde{a} \) was essential) 13 \( \tilde{a}gf3 \) b6 14 0-0 \( \tilde{a}d6 \) 15 \( \tilde{a}ac1 \), and here in Hellers-Adorjan (Thessaloniki OL 1988) Black could have maintained the balance by 15...\( \tilde{a}xe3 \)! 16 fxe3 \( \tilde{a}b7 \) 17 e4 0-0. Therefore 15 \( \tilde{a}d2!\) \( \tilde{a} \) would have been more accurate.

After 10 \$\(\textit{2}\)f4 the bishop again comes under attack by the knight: 10...\$\(\textit{2}\)bd5 (if 10...cxd4?! 11 0-0-0 \$\dotsin d5 12 \$\dotsin b1 \dotsin d7 13 \$\dotsin b2 \dots \dotsin d6 14 \$\dotsin gf3\$ White has a dangerous initiative) 11 \$\dotsin b2 5 cxd4 12 0-0-0 \$\dotsin a5\$

10 ... **≜**xc5

The other main continuation 10... ②bd7 is examined in Chapter 6.

#### 11 De5


White puts into effect the main idea of the ②g5 move. After 12 ②gf3 and kingside castling, in a quiet position he will be able to count on an enduring initiative, based on the pressure of the knight at e5.

- If 11 \(\text{\Delta}\)d2, planning queenside castling, White has to reckon with counterplay on that side of the board:
- (a) 11...0-0 12 0-0-0 ②a4!, with the idea of 13 鱼xh6 Wb6 14 We5 Wxb2+, while after 13 鱼b5 鱼d7 14 鱼xd7 Wxd7 (Kir.Georgiev-Adams, Groningen 1993) Black's chances are preferable, since 15 鱼xh6 Wc6 16 鱼e3 Wb6 17 c3 鱼xe3+ 18 fxe3 里ac8 rebounds on White:
- (b) 11... \$\mathbb{E}\$c7 12 0-0-0 0-0 13 \$\overline{Q}\$e5 \$\overline{Q}\$d7 (the slow 13... \$\overline{Q}\$bd7 14 f4 b6 15 \$\overline{Q}\$gf3 \$\overline{Q}\$b7 16 \$\overline{E}\$he1 \$\overline{Q}\$d6 17 \$\overline{Q}\$d4! a6 18 \$\overline{Q}\$b3 \$\overline{Q}\$d5 19 \$\overline{Q}\$b1 a5 20 g4 allows White to get his attack in first, Oratovsky-Fridman, Israel 1993) 14 \$\overline{Q}\$gf3 \$\overline{E}\$fc8 15 g4 \$\overline{Q}\$e7 16 g5 hxg5 17 \$\overline{Q}\$xg5 \$\overline{Q}\$b5 18 \$\overline{Q}\$fd7 \$\overline{Q}\$xd3 19 \$\overline{E}\$xd3 \$\overline{Q}\$fd5 20 \$\overline{E}\$f3 \$\overline{Q}\$xf4 0-1 (A.Ivanov-Karpov, Moscow 1992).

11 ... 包bd7 12 包gf3 Black's main replies are 12... c7 (5.1) and 12...  $\triangle$  xe5 (5.2).

5.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 &c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ₩e2 ②b6 8 &d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 &xc5 11 ②e5 ②bd7 12 ②gf3)


12 ... ₩c7



Black fights for control of e5.

Here White's main plans are associated with 13 0–0 (5.11) and 13  $ilde{L}$ f4 (5.12), since the attack on his central knight prevents the plan with queenside castling: 13  $ilde{L}$ d2?  $ilde{L}$ xe5  $ilde{L}$ xe5  $ilde{L}$ xe5  $ilde{L}$ xe5  $ilde{L}$ xe5  $ilde{L}$ d4, and White loses a pawn (Suetin-Kholmov, Budapest 1976).

5.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 We2 ②b6 8 ②d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 ②xc5 11 ②e5 ②bd7 12 ②gf3 Wc7)



13 ... 0-0

It is important not to overdo the pressure on e5, since after 13...\$\textit{2}\textit{d6?}!\$

14 \$\times\_{0}\$c4 \$\times\_{0}\$e7 15 \$\times\_{0}\$d4! Black may not manage to castle, as 15...0—0 is met by the unpleasant 16 \$\times\_{0}\$f5! At the same time \$\times\_{0}\$b5 is threatened, and if 15...46 there follows 16 \$\times\_{0}\$xe6! (this is where the weakening move ...h7-h6 tells), while after 15...\$\times\_{0}\$c5 16 \$\times\_{0}\$b5 \$\times\_{0}\$b8 17 \$\times\_{0}\$d1 White's pressure is too great (Gufeld-Bagirov, Tallinn 1981) — Game 21.

## 14 **T**e1

White strengthens his control over e5. In the event of 14 \$\(\textit{2}\)f4 \$\(\textit{d}\)d6 it is easier for Black to attack the knight, e.g. 15 h3 \$\(\textit{2}\)xe5 16 \$\(\textit{2}\)xe5 \$\(\textit{2}\)d7! (weaker is 17...\$\(\textit{2}\)d8?! 18 \$\(\textit{2}\)ae1 \$\(\textit{w}\)e7 19 f4±, Martin-Ledger, British Ch 1992) 18 f4 \$\(\textit{w}\)b6+ 19 \$\(\textit{2}\)h2 \$\(\textit{w}\)xb2, although after 20 \$\(\textit{2}\)ad1 White has compensation for the pawn (Martin).

Also insufficient for an advantage is 14 \( \text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\xrighta}\$}}}\$} \exittender{\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

Ifd8 17 ②e5 ♠b5! with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (7), Linares 1987).

#### 14 ... **≜**d6

Exchanging a pair of knights does not ease Black's problems: 14... 2xe5 15 2xe5 16 264 b6 17 23 266 18 161 267 19 c3 1628 20 261 265 21 164 2c5 22 294 167 23 2xf6+ 164 24 2c5 with advantage to White, who controls the important central squares (Sznapik-Spiridonov, Polanica Zdroj 1982).

After 14...b6 15 2 xd7:

- (a) 15...\( \times \text{xd7} \) 16 \( \times \text{e4} \) \( \times \text{f6} \) 17 \( \times \text{xa8} \) (or 17 \( \times \text{h4} \) 17...\( \times \text{b7} \) 18 \( \times \text{xa7} \) \( \times \text{a8} \) 19 \( \times \text{xa8} + \text{ with advantage to } \) White;
- (b) 15...\(\text{2}\)xd7 16 \(\text{D}\)e5 \(\text{\text{\text{c6}}}\) (if 16...\(\text{\text{\text{Lfd8}}}\) 17 \(\text{\text{\text{L}}}\)xc6 (17 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{Lfd8}}}}\) 17 \(\text{\text{\text{L}}}\)xc6 (17 \(\text{\text{\text{Lfd8}}}\) 18 \(\text{\text{\text{Lg3}}}\) \(\text{\text{\text{Ld4}}}\) 20 \(\text{c3\pm}\) also comes into consideration) 17...\(\text{\text{\text{Lxc6}}}\) 18 \(\text{\text{Lf4}}\) and White retains the initiative (Ivanchuk-Karpov, Reykjavik 1991) Game 22.

## 15 Dc4

15 \$\oldsymbol{\text{15}}\$ f4 can be met by 15...\$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ xe5 (15...\$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ h5!? 16 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ d2 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ c5 17 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ c4 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ f6! also comes into consideration) 16 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ xe5 b6 17 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ f3 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ b7 18 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ h3 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ fd8 19 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ ad1 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ e4 20 \$\oldsymbol{\text{2}}\$ xe4 with equal chances (Barlov-Radulov, Belgrade 1982).


15 ... ≜e7 16 ∮)ce5

Or **16 Ad4 Ac5** with equal chances (Minasian-Vyzhmanavin, Debrecen 1992) – *Game 23*.

Izeta-Karpov (Dos Hermanas 1993) now continued 16... ②c5 17 ♠c4 a6 18 a3 b5 19 \( \text{\text{a2}} \) \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a3}}}}}} \) \( \text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\texi{\text{\texit{\tet{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\ti}}\tint{\tex

5.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q} \)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 \( \tilde{Q} \)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q} \)c4 \( \tilde{Q} \)gf6 6 \( \tilde{Q} \)g5 e6 7 \( \tilde{W} \)e2 \( \tilde{Q} \)b6 8 \( \tilde{Q} \)d3 h6 9 \( \tilde{Q} \)5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \( \tilde{Q} \)xc5 11 \( \tilde{Q} \)e5 \( \tilde{Q} \)bd7 12 \( \tilde{Q} \)gf3 \( \tilde{W} \)c7)

## 13 **å**f4



This practically forces Black to exchange his dark-square bishop, although White achieves this at the cost of losing the right to castle.

## 13 ... **≜**b4+

#### 14 Ød2

After 14 \$\psi 1 &d6 15 &g3 0-0 16 \$\mathbb{I}\$d1 &\times 17 &\times 18 &18 &\times c4 &\times 23 19 hxg3 &d7 (in the mutual flank attacks after 19...b5?! 20 &e5 &b7 21 \$\mathbb{I}\$e1 b4 22 g4 it is White who gets there first: 22...\$\mathbb{I}\$d4 23 g5 hxg5 24 &\times 6 &\times 17 25 \$\mathbb{I}\$xh7 1-0, Popovic-Kosic, Novi Sad 1992) 20 \$\mathbb{I}\$e5 \$\mathbb{I}\$ac8 the chances are equal (Timman-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988).

The active 16... **\*\*b6** was tried in the 1993 FIDE World Championship Match, Timman-Karpov. It proved justified only after 17 ②c4?! **\*\*c5** 18 **\*\*s6 \*\*s6 \*\*s6** 

But then an improvement was found: 16... ②c5 17 \$\text{d}\$e1 ②d5 18 \$\text{d}\$g3 ②xd3+ 19 \$\text{Z}\$xd3 b5! with equal chances (game 7).

17 **≜g**3 **⊘**xe5

17... ₽7f6 can also be considered.

18 **≜xe5** 18 **₩xe5** is stronger.


18 ... ₩a5+
19 �c1 f6
20 �g3 �d7
21 c4 �b4

If 21... ■ac8 White gains the advantage by 22 \( \textit{\$\textit{\$\chi}\$} \) 6 23 b3.

The chances are equal (Topalov-Adams, Belgrade 1995).

5.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \times \) c3 dxe4 4 \( \times \) xe4 \( \times \) d7 5 \( \times \) c4 \( \times \) gf6 6 \( \times \) g5 e6 7 \( \times \) 2 \( \times \) b6 8 \( \times \) d3 h6 9 \( \times \) 5f3 c5 10 dxc5 \( \times \) xc5 11 \( \times \) e5 \( \times \) bd7 12 \( \times \) gf3)

12 .... ②xe5



The exchange of knights makes things more difficult for Black, since it allows White strong piece pressure in the centre, enhancing his attacking chances.

#### 13 ... 0-0

Here 13... C7 allows White to gain the advantage of the two bishops in an open position. This is especially appreciable in an ending, since he has the possibility of creating an outside passed pawn on the queenside: 14 \( \Delta b5+! \Delta d7 \) (if 14... \( \Delta d7 \) there follows 15 \( \Delta f4 \), not fearing 15... \( \Delta b4+ \) in view of the possible typical combination with the sacrifice of both rooks: 16 \( c3! \Delta xc3+ 17 \) bxc3 \( \Delta xc3+ 18 \) \( \Delta d2 \Delta xa1+ 19 \Delta e2 \Delta xh1 20 \Delta xd7+ and \) White wins) 15 0-0 0-0

(15... ♠xb5 16 ₩xb5+ �e7 comes into consideration) 16 ᡚxd7 ᡚxd7 17 c3 and White's chances are preferable (Blatny-Adams, Adelaide 1988) – Game 24.

### 14 \(\text{\text{\text{d}}}\)

Preparing the option of castling on both sides. If **14 0–0** Black has the good reply 14...b6!:


- (a) 15 ₩f3 ₩c7 16 ♠f4 ♠b7 17 ♠g4 ♠xf3 18 ♠xf6+ gxf6 19 ♠xc7 ♠b7 with an equal game (Hübner-Lobron, Biel 1986);
- (b) 15 Id1 We7 (also possible is 15...Wc7 16 Dg4 Dxg4 17 Wxg4 f5 with a complicated game) 16 b4 2d6 (16...2xb4? 17 Dc6 Wc5 18 Dxb4 Wxb4 19 Wf3±) 17 Db2 Db7 18 a3 Ifd8 19 c4 a5 20 b5 Iac8 and the chances are again equal (Filip).

## 14 ... ₩d5

Here both ways of castling are possible: 15 0-0-0 (5.21) and 15 0-0 (5.22), although they both involve a pawn sacrifice.

If White avoids castling with 15 f4 b5! 16 全e3 全xe3 17 數xe3 全b7 18 里g1 里fd8 19 g4 公e4 Black gains equal chances (Tarjan-Rogoff, USA 1985).

5.21 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 2e2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3 2xe5 13 2xe5 0-0 14 2d2 2d5)



15 ... **≜**d4

Or 15...b5 16 \$\disphi\$1 \$\disphi\$b7 17 f4 b4 18 a3 a5 19 axb4 axb4 20 \$\mathbb{Z}\$ad1 \$\mathbb{Z}\$ad8, and here in Mestel-Speelman (Bath 1987) White could have begun an attack with 21 \$\disphi\$e1! \$\mathbb{W}\$a2 22 \$\disphi\$h4 \$\disphi\$e7 23 f5.

## 16 **L**f4

The alternative is 16 包含 Axb2 17 里ab1 全a3 18 全c3 全e7 19 里fd1 豐c6 20 全e5 with a strong initiative for the pawn.

16 ... ≜xb2 17 ≌ab1!

This is stronger than 17 **Zad1 W**c5 18 c4 **2**d4 19 **2**b1 b6 20 **Z**d3 **2**b7 (20...**2**a6!? 21 **Z**g3 **2**c8!∓ is also good) 21 **Z**g3 **Z**ad8! 22 h3 **Z**fe8! 23 **2**c2 **2**c2 **3**c2 **3**c2 **4**c2 **4**c2 **4**c2 **5**c2 **4**c2 **b**c2 **c**c2 **c**c2

17 ... **≜**d4


17... **axe5?** is weak: 18 **axe5 d**d7 19 **ab5 ac6** 20 **axg7!** with a strong attack.

Shterengas-Sokolin (USSR 1987) now continued 18 c4 \dots d8 19 \dots fd1

₩e7 20 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}}}\$}}}}}}}} \ender{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

5.22 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 &c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ₩e2 ②b6 8 &d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 &xc5 11 ②e5 ②bd7 12 ②gf3 ②xe5 13 ②xe5 0-0 14 &d2 ₩d5)

15 0-0-0



A double-edged plan, which has hitherto been insufficiently explored by the top players.

15 ... \widetilde{\psi} xa2 16 c3 b5

In Gaprindashvili-Zaitseva (Tbilisi 1979) Black played 16... ₩a1+? 17 含c2 ₩a4+ 18 含b1 罩b8 19 含c2 ₩a6 20 ₩f3 b5 21 含xh6 b4 22 2xg7 and lost.

Also inadequate is 16... a3 17 ae3 wa1+ 18 ab1, when White's attack is more of a reality.

## 17 **L**b1!

This is stronger than 17 2xh6 2b7 (17...gxh6? loses after 18 #f3 b4 19

**2**b1 **2**0 **2**g3+ **2**h8 21 **2**d8!, Bielchik-Sabolshi, Kikinda 1983) 18 **2**d7 **2**xd7 19 **2**g4 **2**a1+ 20 **2**b1 g6 21 **2**xd7 **2**a3, and now:

(a) 22 bxa3 \(\mathbb{w}\)xc3+ 23 \(\mathbb{c}\)d1 \(\mathbb{I}\)fd8
24 \(\mathbb{I}\)d2 \(\mathbb{w}\)a1! 25 \(\mathbb{c}\)e2 \(\mathbb{w}\)e5+ 26 \(\mathbb{c}\)d1
\(\mathbb{M}\)a1, forcing a repetition of position
(Chandler-Speelman, Brighton 1984);

(b) 22 \( \textbf{\textit{L}}\)d2 - Game 25 (Adorjan-Flesch, Hungarian Ch 1975).

## 17 ... ₩a4

Including the queen in the defence in the event of 18 \(\mathbb{W}\)d3 \(\mathbb{W}\)h4! 19 h3 \(\delta\)b7 20 \(\Delta\)d7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)fd8 21 \(\Delta\)xf6+ \(\mathbb{W}\)xf6, when Black's chances are preferable (Reimann-Oll, Tallinn 1986).

If 17... \(\forall a1\) there naturally follows 18 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xh6!

18 ₩f3! ②d5

19 ₩g3 �h8

20 **Thel!** b4

20... 266? loses to 21 2xh6 gxh6 22 Id8! 2g4 23 2xf7+ 2g7 24 Ie4 1-0 (Diaz-Sieiro, Camaguey 1987).

21 **E**e4! **2**e7

Not 21... 2b7? on account of 22 2xh6 gxh6 23 \( \bar{L}\)h4.

22 **ℤ**g4 g5 Or 22... ♠ f6 23 **₩**d3!

23 h4!

White has a strong attack (Gugmundsson-Torkelsson, corr. 1992).

## Game 21 **Gufeld-Bagirov** *Tallinn 1981*

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \triangle \text{d2} \) dxe4

4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b> 2 1 g 5</b>	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	<b>�b6</b>
8	<b>≜</b> d3	h6
9	<b>2)5</b> 13	c5
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	<b>De5</b>	<b>Øbd7</b>
12	<b>Dgf3</b>	<b>₩c7</b>
13	0-0	


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13 ... **≜**d6?!

An imperceptible inaccuracy, the drawbacks of which were disclosed in this game. 13...0–0 is the main continuation.

16 **②b5 ₩b8** 

After 16... \$\mathbb{\text{W}} d8 17 \$\mathbb{\text{Id}}\$1! a knight nevertheless penetrates to d6: \$17... \$\infty\$xd3 18 \$\mathbb{\text{Ix}}\$xd5 19 \$\infty\$cd6+! \$\infty\$xd6 20 \$\mathbb{\text{Ix}}\$xd5, securing White the advantage.



The knight has triumphantly returned to e5 – White's positional advantage is obvious.

20		②xd3
21	<b>¤</b> xd3	<b>¤</b> d8
22	<b>⊈f</b> 4	₩c5
23	<b>Z</b> ad1	<b>Ød5</b>
24	War en	


Preventing 24...0-0, when there follows 25 2xh6! 2f6 26 \gs 2e8 27 \gs 3, with an attack and an extra pawn for White.

Preventing b2-b4, which was possible after 27... ②f6 28 b4! ¥d5 29 ②dc6 with advantage to White. But now he is able to make a decisive invasion at b5.

28	42b5	g5
29	c4	<b>②f4</b>
<b>30</b>	¤xd8+	≜xd8
31	≜xf4	gxf4
32	₩d3	Àb6
33	Ød6+	1-0

## Game 22 Ivanchuk-Karpov Reykjavik 1991

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Дс3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>②g5</b>	e6
7	₩e2	<b>D</b> b6
8	<b>≜d3</b>	h6
9	<b>2</b> 5f3	<b>c5</b>
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	<b>De5</b>	Dbd7
12	<b>Dgf3</b>	<b>₩c</b> 7
13	0-0	0-0
14	<b></b> Ee1	



14.	<b>≜</b> d6	is more a	ctive.
	15	②xd7	😩xd7
	16	<b>De5</b>	<b>≜</b> c6
	17	<b>Dxc6</b>	₩xc6
	18	<b>≙</b> f4	<b>Z</b> ad8
			40 44


14

Black can consider 18... \$\ddots b4 19 c3 \$\ddots e7 20 \$\ddots ad1 \$\ddots a4!?\$, fighting for the d-file: 21 \$\ddots e5 \$\ddots ad8 (Karpov).

**b6** 

21... **2**e7!? 22 **2**c3 **3**d5 23 **2**c4 **3**c5 was more subtle (Karpov).

22 a3 ♠e7



### 23 Ac3


White has a classic advantage, first formulated by Steinitz — a pawn majority on the queenside and the possibility of creating there an outside passed pawn. Therefore in the spirit of the position was 23 c4! #a4 (or 23...a5 24 \( \) c3 a4 25 \( \) c2 \( \) c8 26 \( \) d4\( \) 24 \( \) c1 \( \) c8 25 \( \) f3 \( \) h8 26 \( \) afl with the idea of continuing b2-b3 and \( \) b2, when White's chances are preferable.

23 ... ₩c7 24 ♠e5 ♠d6 25 ♠c3

Insufficient is 25 \( \text{\xi}}\xi\text{\ti}}}}\text{\ti}}}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}}}\tint{\text{\tex{

25 ... \ \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}e7 26 \ \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}c4 Here too White could have tried to use his queenside pawn majority: 26 #f3!? 2d7 27 b4 2f6 28 2xf6 2xf6 29 c4.

26		₩c6
27	<b> ∡</b> d3	<b>X</b> xd3
28	.⊈xd3	<b>¤d8</b>
29	<b>≖</b> d1	<b>¤</b> d5
30	Wf3	<b>b5</b>



Black has finally managed to equalise.

31	<b>≖</b> e1	<b>₩</b> d7
32	<b>≖</b> e5	<u>\$</u> 18!
33	<b> xd5</b>	②xd5
34	₩e4	f5
35	₩d4	<b>a6</b>
36	<b>⊈</b> d2	<b>≜</b> e7!
37	₩e5	<b>⊈</b> f6
38	<b>₩b8</b> +	<b>⊈f7</b>
39	₩a8	₩d6
40	<b>b3</b>	<b>≜c3</b>


It is useful to exchange the dark-square bishops, but it was better to do this by 40...\$\dot{g}5!\$ 41 \$\delta\$xg5 hxg5, when the initiative passes to Black.

41	≜xc3	Dxc.
42	₩c8	Ød5

43	<b>b4</b>	<b>©e7</b>
44	₩b7	<b>\$</b> f6
45	្នក	1/2-1/2

# Game 23 Minasian-Vyzhmanavin Debrecen 1992

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	Øc3	dxe4
4	②xe4	Ød7
5	⊈c4	Øgf6
6	<b>②g5</b>	e6
7	₩e2	<b>②b6</b>
8	<b>≜</b> d3	h6
9	9)5f3	<b>c5</b>
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	De5	<b>包bd7</b>
12	<b>包gf3</b>	₩c7
13	0-0	0-0
14	<b>≡</b> e1	<b>≜</b> d6



# 15 ②c4 If 15 ≜f4 White has to reckon with 15... ②h5!? 16 ≜d2 ②c5.


15 ... **≜**e7 16 **∮**)d4 If 16 ②ce5 Black can return his bishop to d6 or else play 16...②c5.

16 ... 公c5 17 公b5 ₩d8 18 Ⅱd1 单d7 19 a4?!

19 ②c3 was stronger.

19 **Dc3** 20 4)bd6 20 can be met by 20...Ød5!∓. 20 ₩c7 **¤fd8** 21 9)e5 **≜** f4 22 **≙e**8 23 ≜g3  $\triangle xd3$ 24 **E**xd3 **X**xd3 25  $\triangle xd3$ ₩c4 26 h3 Ic8 27 De1?

This loses a pawn in an already equal position. 27 \(\text{\Lambda}\)e5 was correct, occupying the key square in his variation.



27		<b>≜</b> b4!
28	<b>\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\</b>	<b>≜</b> xc3
29	₩xc3	₩xc3
30	bxc3	<b>De4</b>

31	≜e5	<b>f</b> 6
32	<b>≜</b> d4	②xc3
33	<b>≜</b> xc3	<b>xc3</b>
34	<b>¤</b> a2	a5
35	\$11	<b></b> ⊈c4
<b>36</b>	<b></b> □b2	<b>≜</b> c6
37	<b>Ød3</b>	<b> ■</b> xa4
38	Dc5	<b></b>
<b>39</b>	<b>⊈</b> e2	a4
40	<b>Dxe6</b>	a3
41	<b>¤</b> b3	0-1

# Game 24 Blatny-Adams Adelaide 1988


1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>包c3</b>	dxe4
4	2)xe4	<b>∕</b> 2)d7
5	<b>≜c4</b>	<b><b>②gf6</b></b>
6	<b>Dg</b> 5	<b>e6</b>
7	We2	<b>�b6</b>
8	<b>≜d3</b>	h6
9	<b>2</b> 513	<b>c5</b>
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	<b>De5</b>	<b>€</b> )bd7
12	Øgf3	②xe5
13	4)xe5	Wc7?!


This allows White to gain the advantage of the two bishops. The main move here is 13...0-0.

14 \( \hat{\pm} \) b5+! \( \hat{\pm} \) d7
15 \( 0 \) \( 0 \) \( 0 \)

15...≜xb5 16 ₩xb5+ \$e7 comes into consideration

16	②xd7	②xd7
17	c3	<b>Z</b> ad8
18	<b>≜</b> a4	<b>a6</b>
19	<b>≜c2</b>	<b>Ð</b> f6





21 ... \( \mathbb{\textit{e}} e5?!

The position is one where Black has to reckon with his opponent setting up an outside passed pawn on the queenside, and therefore exchanges, bringing the endgame nearer, are unfavourable for him. On the other hand, there is still the threat of an attack on the kingside, on which the white bishops are trained. In this respect 21... 2d5 22 464 2f6 23 464 2e7 is more accurate.

Exchanges aid White's aforementioned plan. 26... \$\mathbb{L}e7\$ 27 \$\mathbb{L}c2\$ \$\mathbb{L}c5\$ is a tougher defence, although after 28 \$\mathbb{L}e3\$ White retains the advantage.


#### 27 \wxb7! \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}e7

Black has to go voluntarily into a pin, as after 27... 2c5 White gains a

material advantage by the tactical manoeuvre 28 \(\mathbb{w}\xxf7+!\) \(\drivxf7\) 29 \(\drivxxe8+\)\(\mathbb{z}\xxe8 \) 30 \(\mathbb{z}\xxe8 \).

Taking the game into the technical stage.

29		₩c7
<b>30</b>	₩xc7	<b>≜</b> xc7
31	<b>Z</b> ed1	<b>Z</b> d8
32	<b>b4</b>	f5
<b>33</b>	ı⊈xd7	<b>≌exd7</b>
34	<b>xd</b> 7	<b>xd</b> 7
35	<b>X</b> xa6	e5
36	<b>⊈g2</b>	g5
37	<b>≜</b> b6	åd6



#### 38 **Za8**+

After the exchange of rooks by 38 \$\mathbb{Z}a7! \$\mathbb{Z}xa7 39 \$\mathbb{L}xa7 \displays f7 40 b5 \displays 641 c4! White would have won more quickly.

38	• • •	<b>⊈17</b>
<b>39</b>	<b>Zd8</b>	<b>xd8</b>
40	<b>≜</b> xd8	<b>⊈</b> e6
41	h3!	<b>Ġ</b> d5
42	g4	f4
43	<b>⊈.f</b> 6	<b>⊈.f8</b>

44	f3	e4
45	fxe4+	<b>⊈</b> xe4
46	<b>b5</b>	<b>⊈</b> d5
47	<b>b6</b>	<b>\$</b> c6
48	<b>⊈d4</b>	<b>⊈e</b> 7
49	c4	<b>≜</b> d8
50	c5	<b>≜e</b> 7
51	<b>∲</b> f3	<b>≙</b> f8
52	фe4	<b>≜e</b> 7
53	<b>\$</b> 15	<b>≙</b> f8
54	<b>\$e6!</b>	f3
55	b7	<b>⊈</b> c7
56	c6	<b>≜</b> d6
57	b8₩+	dxh8
58	ŵxd6	<b>\$</b> c8
59	<b>≜</b> b6	1-0
37		1 0

# Game 25 Adorjan-Flesch Hungarian Ch 1975

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>€</b> 0c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>⊈c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b> Ø</b> g5	e6
7	₩e2	<b>€</b> )b6
8	<b>⊈d3</b>	h6
9	<b>€</b> 25f3	<b>c5</b>
10	dxc5	≜xc5
11	<b>②e5</b>	<b>包bd7</b>
12	<b>包gf3</b>	②xe5
13	2xe5	0-0
14	ı⊈d2	₩d5
15	0-0-0	
h1-	adaad ale	The

A double-edged plan. The quiet 15 0-0 is less risky for White.

15	• • •	₩xa2
16	c3	<b>b5</b>

#### 17 Axh6

White is drawn into forcing play. More subtle is 17 \(\textit{\Lambda}\) b1! \(\textit{\W}\) a4 18 \(\textit{\W}\) f3! (18 \(\textit{\W}\) d3 \(\textit{\W}\) h4!) 18...\(\textit{\Q}\) d5 19 \(\textit{\W}\) g3.

17 ... **≜**b7


17...gxh6? loses to 18 \mathbb{\mathbb{#}}f3.

#### 18 **包d7**

18 ... **②xd7** 

If 18... ₩a1+ 19 ♠b1 ②e4 White has the decisive 20 ♠xg7! ♠xg7 21 ②xc5 ②xc5 22 ₩g4+.

19 \(\mathbb{\matha\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathba\\\a



One cannot help asking: who is attacking who?

#### 22 \mathbb{\ma

It transpires that both White and Black should have been satisfied with perpetual check after 22 bxa3 \(\mathbb{w}\)xc3+.

#### 22 ... **I**fd8?

An exchange of mistakes, after which the picture again changes. After 22... Ifc8! 23 Wd4 2f8 24 2xf8 Ixf8 Black would have parried the opponent's threats, while maintaining his own (Adorjan).

23 bxa3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3+
24 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d1 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd2+


Now White succeeds in defending his king. 24...2d5!? came into consideration.

In such a mêlée it is not surprising that mistakes are made. After 28... #d3+! 29 &c1 #xa3+ Black would have held on.

29 \$b2 \$\forall xh1
30 \$\hat{\text{\text{\text{\$\geq x}}} h2}\$
31 \$\hat{\text{\$\delta}} h5+ 1-0

# 6: 10...**5**bd7

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b></b> 2∫g5	e6
7	₩e2	<b>�b6</b>
8	<b>≜d</b> 3	h6
9	<b>2</b> 5f3	c5
10	dxc5	<b>包bd7</b>



This move was devised by Smyslov. The idea of retreating the knight, which involves a pawn sacrifice, is to gain the possibility of capturing on c5 with knight or queen.

The simple 11 **2f4** can be met by 11... ②xc5 12 **2b5+ 2d7** 13 0-0-0 **3f4 2xd7+** ②cxd7 15 **3f4 2xd7+** ②cxd7 15 **3f4 2xd7+** (Henao-Isaacs, St Martin 1992).

11 De5 is also insufficient for an advantage: 11...Dxe5 12 wxe5 wa5+ (12...Dd7 13 we2 Dxc5 14 Db5+ Dd7= is also possible) 13 Dd2 wxc5

14 ② f3 ₩xe5+ 15 ② xe5 ② c5 (or 15... ② d6) 16 ② b5+ ② e7 with an equal ending (Parma-Smyslov, Lugano OL 1968) – Game 4.

Of course, White can spoil the opponent's pawn structure by 11 c6 bxc6, but this allows Black to begin active piece play: 12 \( \Delta d2 \) (or 13 \( \Delta d2 \) (or 13 \( \Delta d2 \) (or 13 \( \Delta d2 \) (or 14 \( \Delta d2 \) (or 15 \( \Delta d2

White's critical decision is of course to defend his extra pawn, despite the obvious defects of his queenside pawn structure.

#### 11 b4

6.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ¥e2 ②b6 8 ②d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 ②bd7 11 b4)


#### 11 ... b6

This obvious frontal attack weakens the c6 square and allows White to activate his knight.

#### 12 **②d4**

This active move is based on the fact that Black cannot simply capture the pawn: 12...bxc5?? 13 ②c6 Wc7 14 Wxe6+! fxe6 15 ②g6 mate! (Perenji-Eperjesi, Hungary 1984).

10...**②**bd7 75



Also after 12... \(\tilde{\tii

Black usually plays 12... 2 d5 (6.11) or 12... 2 c7 (6.12).

6.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 2e2 2b6 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2bd7 11 b4 b6 12 2d4)

12 ... 包d5

In attacking the b4 pawn Black loses time, and the e6 square remains his Achilles' heel.


13 ♣b2 ②xb4 14 ②xe6!

This sacrifice, analysed by Sap-

firov, is promising, although it has not been tried in practice. Other moves allow Black to maintain the balance:

14 **2e4 2**a6 − cf. *Game 26* (Van der Wiel-Balashov, Malta OL 1980).

14 c6?! ②xd3+ 15 wxd3 ②c5 16 wf3 ②a4 17 0-0-0 ②xb2 (or 17...wg5+ 18 \$b1 ②xb2) 18 \$xb2 wc7 and Black's chances are preferable (Tseshkovsky-Razuvaev, Volgodonsk 1981).



If White retains his bishop he gains a strong attack: 14...fxe6 15 单g6+ 全e7 16 單f3! bxc5 17 獸xa8 獸a5 18 0-0-0! ②b6 19 獸f3 ②xa2+ 20 全b1 全d7 21 獸f7+ 全d8 22 ②f3±.

15 ₩xd3 ₩e7

Or 15...fxe6 16 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{\mathba\mathbb{\mathbb


16 0-0-0 fxe6

**16...₩xe6** is dangerous: 17 ②f3 ♠e7 18 ℤhe1±.

Now after 17 We4 Zb8 18 c6 2c5 19 Wg6+ Wf7 20 c7 Za8 21 Zd8+ \$e7 22 Wxf7+ \$\prime xf7 23 \$\Oldot f3\$ \$\Oldot a6 24\$ ♠e5+ Black cannot develop without losing material.

6.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ₩e2 ②b6 8 ②d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 ②bd7 11 b4 b6 12 ②d4)


12 ... ₩c7



Black maintains the tension, but allows himself to be drawn into forcing play.

White's pieces are impending over the black king's position, and therefore 15...₩xh1 is not possible on account of 16 ②c7+ \$\times\$d8 17 ②f3 \$\times\$g2 18 \$\times\$g1 \$\times\$h3 19 \$\times\$d4.

16 ②c7+ №e7



Or 20...2xc6 21 2xc6 2xf2 22 2f3! and Black cannot develop without losing material.

Christiansen-Saidy (USA 1975) now continued 21 \( \textbf{\substack} \textbf{\substack}

6.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 &c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ¥e2 ②b6 8 &d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 ②bd7 11 b4)


#### 11 ... a5

This attack on the pawns is more justified, since Black has the additional resource of opening the a-file.

#### 12 c3 **≜**e7

12...axb4 13 cxb4 b6 is premature: 14 ②d4! ②xc5 15 单b5+ ②cd7 16 单d2 单b7 17 ②gf3 with an unpleasant *10...***4***bd7 77* 

pin (Rajhman-Leman, Wolfsberg 1985).



13 a3

It is useful to over-protect the b4 pawn in the event of ...b7-b6. 13 **\(\Delta\)d2!?** pursues the same aim, but attempts to activate White's pieces merely create problems for him:

13 ♠c4?! 0-0 14 ♠h3 axb4 15 cxb4 b6 and the pawn structure crumbles in favour of Black (Lukov-Meduna, Varna 1983).

13 Ød4 0-0 14 Øgf3 (14 ♠b2 axb4 15 cxb4 e5!) 14...e5 and Black firmly seizes the initiative (Martin-Meduna, Bad Wörishofen 1988) – Game 27.


In the event of 14...\$66 15 \( \textbf{15} \) axb4 16 axb4 White controls the situation on the queenside.

### 15 cxb4 2f6

Now after 16 **国**a2 **②**c3 17 **皇**xc3 **皇**xc3+ 18 **當**fl **②**f6 Black has some compensation for the pawn (he threatens 19...**皇**xb4).

6.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ¥e2 ②b6 8 ②d3 h6 9 ②5f3 c5 10 dxc5 ②bd7 11 b4)

### 11 ... 包d5



Before beginning an attack on the pawns, Black activates his pieces.

#### 12 Ad2 #f6

The inclusion of 12...a5 13 c3 is less effective: 13...\footnote{\subset}f6 14 \footnote{\subset}c1 axb4 15 cxb4 \footnote{\subset}f4 16 \footnote{\subset}xf4 \footnote{\subset}xf4 17 \footnote{\subset}b1 g5 18 \footnote{\subset}c2 and Black has no compensation for the pawn (H\vec{\text{ubner-Lein, Chicago 1982}).}


In Geller-Speelman (Sochi 1982) Black chose 12...g5 13 c4 2 f4 14 2 xf4 gxf4, and after 15 Id a5 16 a3 f6 White did not achieve anything. But, as shown by Velickovic, by playing 15 Ib! a5 16 a3 axb4 17 axb4 2 g7 18 2 h3 2 c3+ 19 f1 f6 20 g3 he could have retained an advantage.

 16 ∰d2 ∰xa3 17 ♠b5! Black comes under an unpleasant pin.

In the event of 17...\$\,\textit{\alpha}7?! 18 \tilde{\alpha}e2\$
\textit{\textit{\mathref{\mat

#### 18 ₩d4 e5

The queen sacrifice 18... Ig8?! 19 III axb4 20 III xa3 bxa3 favours White: 21 De2 a2 22 ded2 2g7 23 III b4!± (Am.Rodriguez-Tal, Subotica IZ 1987).



20 ... axb4!

21 **X**xa3 bxa3 22 **2**gf3 0-0

22...a2 23 \$\display\$d2 0-0 followed by ...\$\tilde{\textbf{B}}e8\$ also comes into consideration.

23 Ad5 g4!

25 ₩d5 gxf3!

After 25... 2xe5? 26 2xe5 2xe5


27 wxe5 a6 28 0-0 a2 29 a1 White has the advantage (Mestel-Flear, British Ch 1988).

26 ₩xf7+ \$\psi h8

Now after 27 **w**e8+ **c**h7 28 **w**g6+ the chances are equal (Flear).

### Game 26 Van der Wiel-Balashov Malta Olympiad 1980

**e4 c6** 2 d4d5€)d2 3 dxe4 4 9)xe4 9)d7 **⊈c4** 2)gf6 5 ②g5 6 **e6** We2 7 **∮**)b6 ⊈d3 8 h6 9)5f3 9 **c5** dxc5 €)bd7 10 11 **b4 b6** Ød4 12



#### 12 ... 包d5

A questionable move, although it has given Black reasonable results in practice. 12... \*\*C7 looks more natural.

10…**む***bd*7 79

#### 13 **♠**b2 **♠**xb4 14 **♠**e4


The evaluation of this variation largely depends on the evaluation of the knight sacrifice 14 ②xe6!? analysed by Sapfirov.

14 ... \( \text{\$\pi a6} \)
15 \( \psi f3 \)
\( \text{\$\pi xc5} \)

15... ≜xc5! is stronger, not fearing 16 ②xe6?! fxe6 17 ≜g6+ ⇔e7 18 ₩f7+ \$\d6∓.

#### 16 Axa8?

Now Black's well mobilised pieces develop a strong attack. It was still possible to simplify the position by 16 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{0}}}} \) \( \text{\text{\text{0}}} \) \( \text{\text{0}} \) \( \text{0} \) \( \text{\text{0}} \) \( \text{0} \) \( \text{\text{0}} \) \( \text{0} \) \( \text{0



②xc2+! 16 17 €)xc2 4)d3+ **\$**d2 18 €)xb2+ 19 фc1 4)d3+ 20 фh1 **\$**c5 21 6)h3 0-0


After these fireworks Black is a rook down, but on the other hand

White's 'castles' are stuck in their corners.

24 f4

White should have brought up his rook: 24 \( \Delta f3 \) \( \Delta d3 \) 25 \( \Delta d1 \), although after 25...\( \Delta b4! \) the attack continues.

24 ... ②c4 25 ②d3



25 ②a3+! **≜xd3**+ 26 **Øxa3** 27 9)c2 **≜**b4 **₩**b3 Ic8 28 29 **¤**d1 **¤c3** 9)12 ¤xb3+ 30 31 axb3 **≜xc2+** 32 **\$**xc2 ₩c5+ 0-1

## Game 27 **Martin-Meduna** *Bad Wörishofen 1988*

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \hat{D}\)d2 dxe4


4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> 2d7
5	ı£c4	Øgf6
6	<b>∳</b> ]g5	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	<b>€</b> 0b6
8	₽d3	h6
9	<b>2</b> )5f3	c5
10	dxc5	<b>Øbd7</b>
11	<b>b4</b>	a5
12	c3	<b>⊈</b> e7
13	E) d4	

White should lend additional support to the b4 pawn by 13 a3 or 13 add.

13		00
14	Øgf3	<b>e5</b>
15	<b>Df5</b>	e4
16	<b>约xe7+</b>	

Or 16 \( \alpha \) xe4 \( \alpha \) xe4 \( \alpha \) xe5! 18 0-0 \( \alpha \) f6 and Black has the initiative.

16	• • •	₩xe7
<b>17</b>	êc4	axb4
18	cxb4	<b>b6</b>
19	<b>≜</b> f4	<b>Ðh5</b>
20	<b>≜</b> d6	₩f6
21	Ø)d4	




After doing well up to this point, Black unexpectedly falls for the bait. He should first have prepared the gathering of the 'harvest': 21...bxc5! 22 bxc5 \widetilde{\pi}xd4 23 0-0 \overline{\pi}xc5 24 \widetilde{\pi}ad1 \overline{\pi}d3, after which White stands badly.

22	0-0	<b>De5</b>
23	₩xh5	②xc4
24	<b></b> Ifd1	Ød2?

An over-committing move, which leaves the knight 'hanging'. Stronger was 24...#f6! 25 \( \Delta xf8 \) e3 26 \( \Per e^2 \) \( \Per xf2 + 27 \) \( \Per xf2 \) exf2 + 28 \( \Per xf2 \) \( \Per xf8 \) 29 \( \cho xb6 \) \( \Delta xb6 \) 30 \( \Per d6! \) \( \Delta xf8 \) (Martin).

25	🕰 x f8	e3
26	₩e2!	exf2+
27	₩xf2	₩xf2-
28	<b>\$</b> xf2	②e4+
29	<b>œe3</b>	<b>⊈</b> b7
30	<b>≜</b> e7	bxc5
31	<b></b>	<b>¤</b> xd8
32	<b>≜</b> xd8	cxb4
33	<b>\$</b> d4	<b>Dc3</b>
34	g3	<b>≜c8</b>
35	ı La5	<b>≜e</b> 6
36	⊈xb4	②xa2
37	<b>≜</b> .d2	



10...**₽**bd7 81


After	his	incorrect	24	නd2?
Black has	pick	ed up as m	uch n	naterial
as possible, but he is obliged to play				
without h	is kni	ght at a2.	_	

	_	
37	• • •	g5
38	<b>\$</b> e5	<b>⊈g</b> 7
39	ΠfI	<b>ġ</b> g6

40	<b></b> 46+	<b>⊈g</b> 7
41	h4	<b>\$</b> h7
42	Exe6!	fxe6
43	h5	⊈g8
44	<b>\$</b> xe6	⊈h8
45	<b>\$</b> f6	1-0

# 7: 8 & b3 h6 9 4 5f3 a5

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> 2d7
5	<b>⊈c4</b>	Dgf6
6	<b>②g5</b>	e6
7	₩e2	<b>Ðb6</b>
Q	<b>∲</b> h3	



On the a2-g8 diagonal the bishop has no less a future than on the adjacent one, especially as the d4 pawn is immune (8... \widetilde{\psi} xd4? 9 \overline{\Delta}1f3 and 10 \overline{\Delta}e5).

8 ... h6

Here too there is no point in delaying this move. The flank operation 8...a5 9 c3! (there is no point in obstinately maintaining the bishop's diagonal: 9 a3 a4 10 \(\Delta\)a2 c5 11 dxc5 \(\Delta\)xc5 12 \(\Delta\)1f3 \(\Delta\)e7 13 0-0 0-0 14 \(\Delta\)e5 h6 15 \(\Delta\)gf3 \(\Delta\)bd7 16 \(\Delta\)d3 \(\Delta\)d6 17 \(\Delta\)e1 =8 18 \(\Delta\)d2 e5!=, Suetin-Wilson, Berlin 1991) 9...a4 10


©c2 a3 11 b3 ②bd5 12 ②d2 ②d6 undertaken in Kasparov-Speelman (Linares 1992) does not bring Black any particular gains. White could have gained an advantage by 13 ②e4.

9 **2**5f3 a5

9...c5 is examined in Chapter 8.Here the main continuations are 10 c3 (7.1), 10 a3 (7.2) and 10 a4 (7.3).

7.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{\D}\)c3 dxe4 4 \( \D\)xe4 \( \tilde{\D}\)d7 5 \( \tilde{\D}\)c4 \( \D\)gf6 6 \( \D\)g5 e6 7 \( \tilde{\W}\)e2 \( \D\)b6 8 \( \tilde{\D}\)b3 h6 9 \( \D\)5f3 a5)

10 c3



White prepares to withdraw his bishop onto the b1-h7 diagonal.

10 ... c5

An important moment. Black is not averse to winning an important tempo by ...c5-c4, and therefore he does not hurry with the natural 10...a4 11 \(\Delta \cdot c2\):

- (a) 11...a3 12 b3 c5 13 2d2 2c7 14 2c1 2d6 15 2e5 0-0 16 2gf3 cxd4 17 cxd4±, and the further advance of Black's pawns has in fact restricted his possibilities on the queenside (Matkovic-B.Nikolic, Yugoslav Ch 1991);
- (b) 11...c5 12 dxc5 \( \text{\te}\text{\texi{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\t
- (c) 11...②bd5 12 单d2 增b6! 13 量b1 c5 14 dxc5 单xc5 15 包e5 0-0 16 包gf3 豐c7 17 0-0 b6 18 量bc1 单b7 with an equal game (Anand-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993), but here too improvements for White are possible, e.g. 18 单d3!? 单b7 19 ②d4 with slightly the better chances.

#### 11 a3

J.Polgar-Gulko (Moscow OL 1994) went 11 2d2 a4 12 2c2 2c7 13 2c1 2d6 14 2e5 2bd5 (aiming at c3; Black is already threatening ...a4-a3) 15 a3 b6 16 2gf3 0-0 17 c4 2e7 18 2c3 cxd4 19 2xd4 2b7 20 0-0 2c6 21 2c3 2fd8 22 2fd1 2xe5 23 2xe5 2c5 24 2h1 2xd1 2d8 with an equal game.

An important move, controlling e5.


#### 12 包h3

After 12 De5?! cxd4 13 cxd4 Black has a choice:

- (a) 13...a4 14 **Q**c2 **Q**d7 15 **Q**xd7 **D**bxd7 − *Game* 28 (Kasparov-Karpov, Linares 1994);
- (b) 13... xa3!? However, Makarychev has dispelled the mirage of this

move, showing that 14 鱼xh6! gives White the better chances after both 14...鱼xb2 15 豐xb2 里xh6 16 ②gf3, and 14...里xh6 15 里xa3 豐c1+ 16 鱼d1 ②fd5 17 ②gf3 f6 18 ②d3.

12 ... **⊈**d7 13 0–0



This position was thoroughly studied in the Short-Gulko match (New York 1994).

### 13 ... cxd4!

In the 3rd game Gulko discovered that 13...\$\times d6?! was unpromising: 14 dxc5 \$\times xc5 (14...\$\times xc5 15 \$\times f4\times ) 15 \$\times 64\$ with strong pressure for White - Game 29.

14 🙎 f4

Or 14 ②xd4 ②d6 and now 15 ②f5?! ②xh2+16 ③h1 ⑤f8 17 g3 exf5 favours Black.

14 ... 2d6 15 2xd6 \wxd6 16 \width=61

In the 5th game Short gained the better chances after 16 **Zad1** 0-0 17 **Zxd4 Zc5** 18 **Zfd1 2c6**?! 19 **Ze5**, but in analysis an improvement for

Black was found: 18...**≜**b5! 19 **₩**e5 **⊘**bd7!


16 ... 0-0 17 罩xd4 豐c5 18 分f4 豐b5

Also possible is **18...\$b5** 19 **W**e1 (19 ②xe6? fxe6 20 **W**xe6+ **\$\display\$h8** 21 ②e5 **\$\display\$e8**\Tilde{T}) 19...\$\display\$c4 20 **\$\display\$c2** ②bd7 with equal chances (Gulko).

The seventh game of the Short-Gulko match now continued 19 對xb5 全xb5 20 單e1 ②bd7 with equal chances.

7.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②c4 ②gf6 6 ②g5 e6 7 ₩e2 ②b6 8 ②b3 h6 9 ②5f3 a5)

#### 10 a3



White maintains his bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal.

10 ... a4

If 10...\$e7 White has the good reply 11 \$\frac{1}{2}d2!\$ \$\frac{1}{2}bd5\$ 12 c4 \$\frac{1}{2}c7\$ 13 \$\frac{1}{2}c2\$ 0-0?! (more circumspect is 13...b5 14 \$\frac{1}{2}e5\$ \$\frac{1}{2}b7\$ 15 c5 \$\frac{1}{2}cd5\$ 16

②gf3±, Bagirov) 14 ②e5! ₩xd4 15 ②c3 ₩d8 16 ②gf3 ②ce8 17 g4 b5 18 g5 hxg5 19 ②xg5 Za6 20 ₩f3 with a strong attack (Tal-Speelman, Subotica IZ 1987).

10...g6 is another idea of Speelman:

- (a) 11 c3 \( \text{\$\$\text{\$\}\$\$}}\ext{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\}\$}}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex

11 \( \hat{\parallel{a}}\) c5

After 11... e7 12 c3 c5 White maintains a slight advantage:

- (a) 13 dxc5 Dbd7 14 Dd4 &xc5 15 Dgf3 0-0 16 &f4 &xd4 17 cxd4 Dd5 18 &d6 Ze8 19 0-0 (Cabrilo-Spiridonov, Varna 1983);
- (b) 13 \( \text{\$\text{\frac{1}{2}}\$ d6 14 \( \text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}\$}}}}}} encoreminine{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}}}\$}}}}}}} en

### 12 &f4

Karpov in his prime preferred 12 c3, when after 12... \( \Delta bd5 \) 13 \( \Delta e5! \) it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13... cxd4 14 cxd4 \( \mathbb{\mathbb{W}} a5+ 15 \) \( \Delta d2 \) \( \mathbb{\mathbb{W}} b6 16 \) \( \Delta gf3 \) \( \mathbb{W} xb2 17 0-0 \) \( \Delta c3 \) on account of 18 \( \mathbb{W} c4! \) Petrosian replied against him 12... \( \Delta d7 13 \) \( \Delta e5 \) cxd4 14 cxd4 \( \Delta e7 15 \) \( \Delta gf3 0-0 16 0-0 \), but could not cope with the difficulties - \( Game 30 \) (Karpov-Petrosian, Tilburg 1982).

After 12 2e3 Smyslov suggested 12... bbd5, which has become a standard reaction to the bishop's development. Here Black has no problems:

- (a) 13 c3 \( \Delta e 7 \) (also possible is the more active 13...\( \Delta c 7 \) 14 \( \Delta e 5 \) \( \Delta d 6 \) 15 \( \Delta g f 3 \) 0-0, with a sound position for Black, Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982) 14 \( \Delta e 5 \) 0-0 15 \( \Delta g f 3 \) \( \Delta c 7 \) 16 \( \Delta c 4 \) (or 16 \( 0 0 \) b5!, and the initiative passes to Black) 16...\( b 6 \) 17 \( 0 0 \) \( \Delta b 7 \) with equal chances (Liberzon-Smyslov, Biel IZ 1976) \( Game 31 \);
- (b) 13 De5 Wa5+ 14 Ad2 Wb6 15 Dc4 Wa7 with equal chances (I.Gurevich-Epishin, Biel IZ 1993).

12 ... **②bd5** 

With 12... 2d6 Black can also count on an equal game:

- (a) 13 \( \text{2g3} \) cxd4 14 0-0-0 \( \text{\$\subseteq} \) c7 15 \( \text{\$\infty} \) xd4 \( \text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$
- (b) 13 \( \hat{2}e5 \) cxd4 14 0-0-0 \( \hat{2}xe5 \) (after 14...\( \hat{2}c7 \) 15 \( \hat{2}xd4 \) \( \hat{2}xe5 \) 16 \( \hat{2}xe5 \) \( \hat{2}xe5 \) in the endgame the weakness of the a4 pawn is felt) 15 \( \hat{2}xe5 \) 0-0 16 \( \hat{2}xd4 \) \( \hat{2}bd5 \) 17 c4 \( \hat{2}c7 \) with equal chances (Hazai, Lukacs).


Black can also consider 15...c4 16 0-0 (16 c3 \( \text{2} \text{xa3} \) 17 \( \text{2} \text{xc4!} \( \text{2} \text{xb2} \) 18 \( \text{2} \text{xb5+} \) \( \text{2} \text{d7} \) 19 \( \text{2} \text{xc3=} \) 16...\( \text{2} \text{b7} \) 17 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{2} \text{e7} \) 18 \( \text{2} \text{b1} \) 0-0-0 19 \( \text{2} \text{c2} \) \( \text{wa6} \) with a complicated game (Hazai, Lukacs).

#### 16 ≜c4

Ivanchuk-Karpov (Tilburg 1993) now continued 16... \( \alpha a6 17 0 - 0 \) bxa3 18 \( \precent x3 \) cxd4 19 \( \precent aa1 \) \( \alpha e7! 20 \( \alpha \) xd4 0-0 with equal chances.

7.3 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2C3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2c4 2gf6 6 2g5 e6 7 2e2 2b6 8 2b3 h6 9 25f3 a5)

#### 10 a4



White nips in the bud Black's threat of ...a5-a4.

#### 10 ... c5 11 **\$**f4

The most energetic move, with which White fights for control of e5 – the key square in many similar variations. But it is also useful to be acquainted with his other possibilities:

 11 dxc5 ②bd7 12 ②e5 ②xe5 13 wxe5 ②d7 14 we2 ②xc5 (the alternative is 14...②xc5 15 ②c4 ②e7 16 ②f3 0-0 17 0-0 b6) 15 ②f3 b6! 16 0-0 0-0 17 c3 wc7 18 ②e3 ②a6 19 ②c4 ②xe3 20 ②xa6 ②c5 21 ②d3 and White's position is slightly preferable (Belyavsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1993).

## 11 ... **≜**d6

Or 11...cxd4 12 0-0-0 2bd5 13 \( \text{\ti}\text{\texi{\texi{\text{\texi{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tex{

#### 12 \(\text{\partial}\)g3!

For the moment White should not be in a hurry to occupy e5:

12 全e5 0-0. Here in Tal-Petrosian, (41st USSR Ch 1973) — Game 32, there followed 13 0-0-0?! c4 14 全xc4 公xa4 15 包h3 ②b6, when Black already stood better, but even after 13 包h3 全xe5 14 dxe5 包fd5 his chances are not worse.

12 ②e5 0-0 13 ②gf3 豐c7 14 皇g3 ②bd5 15 dxc5 豐xc5 16 0-0 b6 17 罩fd1 皇a6 with equal chances (Anand-Karpov, Monaco Blind 1994).

#### 12 ... 0-0

In the event of 12... \( \) xg3?! 13 hxg3 \( \) c7 14 \( \) e5 cxd4 15 \( \) gf3 0-0 16 g4! the opening of the h-file assists White's attack (Mikh.Tseitlin-Spiridonov, Prague 1985).


## 13 De5

White also retains the initiative with 13 **Id1** ②bd5 14 ②e5 – Game 33 (Mikh.Tseitlin-Lutz, Budapest 1989).

# 13 ... ₩e7 14 ②gf3

Or 14 0-0-0 cxd4 15 ②gf3 单d7 16 ②xd7 ②bxd7 17 单xd6 豐xd6 18 ②xd4 豐f4+ 19 \$b1 ②c5 with equal chances (Karpov).

14 ... **⊘**bd5 15 0–0



#### 15 ... ②h5?!

This leads to the creation of an isolated pawn. Black should have maintained the tension with 15...b6!?

#### 16 ≜xd5!

White played less strongly in Anand-Karpov (Linares 1994) – 16 **Ife1 W**c7 17 **I**ad1 **△**xg3 18 hxg3 ②f6 19 ②c4 ♠e7 20 ₩e5 ₩c6, and Black achieved an equal game.


Now after 16... 2xg3 17 hxg3 exd5 18 dxc5 2xc5 19 2fe1 White's chances are preferable (Karpov).

Game 28	
Kasparov-Karpov	
Linares 1994	

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>∕</b> 2)d2	dxe4
4	2xe4	∕∆d7
5	<b>⊈c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>②g5</b>	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	<b>�b6</b>
8	<b>≜b3</b>	h6
9	<b>₫</b> 5f3	a5
10	c3	<b>c5</b>
11	a3	₩c7
12	②e5?!	

A committing move. 12 2h3 is simpler.

12 ... cxd4 13 cxd4




13 ... a4

At the time it was thought that Black had missed a good opportunity here with 13... 2xa3, but, as shown in the analysis, after 14 2xh6! White gains the better chances.

14	<b>⊈c2</b>	<b>⊈d</b> 7
15	②xd7	②bxd7
16	₩d1	

As a result of his poorly played opening, White has been saddled with an isolated d-pawn, and Black can freely use the d5 square as a transit point. For the moment White tries to cover the c-file, which is controlled by Black.

16	• • •	<b>≜d</b> 6
17	<b>②e2</b>	<b>⊘d5</b>
18	<b>≜</b> d2	<b>b5</b>
19	<b>Dc3</b>	②xc3
20	<b>≜</b> xc3	<b>ᡚf6</b>
21	<b>W</b> 43	



21 ... ᡚd5!


Showing a subtle understanding of the position. After 22 \wxb5+?! \&e7
Black is fully mobilised and he threatens 23...\( 2\) xc3.

22 **≜**d2 **⊈**e7!

Karpov's favourite move in this variation.

Over-hasty. Karpov considers that he should have developed his initiative with 24...②f4+! 25 \$\times\$xf4 \$\times\$xf4 26 \$\times\$xc4 bxc4 27 \$\times\$b1 \$\times\$hd8 28 \$\times\$hd1 \$\times\$g5, although after 29 g3 \$\times\$f6 30 \$\times\$e3 White is soundly enough placed.

25 g3 ₩xd3+ 26 ♠xd3 b4



#### 27 Ha1!

The World Champions are as though competing with each other to see who can play more subtly. With this pawn sacrifice White succeeds in exchanging the targets of Black's attack.

27		bxa3
28	bxa3	<b> □</b> b3
29	<b>≜</b> c2!	<b>¤</b> xa3
<b>30</b>	<b>E</b> xa3	🔔 xa3
31	<b>Z</b> a1	⊈b2
32	<b>E</b> xa4	<b>¤</b> xa4
33	⊈xa4	<b>≜</b> xd4

#### 34 f4!

The concluding move of the manoeuvre begun with 27 **Zal!** The advance of the black pawns is blocked at a distance.

34		<b>⊈</b> d6
35	<b>\$</b> f3	f5
36	h4!	≗b2
<b>37</b>	g4!	fxg4+
38	\$xg4	<b>包f6+</b>
39	<b>\$</b> f3	<b>Ød5</b>
40	<b>⊈</b> c2	<b>⊈</b> f6
41	h5	1/_1/


## Game 29 Short-Gulko Match (3), New York 1994

1	<b>e4</b>	CO
2	d4	<b>d5</b>
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>≜c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>②g5</b>	e6
7	₩e2	<b>Ðb6</b>
8	<b>≜</b> .b3	h6
9	<b>4</b> 25f3	a5
10	c3	<b>c5</b>
11	a3	₩c7
12	<b>⊘h3</b>	<b>≜</b> d7
13	0-0	<b>≜</b> d6?

In the 7th game of the match Gulko played the stronger 13...cxd4!

14	dxc5	₩xc5
15	<b>≜e</b> 3	₩c7
16	⊈d4	Øg4?

An unsuccessful sortie. Had Black anticipated his opponent's reply, he would have preferred 16...0-0!? 17 \$\&\times\$0:e5\pm\$.




#### 17 2d2! 2f6

An admission of his mistake. After 17... 2xh2 the knight will be unable to return.

18 **☆**h1 0-0?

To castle into such an obvious attack is suicidal. 18... ≜c6 19 f4 0–0–0 was correct.

19	£xf6	gxf6
20	₩g4+	<b>Ġ</b> h7
21	<b>De4</b>	f5
22	<b>②f6+</b>	<b>\$</b> h8
23	₩h4	<b>⊈</b> g7
24	₩ad1	<u> 0</u> 65



25 ②h5+ \$\psi h7\$
26 f4 \$\pm h8\$
27 ②g5+ 1-0

The knight is taboo (27...hxg5 28 公f6+ 含g7 29 wxg5 mate), while if the king moves, the rook joins the attack: 27...全g8 28 公f6+ 全xf6 (28...全g7 29 公gh7) 29 wxh6 全xg5 30 wxg5+ 全h8 31 量d3 (Short).

# Game 30 Karpov-Petrosian Tilburg 1982

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>包d2</b>	dxe4
4	( Ved	<i>©</i> \d7

Was it this game that saw the baton of the variation being passed from the ninth World Champion to the twelfth?


5	<b>≗c4</b>	્ય)gf(
6	<b>②g</b> 5	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	<b>D</b> b6
8	<b>≜b3</b>	a5
9	a3	a4
10	⊈a2	h6
11	<b>2</b> 513	c5
12	c3	<b>≜d</b> 7

12... ②bd5 can be answered by 13 ②e5!, when it is dangerous to win a pawn by 13...cxd4 14 cxd4 ¥a5+ 15 ②d2 ¥b6 16 ②gf3 ¥xb2 17 0-0 ②c3 on account of 18 ¥c4! (Karpov).

13	41e5	cxa4
14	cxd4	<b>⊈e</b> 7
15	<b>Dg</b> 3	0-0
16	0-0	<b>≜.e8</b>
17	ı⊈d2	<b>包bd5</b>
10	West.	


Black was intending ...b7-b5, and after 18 2c4 2b8 White would be obliged to exchange the light-square bishops. But now 18...b5 would weaken the c6 square: 19 2c6 2xc6 20 2xc6 with advantage to White.

18 ... \#b6
19 \&c4 \&c6
20 \Pmatrix



20 ... ©c7?! 20... d6, taking control of e5, came into consideration.

21	Dxc6!	bxc6
22	<b>⊈f4</b>	<b>包cd5</b>
23	е́5	<b></b> Ifd8
24	<b>¤</b> ad1	<b>≜</b> d6
25	<b>¤</b> d2	



Although Black's position is cramped, why aggravate the situation? An eventual ...c6-c5 would have eased his defence.


26	dxe5	41 <b>d</b> 7
27	g3!	<b>D18</b>
28	<b>Z</b> ed1	<b>¤d</b> 7
29	₩e4	<b>≖</b> b7
<b>30</b>	Ic2	<b></b> ab8
31	<b> ■ dd2</b>	<b>De7</b>
32	<b>Ġ</b> g2	₩a5
33	h4	<b> ■</b> d7
34	<b>≜</b> e2	<b> ■</b> d5
35	<b> ■</b> d4	<b>¤</b> xd4
36	₩xd4	<b>Ød5</b> ?

With this move Black blunders away a pawn. After 36... \$\mu\$b7 he could have put up a tough resistance, although White's positional advantage is obvious.

37	<b>E</b> xc6	₩a8
38	Ic4	<b>₩</b> b7
39	Ic2	<b>Ðb6</b>
40	<b>≜</b> b5	<b>ᡚg6</b>
41	₩d6	₩a8
42	<b>≜</b> c6	1-0

# Game 31 Liberzon-Smyslov Biel Interzonal 1976

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Øc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> 2)d7
5	<b>⊈c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>∕</b> 2)g5	<b>e6</b>
7	₩e2	�b6
8	<b>≜b3</b>	h6
9	<b>€</b> 05f3	a5
10	a3	a4
11	🙎a2	<b>c5</b>
12	<b>≜e</b> 3	<b>②bd5!</b>



Black has equalised.

13 c3 **≜**e7

Black can also play the more active 13... **业**c7 14 包e5 全d6 15 包gf3 0-0, with a sound position (Karpov-Kavalek, Turin 1982).

14 ②e5 0-0 15 ②gf3 ₩c7 16 ②c4


After 16 0–0 b5! (17 wxb5? \( \textit{a}\)a6) Black threatens to advance ...b5-b4.

16		<b>b6</b>
17	0-0	<b>≜b7</b>
18	<b>⊈</b> d2	<b>≜</b> d6
10	dvc5	

After 19 Ifel cxd4 White is left with an isolated pawn, but the surrender of the pawn centre also gives Black active piece play.

19	• • •	bxc5
20	<b>≜d3</b>	<b>≖</b> fd8
21	<b>E</b> fe1	<b>એb6</b>
22	c4?	

In defending against 22...c4, White loses a pawn. He should have reconciled himself to 22 Zad1 c4 23 2b1 2d5, when Black's position is only slightly more pleasant.




22		ı⊈xf3!
23	<b>Dxf3</b>	<b>≜</b> xh2+
24	②xh2	₩d6
25	<b>∳</b> ]g4	₩xd3
26	②xf6+	gxf6
27	🕰 xh6	₩xe2
28	<b>E</b> xe2	②xc4
29	Hc1	5005

After this lively skirmish Black succeeds in retaining his extra pawn,

since if 30  $\blacksquare$ xc5? there follows 30... $\blacksquare$ d1+31 h2 0g4+.

<b>30</b>	ı⊈e3	<b>Ød3</b>
31	<b>Ec4</b>	<b> ■</b> d5
32	<b>¤</b> ec2	<b>¤</b> a5
33	<b>≜</b> d2	<b>Z</b> a8
34	<b>≜e</b> 3	<b></b>
35	<b>E</b> xa4	¤xb2
<b>36</b>	<b> x</b> b2	②xb2
<b>37</b>	<b></b>	<b>⊈</b> g7
38	a4	<b>Dc4</b>
<b>39</b>	<b>₽</b> 1	<b>②xe3</b> +
40	fve3	f5



Things have reduced to a rook ending where White's outside passed pawn, together with the compact grouping of the black pawns within his king's sphere of influence, give him good drawing chances.

41	<b>⊈</b> e2	<b>\$</b> f6
42	<b>¤</b> a7	<b>≖</b> e5
43	<b>∲</b> ß	<b>Ze4</b>
44	<b>¤</b> c7	<b>E</b> xa4
45	Exc5	e5
16	<b>~31</b>	

Restricting the mobility of the black pawns. After the careless 46

**I**c2 f4 47 exf4 **I**xf4+ it is much more difficult to defend.

4	46		<b></b> a2
4	47	g4	e4+
4	48	<b>Ġ</b> g3	fxg4
4	49	Żxg4	<b>II</b> 12
:	50	<b>Zc6+</b>	<b>\$e5</b>
		<b>Ec5</b> +	<b>\$</b> e6
If 51	. <b>⊈d</b> d		lows 52 <b>≖</b> f5.
:	52	<b></b>	<b>\$</b> d5
:	53	<b>ℤc8</b>	<b>II</b> f3
:	54	<b>ℤ</b> d8+	<b>\$</b> c5
:	55	<b>Ec8+</b>	<b>\$</b> b5
:	56	<b>≅</b> c7	<b>f</b> 6
:	57	<b></b> □c8	<b>Exe3</b>
:	58	<b>⊈</b> f4	<b>≖</b> e1
:	59	<b>ℤ</b> c7	e3
	60	<b>∲f3</b>	f5
	61	<b> ⊈</b> c8	1/2-1/2

# Game 32 **Tal-Petrosian**41st USSR Ch 1973

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	ı⊈c4	Dgf6
6	<b>夕g5</b>	<b>e</b> 6
7	₩e2	<b>એb6</b>
8	<b>≜</b> b3	a5
9	a4	

Tal radically halts the advance of the black a-pawn.


9	• • •	h6
10	<b>€</b> 05f3	<b>c5</b>
11	<b>≜</b> f4	<b>≜d</b> 6
12	<b>O</b> 05	

At the present time, not without the

influence of this game, 12 \(\textit{\textit{g}}3!\) is considered strongest.

12 ... 0-0 13 0-0-0?!

A risky decision, since the king is less secure here. 13 ②h3 is sounder, although after 13... 2xe5 14 dxe5 ⑤fd5 Black's chances are not worse.



13 ... c4!

By this exchange of pawns Black seizes the initiative and quickly approaches the white king.

18 包fxg5 came into consideration, allowing the queen to go to h5, which, in view of the threat of exchanging the knight at f6, would have tied its black opponent to the defence of the kingside (by ... 對f6-h6). However, in this case too Black could have attacked as in the game.

18 ... a3! 19 b3 ♠b4

#### 20 **H**hg1

20 \disk d3 is met by the same reply as in the game.

20 ... a2

The tempting 20...2c3 (with the threat of 21...a2) could have been answered by 21 2xf6 22 d3.


In a difficult position White overlooks an intermediate check, but even after 24 \( \text{\Lambda} g3 \) f5 25 \( \text{\Lambda} e5 \) \( \text{\Lambda} f7 \) the threat of ...\( \text{\Lambda} c3+ \) cannot be parried without losing the knight.

24 ... \( \text{\Delta} a3+ 25 \( \text{\Delta} a1 \) \( \text{\Delta} xf4 26 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{\Text{\Text{T}}} 7 27 \( \text{\Text{Tg4}} \) \( \text{\Wa5} \)

Now if 28 \( \frac{1}{2}\)xf4 there follows 28...\( \frac{1}{2}\)b2+. White resigns (0-1).

# Game 33 Mikh.Tseitlin-Lutz Budapest 1989


1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>∕</b> Dd7
5	<b>⊈c4</b>	Øgf6
6	<b> ②g</b> 5	e6
7	₩e2	<b>Db6</b>
8	<b>≜b</b> 3	h6
9	<b>₫</b> 5f3	a5
10	a4	<b>c5</b>
11	<b>⊈</b> f4	<b>≜</b> d6
12	<u>.</u> £g3!	00
13	<b>Z</b> d1	



13 ②e5 is also good.

13	• • •	<b></b> 2bd5
14	<b>De5</b>	cxd4
15	Øgf3	<b>⊈</b> b4+
16	₩	<b>€</b> )d7
16 <b>⊈</b> d7!	? can also	be considered.
17	M-34	D


17 ②xd4 ②xe5 18 ②xe5 ②d7 19 h4! ₩e8 20 ②b5 f6 21 ②g3! Ⅱd8? Black fails to take account of the changed situation – the weakening of the a2-g8 diagonal. He should have preferred 21... 2c8 22 h5 $\pm$ .



22	②c7!	₩e7
22∕∑xc7	23 <b>≜</b> xc7	<b> ⊆</b> c8 24 <b>⊆</b> xd7!
is also bad.		
23	②xd5	exd5
24	₩xe7	⊈xe7
25	<b>¤</b> xd5	<b>\$</b> h7
26	<b>⊈c</b> 7	1-0

# 8: 9...c5

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> ]d7
5	⊈.c4	<b>包gf6</b>
6	€)g5	<b>e</b> 6
7	₩e2	<b>ᡚb6</b>
8	. <b>≜</b> .b3	h6
9	<b>2)5f3</b>	c5



This logical continuation is the most consistent.

#### . 10 **⊈**f4

An energetic move: the white pieces aim for control of the important e5 square. But other logical continuations by White must also be considered:

10 dxc5 \( \times \) bd7 (this is considered best, but also possible is 10...\( \times \) xc5 11 \( \times \) c5 0-0 12 \( \times \) gf3 \( \times \) bd7 13 \( \times \) f4 \( \times \) xc5 \( \times \) d5 15 \( \times \) d2 a5 16 c4 a4 with an equal game, Duckstein-Pachman, Bad Wörisofen 1992) 11

②e5 (11 c6 is insufficient to retain the initiative: 11...bxc6 12 ②h3 ②e7 13 0-0 ₩b6 14 ②f4 ②a6 15 c4 c5 16 ②d3 0-0=, Suetin-Petrosian, Moscow 1959) 11...②xe5 12 ₩xe5 ₩a5+ 13 ②d2 ₩xc5 14 ₩e2 ②e7 15 ②f3 0-0 16 ②e5 b6 17 f4 ②b7 18 0-0-0 ℤad8 19 ℤhe1 ②e4 20 ②e3 ₩c7 with a complicated game (Van der Wiel-Mittelman, Leeuwarden 1995).

10 c3 \$\colon\cdot c7\$ (releasing the pawn tension by 10...cxd4 allows White to occupy the central squares: 11 \( \tilde{2}\)xd4 \( \tilde{2}\)e7 12 \( \tilde{2}\)gf3 0-0 13 0-0 \( \tilde{2}\)d7 14 \( \tilde{2}\)e5 \( \tilde{2}\)a4 15 \( \tilde{2}\)f4 \( \tilde{2}\)e8 16 \( \tilde{2}\)g6! \( \tilde{2}\)e8 17 \( \tilde{2}\)xe7+ \( \tilde{2}\)xe7 18 \( \tilde{2}\)f5, and to gain an advantage, Short-Adams, London 1989) 11 \( \tilde{2}\)h3 \( \tilde{2}\)d6 12 dxc5 \( \tilde{2}\)xc5 13 \( \tilde{2}\)f4 \( \tilde{2}\)d6 (13...\( \tilde{2}\)e7 14 \( \tilde{2}\)e5!?) 14 \( \tilde{2}\)xd6 \( \tilde{2}\)xd6 \( \tilde{2}\)d8 d13 \( \tilde{2}\)d7 16 0-0 0-0 17 \( \tilde{2}\)d4 with some initiative for White (Adams-Vyzhmanavin, Burgas 1993).

10 2e3 27 11 2e5 2d6 12 2gf3 0-0 13 g4!? (or 13 0-0 a5 14 c4 2bd7 15 2xd7 2xd7=, Stein-Smyslov, USSR 1964) 13...c4 14 2xc4 2xc4 15 2xc4 2xg4 16 2g1 2xe3 17 fxe3 b5 18 2d3 2b7 19 0-0-0 f5 20 2b1 2d5 with a complicated game (D.Frolov-Krogius, St Petersburg 1994).

## 10 ... **②bd5**

In order to maintain the balance, energetic counterplay is required of Black. With a white rook about to appear on the d-file, the attempt to exchange the dark-square bishops by

10...\$\textit{2}\textit{d6}\text{ involves a certain loss of time: } 11 \textit{2}\text{g3}! \text{ we7 (or } 11...\text{2}\text{xg3 } 12 \text{hxg3 } \text{ we7 } 13 0-0-0 \text{ d4 } 7 14 \text{ le5} \text{cxd4 } 15 \text{ lh4 } 0-0-0 16 \text{ lhxd4 } \text{ with the better chances for White, Makropoulou-Dahl, Manila OL 1992) } 12 \text{ dxc5 } \text{ lxc5 } 13 \text{ le5 } \text{ ld7 } 14 \text{ lgf3} \text{ lh5 } 15 0-0-0 \text{ with the better chances for White (Kasparov-Karapov, Linares 1992) - Game 34.}

The recent continuation 10...a6 (with the idea of sacrificing a pawn: 11 0-0-0 c4! 12 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\) xc4 \(\text{\text{2}}\) xc4 \(\text{\text{2}}\) xc4 ②d5 14 单d2 b5 15 ¥e2 单b7 16 De5, and here in Kurpeichik-Spiridonov, Palma de Mallorca 1989, by playing 16... \( \sigma c 8, \) with the idea of ...**≜**e7. ...0–0 and...b5-b4, would have gained a dangerous attack) has been compromised by the energetic reply 11 c4! 2d6 (or 11...cxd4 12 0-0-0 **≜**c5 13 **€**)xd4 with the initiative for White, Watson-Spiridonov, Palma de Mallorca 1989 - Game 35) 12 \(\text{\(\text{\(L}\)}\) e5 cxd4 13 0-0-0 £xe5 14 ②xe5 ②bd7 15 ②gf3 ₩c7 16 **\(\Delta\)**xd4 ②xe5 17 ②xe5 with unpleasant pressure in the centre for White (Cs.Horvath-Kelecevic, Budapest 1992).

#### 11 **≜**e5


Passive is 11 âg3 ₩a5+ 12 2d2 cxd4 13 2gf3 âc5 14 0-0 0-0 with an equal game (Belotti-Kallai, France 1993).

## 11 ... ₩a5+ 12 ᡚd2

 (Yang Xian-Adianto, Djakarta IZ 1993).

#### 12 ... b5

The voluntary conceding of the centre leaves White with the initiative: 12...cxd4 13 Øgf3 (after 13 ≜xd4 \$c5 14 \$e5 \$d7 15 \$\displant \text{h3} 0-0-0 16 0-0  $\triangleq$  c6 17 a4  $\blacksquare$ d7 the game is equal. Ehlvest-Vyzhmanavin, Novosibirsk 1993) 13... e7 14 2xd4 0-0 15 0-0-0! (after 15 0-0 Ad7 16 c4 Db4 17 ②4f3 ②c6 18 এc3 ₩f5 19 a3 耳fd8 20 Ifd1 2e8 21 2fl 2e4 22 2e1 20g5 the game is equal, Anand-Karpov, Monaco 1993) 15... 2d7 16 \$b1 \$\begin{array}{c} \pm b6 & 17 & c4 & b4 & 18 & be4 & 2xe4 \end{array}\$ 19 ₩xe4 \(\mathbb{L}\)c5?! 20 \(\overline{D}\)c2 \(\mathbb{L}\)c6 21 \(\warpi\)g4 with a dangerous attack for White (Anand-Khalifman, Biel IZ 1993). Stronger is 19... Ifd8!? (Khalifman).



#### 13 dxc5

13 c4 is also interesting: 13... ②b6 (or 13...bxc4 14 皇xc4 ②b6 15 b4 豐xb4 16 量b1 豐a5 with equal chances, Short-Speelman, Hastings 1988/9 — Game 36) 14 cxb5 c4 15 皇xc4 皇b7 16 ②gf3?! (16 学f!!)

9...*c*5

16... ②xc4 17 wxc4 xc8 18 wd3 2e4 19 we2 2xf3 20 wxf3 ②d5, and Black has the initiative for the pawn (Anand-Ivanchuk, Moscow Grand Prix 1994).


#### 

The pawn exchange in the centre has allowed Black to develop his pieces in active positions. He is ready to develop counterplay and therefore White aims to exploit the slight weakening of his opponent's queenside.

In J.Polgar-Leko (Vienna 1996) White immediately counter-attacked with 14 a4 and after mass exchanges – 14... \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) b7 15 \(\textit{\textit{w}}\) xb5+ \(\textit{\textit{w}}\) xb5 16 axb5 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) xf2 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) g4+ 18 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) 2\(\textit{2}\) 2xe5 19 \(\textit{2}\) xd5 \(\textit{2}\) xd5 20 \(\textit{2}\) gf3 gained the better ending thanks to her queenside pawn majority. 14... \(\textit{2}\) d7 would have been more circumspect.

### 14 ... ₩b6

Also possible is 14... \(\textit{2}\)b7 15 \(\textit{Q}\)gf3 \(\textit{B}\)b6 16 0-0 0-0 17 \(\textit{Z}\)ad1 \(\textit{Z}\)ad3 with an equal game (Eichorn-Morgado, corr. 1994).



15 a4!

15 \( \text{2}\)xd5, attempting to give Black an isolated pawn, can be met by 15...\( \text{2}\)xd5!, not fearing the complications after 16 \( \text{2}\)xg7 \( \text{2}\)g8 17 \( \text{2}\)xh6 \( \text{2}\)xe3 \( \text{2}\)xe3 \( \text{2}\)xe3 \( \text{2}\)f6+ \( \text{2}\)e7 etc., while the two bishops give Black good a good game in the event of 16 b4 \( \text{2}\)f8 17 a4 bxa4 18 \( \text{2}\)xa4 \( \text{2}\)b7.

Ivanchuk-Gulko (Riga 1995) now continued 15...bxa4 16 单xa4+ 单d7 17 夕c4 豐d8 18 夕f3 0-0 19 0-0 豐c8 20 夕d6! 单xd6 21 单xd6 單d8 22 单e5 a5 23 单c2 单c6 24 夕d4 单b7 with equal chances.

# Game 34 Kasparov-Karpov Linares 1992

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>€</b> )d2	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>©d7</b>
5	<b>包g5</b>	2)gf6
6	ı£c4	e6


7	₩e2	<b>Ðb6</b>
8	⊈b3	h6
9	<b>€</b> 15f3	c5
10	<b>⊈</b> f4	<b>≙</b> d6
1 15	• 41	

10... ②bd5 is the main continuation.

		W 4 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
11	<u> </u>	<b>₩</b> e7
12	dxc5	<b>≜</b> xc5
13	<b>Фе5</b>	<b>≗</b> d7
14	<b>∮</b> )gf3	<b>�h5</b>
15	0-0-0	<b>Øxg3</b>

If immediately 15...0–0–0, then 16 ②xd7 ②xd7 17 ≜e5! ②xe5 18 ②xe5 is possible, with strong positional pressure.

16 hxg3 0-0-0



### 17 **Zh**5!

One of Kasparov's creative discoveries. While pressurising the kingside, the rook also joins the attack on the queenside. The threat is 18 \Dxf7 \Wxf7 19 \Zxc5+.

17		<b>⊈e</b> 8
18	$\mathbf{z}_{\mathbf{xd8}}$ +	<b>\$</b> xd8
19	₩d2+	<b>≜</b> d6
20	<b>Ød3</b>	<b>₩</b> c7
21	g4!	<b>\$</b> c8
22	g5	<b>≜</b> f8?!

Were the rook at h1, Black would have 22...h5. However, this total retreat is an unfortunate decision. 22...\$\dot\beta\$\! 23 gxh6 gxh6 24 \$\dot\beta\$\!\dot\beta\$ is stronger.


#### 23 Hh4!

The threat is stronger than the execution!

23		<b>⋭b8</b>
24	a4!	<b>≜</b> e7?!

Stronger was 24... ②c8! 25 **\$**b1!?±.

And here 26... Ig8!? 27 Ic4 Wd6 28 Id4 hxg5 29 c4 Af6 came into consideration (Kasparov).



Now that Black's queenside has been destroyed, it only remains for White to bring up the reserves – his rook.

29		≜xg5
<b>30</b>	<b>②xg5</b>	₩xg5
31	<b>L</b> h5!	₩f6
32	Ea5	<b>\$</b> c6

33	Dc5	<b>≜</b> xb7
34	②xb7	⊈xb7
35	₩a6+	<b>⊈</b> c6
<b>36</b>	<b>≜</b> a4+	<b>⊈</b> d6
37	₩d3+	4ે)d5
38	₩g3+	₩e5
39	₩a3+	<b>⊈c7</b>
40	₩c5+	<b>⊈d8</b>
41	<b>¤</b> xa7	1-0

# Game 35 Watson-Spiridonov Palma de Mallorca 1989


1	e4	c6
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ðd7</b>
5	êc4	<b>∕</b> ∆gf6
6	<b>包g5</b>	e6
7	₩e2	<b>包b6</b>
8	<b>≜</b> b3	h6
9	<b>€</b> 25f3	<b>c</b> 5
10	<b>⊈f4</b>	<b>a</b> 6
11	c4	cxd4
12	0-0-0	<b>≜c5</b>
13	2xd4	₩e7

13... 全xd4 is risky: 14 包f3 全xb2+ 15 豐xb2 全d7 16 包e5 with a dangerous initiative for White.

14	⊌)gf3	0-0
15	<b>µ</b> hg1	<b>Z</b> d8
16	<b>\$</b> b1	<b>≜</b> d7
17	g4	e5!?

A very clever resource, in accordance with classical rules: a flank attack should be met by a counterattack in the centre.

20 gxf5 **X**xd4



The subsequent play resembles a fencing contest, in which the decisive hit is landed by Watson.

21	🕰 xh6	<b>Eg4!</b>
22	<b>E</b> xg4	②xg4
23	£xg7!	\$xg7


Or 23... #g5 24 ②xg4 #xg7 25 h3! ②d7 26 #e7± (Watson).

As a result White has three, albeit unconnected, pawns for the exchange, and in addition the black king has not yet found any peace.

	20	• • •	-کا <b>ن</b> /
	26	②xd7+	₩xd7
	27	a3	<b>≖</b> d8
	28	<b>f6</b>	₩d3+
	29	<b>≜</b> c2	₩d4
	30	₩h6+	<b>⊈e8</b>
	31	<b>≜</b> f5	₩c5
	32	₩h8+	₩f8
	33	₩h5	<b>Z</b> d6?
22			

33... \dd 34 \dd g5\pm is a tougher defence.

34 ₩e2+ �d8



35 \(\psi = 5!\) \(\pm \d d 1 + \)
36 \(\phi = 2\) \(\pm \d 6 \)
37 \(\pm = 7 + \)
1-0

## Game 36 Short-Speelman Hastings 1988/9

e4 **c6** 1 d52 d43 **包c3** dxe4 ②xe4 **包d7** 4 5 ⊈c4 2)gf6 6 **包g5 e6** 7 ₩e2 4)b6 **≜**b3 8 h6 €)5f3 **c**5 9 10 **£**f4 **€**Dbd5 11 **≜** e5 ₩a5+ 12 **包d2** 

> 12 ... b5 13 c4

A double-edged move. 13 dxc5 is more natural.

13 ... bxc4


An interesting idea of Ivanchuk is to sacrifice a pawn by 13... 4b6 14 cxb5 c4.

14 **≜**xc4 **②**b6

15 b4!?

With this pawn sacrifice White tries to seize the initiative.

₩xb4 15 ₩a5 16 **¤**b1 **≜**b5+ **≜**d7 17 ⊈xf6! gxf6 18 19 2gf3 cxd4 **Zd8** 20 0 - 0



23 Ifd1

Black's position looks very hazardous, but there are no real threats.


23 ... f5 24 ②g3?

Now the initiative passes to Black. 24 Axd7 Xxd7 25 Cc6 Xxd1+ 26 Xxd1 Wa4 27 Cxe7 Wxe4!? 28 Wb2 e5 29 Wa3 Pg7 30 g3 would have led to a double-edged game (Speelman).

*9...c5* 101

24		. <b>⊈</b> .xb5!
25	②xb5	<b>4</b> 2d5
26	<b>x</b> b3	h5!?
27	E 491	

27 ∑xh5!? should have been ventured.



27 ... **Df4!** 

28	<b>Wf1</b>	₩xa2
29	<b>I</b> f3	h4
<b>30</b>	②gxf5!	exf5
31	<b>E</b> xf4	<b>L</b> h6!
32	II 91?	

White could have picked up a pawn by 32 \( \mathbb{I}\) xf5! \( \mathbb{I}\)hd6 33 \( \mathbb{I}\)f4.


32		₩d2
33	5)e2?	

An oversight. As shown by Speelman, the only way to hold the position was 33 豐c4! 單hd6 34 單xf5 單f6 35 單xf6 全xf6 36 色b3, although after 36...豐d5 37 豐xd5 里xd5 the ending is clearly better for Black, who has an outside passed pawn.

33	• • •	<b>≖e</b> 6
34	<b>¤</b> xf5	₩xe2
35	₩c1	<b>≖</b> ed6
	Λ.1	

# PART III: 5 🖾 f3 🖄 gf6

1	<b>e4</b>	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	Øf3	



The classical continuation, which White retains the option of exchanging knights at f6 or of retreating to g3. In connection with the latter, it is worth mentioning Romanishin's interesting idea of 5 De2 Dgf6 6 2)2g3, to which the most natural reply is 6...e6, preparing ...c6-c5. Romanishin-Petrosian (USSR 1979) continued 6...g6 7 \( \hat{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}} \) 8 c3 0-0 9 0-0 Ød5?! (it was more logical for Black to complete his development by 9... 4b6) 10 **L**e1 e5 11 **L**g5 f6? (and here he should have sacrificed a pawn by 11...\bulletb6) 12 \( \text{\textit{d}}\)d2 exd4 13 cxd4 ②7b6 14 ♠b3 ♠b8 15 ₩c1 a5 16 a3 2c7 17 2c5!, and White gained the advantage.

The modest **5 c3** ②gf6 has no independent significance, as 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 7 ②f3 or 6 ②g3 c5 7 ②f3 transposes into other lines.


5 ... ∮2gf6

After 5... 2df6 White can play 6 2eg5, transposing into variations examined in Chapter 4 (5 2g5 2dg6 6 21f3).

Here White's main continuations are 6 🗗 xf6+ (Chapter 9) and 6 🖆 g3 (Chapters 10 and 11).

After the sortie 6 2eg5 and the soundest reply 6...e6 7 2d3, play transposes into variations examined in Chapters 1-3.

After the retreat 6 5 c3:




(a) Black can equalise using Flohr's prescription of 6... ②b6 7 皇f4 皇f5, e.g. 8 皇d3 皇xd3 9 豐xd3 e6 10 0-0 皇e7 11 置fe1 0-0 12 ②g5 h6 13 ②ge4 ②bd5= (Antoshin-Flohr, 22nd USSR Ch 1955);

5 Df3

- (b) the classical 6...e6 7 \( \Delta d3 \) (or 7 g3 b6 8 \( \Delta g2 \) \( \Delta a6 9 \) \( \Delta e2 \) \( \Delta e7 10 0-0 \) 0-0=, Spassky-Speelman, London 1982) is also possible:
- ②xf6 13 dxc5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc5 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 h6 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h4 g5 16 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h5 with equal chances (Bronstein-Razuvaev, Moscow 1978);

# 9: 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>ᡚd7</b>
5	<b>DB</b>	<b>包gf6</b>
6	②xf6+	②xf6



After this unpretentious exchange one may gain the impression that it is now easier for Black to solve his opening problems. But the outward simplicity is deceptive. White retains a solid centre and the advantage of the first move, and has a slight initiative with which Black has to reckon.

Here White's main continuations are  $7 \triangle e5$  (9.1) and  $7 \triangle c4$  (9.2).

Against the modest 7 c3 Petrosian suggested 7...\$\textit{\textit{2}}\textit{94}. His game with Pilnik (Amsterdam CT 1956) continued 8 \$\textit{2}\textit{2}\textit{2}\textit{6} 6 9 h3 \$\textit{2}\textit{h5} 10 \$\textit{2}\textit{e5} \$\textit{2}\textit{xe2} \$\textit{2}\textit{d6} 12 \$\textit{2}\textit{g5} \$\textit{wc7} 13 0-0-0 \$\textit{2}\textit{d7} 14 \$\textit{khe1} 0-0 15 \$\textit{wb1} \$\textit{2}\textit{ae8}, and Black solved his opening problems.}

Nowadays after 7... 2g4 White plays more shrewdly: 8 h3 2xf3 (if 8... \$\dagger\$h5 Black has to reckon with 9 g4 \$g6 10 De5, e.g. 10... Dd7 11 Dxg6 hxg6 12 d5 cxd5 13 \wxd5 \wxd5 14 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}}\\ \tittt{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tilie\text{\texit{\texit{\text{\texitile}}\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\texit}\text{\texitile}}\tint{\text{\tiint{\texitilex{\tiint{\texit{\t active bishops plus a spatial advantage, Nikolenko-Donchenko, Moscow 1990) 9 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)xf3 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)d5 10 \(\mathbb{\parabole}\)e2 e6 11 0-0 wxf3 (also possible is 11... ad6 12 ₩d3 &c7 13 &f3 ₩d7 14 ¤d1 0-0 15 c4 Zad8 16 Wb3 We7=, Kasparov-Karpov (WC match (14), Seville 1987) 12 \$\text{\$\xi\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xet{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xet{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{}\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xet{\$\xi\exitin{}\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{}\e Zad1 Zfd8 15 g3 Zd7 16 2c1 Zad8 17 堂g2 皇e7 18 皇e2 包d5 19 f4 with some initiative for White, although Black's position is solid enough (Nikolenko-Podgaets, Moscow 1992).

9.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{D}c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{D}xe4 \( \tilde{D}d7 5 \( \tilde{D}f3 \( \tilde{D}gf6 6 \( \tilde{D}xf6+ \( \tilde{D}xf6)


#### 7 包e5

An aggressive sortie: White immediately occupies the key square of the position. Here Black's main replies are 7... 2d7 (9.11) and 7... 2e6 (9.12).

If he develops with 7...\$\(\textit{65}\) 8 c3 e6 he has to reckon with the flank attack 9 g4! \$\frac{1}{2}\)g6 10 h4 \$\frac{1}{2}\)d6 (weaker is 10...h5 11 g5 \$\frac{1}{2}\)d5 12 \$\frac{1}{2}\)xg6 fxg6 13 \$\frac{1}{2}\)c2 \$\frac{1}{2}\)f7 14 \$\frac{1}{2}\)h3 \$\frac{1}{2}\)e7 15 \$\frac{1}{2}\)c4 \$\frac{1}{2}\)f5 16 \$\frac{1}{2}\)f3 \$\frac{1}{2}\)d7 17 \$\frac{1}{2}\xf5+! with advan-

tage to White, Karpov-Hort, Bugojno 1978) 11 we2 c5 (or 11...wa5 12 22 0-0-0 13 h5±, Malishauskas-Kostenko, Warsaw 1993) 12 22 cxd4 13 h5 dxc3 14 wb5+ &f8 15 hxg6 with advantage to White (Ciric).

However, 8... 2d7 comes into consideration. Kavalek-Barcza (Caracas 1971) continued 9 2xf7 2xf7 10 3f3 e6 11 g4 3f6 12 gxf5 3xf5 13 e3 c5 14 2h3 cxd4 15 cxd4 2b4+ 16 2xf1 3b5+ 17 2xf1 3he8 18 3b3 56 19 2xf3, although here too White's chances are preferable.



9.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 7 ②e5)

## 7 ... ②d7

Black aims to exchange or drive back the active knight.

#### 8 **2**d3


If **8 ②f3** Black can invite a repetition of moves by 8...**②**f6.

After the exchange of knights he does not experience any difficulties:

8 2e3 2xe5 9 dxe5 2f5 (winning a pawn by 9... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}a5+ 10 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}d2 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xe5\$ allows White a lead in development after 11 0-0-0) 10 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xd8+ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xd8 11\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xa7 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}xc2 12 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}b6 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{m}}a8 13 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}c4 e6\$ 14 f3 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{m}}a4! with equal chances (A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (2), Linares 1987);

#### 8 **≜** f4 **€** xe5 9 **≜** xe5, and now:

- (a) 9... \$\mathbb{\mat
- (b) 9...\$f5 10 \$\text{d}3\$ \$\text{g}6\$ (stronger than 10...\$\text{x}d3\$ 11 \$\text{w}xd3\$ e6 12 0-0 \$\text{w}d7\$ 13 \$\text{ifel}\$ \$\text{Id}8\$ 14 \$\text{Ia}d1\text{t}\$ (De Wit-Bakker, Holland 1985) 11 0-0 e6 12 \$\text{Ie}\$ 1 \$\text{w}b6\$ 13 a4 a5 14 \$\text{w}f3\$ \$\text{x}xd3\$ 15 \$\text{w}xd3\$ 0-0-0 with equal chances (Fleck-Meduna, Porz 1988);
- (c) 9... wd5 10 c4 (10 e2 f6 11 eg3 wxg2 12 ef3 wh3 13 d5 is unclear, Jansa-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1983) 10... wa5+ 11 wd2 wxd2+ 12 exd2 ef5 13 ed3 with a drawish ending (Hübner-Karpov, Wijk aan Zee 1988);
- 8 🖒 xd7 & xd7 (or 8... \ xd7 9 c3 \ \ g4 \ with further simplification, Smagin-Chernin, Moscow 1988), and the position is completely equal, as even 9 \ d3 can be answered by 9... \ f5 10 0-0 (or 10 \ xf5 \ \ a5+) 10... \ xd3 11 \ \ xd3 e6 12 \ f4 \ d6 with an imminent draw (Matanovic-Radulov, Surakarta 1982).



8 ... g6

Also possible is 8... 166 9 c3 \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) 2 (or 10 \( \) \(

#### 9 **≜**e3

Or 9 c3 \( \text{g} g 7 \) 10 \( \text{g} 14 \) (10 \( \text{ke} 2 \) can be met by 10...e5 11 dxe5 \( \text{ke} x \) xe5 12 \( \text{ke} x \) xe5 \( \text{w} x \) d1+ 13 \( \text{ke} x \) d1 \( \text{ke} x \) xe5 with simplification) 10...\( \text{w} a 5 \) 11 \( \text{w} d 2 \) 0-0 12 \( \text{ke} 2 \) e5 13 dxe5 \( \text{ke} x \) xe5 with equal chances (Karpov-Sosonko, Amsterdam 1980).

9 ... **全**g7 10 **₩**d2 **夕**)b6

If 10...e5, then 11 \(\delta\)h6! is unpleasant.

11 **②e5 ≜e6** 

12 **⊈**e2

If **12 0-0-0** Black can risk taking the pawn: 12... xa2 13 b3 a5 14

\$\frac{15}{2}\$ a4 15 \$\mathbb{\mathba}\and\mathba{\mathba{\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathba\\mathba{\mathba\\\mathba{\mt


12 ... 0-0 13 0-0-0 f6

The piece sacrifice suggested by Timman also comes into consideration: 13...2xa2 14 b3 a5 15 \$\display\$ b2 a4 16 \$\mathbb{L}\$a1 axb3 17 cxb3 \$\display\$xb3 18 \$\display\$xb3 \$\display\$d5+ 19 \$\display\$c4, with unclear consequences.

Timman-Korchnoi (Montpellier CT 1985) now continued 14 包d3 包c4 15 豐c3 ②xe3 16 fxe3 盒d5 17 ②f4 盒h6 18 單hf1 盒xf4 19 罩xf4 豐d6 with equal chances.

9.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q}\)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q}\)xe4 \( \tilde{Q}\)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q}\)f6 6 \( \tilde{Q}\)xf6+\( \tilde{Q}\)xf6 7 \( \tilde{Q}\)e5)

7 ... **≜**e6



Black chooses a plan of piece development.

8 **£**e2 g6

## 9 0–0 <u>\$g</u>7

Passive is 10 c3 0-0 11 \( \text{2}\) f4 \( \text{2}\) d7 12 \( \text{2}\) f3 \( \text{2}\) d5 13 \( \text{2}\) c2 \( \text{2}\) e8 14 \( \text{2}\) ad1 e5 15 dxe5 \( \text{2}\) c7 16 \( \text{2}\) g3 \( \text{2}\) xe5 17 \( \text{2}\) d4 \( \text{2}\)-\( \text{2}\) (Tal-Agdestein, Wijk aan Zee 1988).

11... 2e8 is also played, with the same idea: 12 2f4 2d6 13 d5 cxd5 14 cxd5 2f5! The game is equal (Grünfeld-Dlugy, New York 1985).

To 11... 2d7 White can also reply 12 f4 (if 12 2f3 2f6 13 h3 2e4 14 2c1 b5!? 15 cxb5 cxb5 16 2xb5 2d5 with active piece play for the pawn, Belyavsky-Korchnoi, Montpellier CT 1985) 12... 2xe5 13 fxe5 2c7 14 3b3 2ad8 15 2ad1 b5 16 2c3 3b8, and here in Larsen-Arkell (London 1991) he could have retained some advantage by 17 b3.

#### 12 f4

12 \(\mathbb{w}c2\) can be met by 12...\(\Delta\)d6 13 b3 c5! 14 \(\mathbb{Z}\)ad1 \(\Delta\)f5 15 d5 \(\Delta\)xe5 16 dxe6 \(\mathbb{w}c7\) 17 exf7+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf7 18 g3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)af8 19 \(\Delta\)g4! \(\Delta\)xe3 20 fxe3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf1+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)-\(\frac{1}{2}\)(A.Sokolov-Karpov, match (3), Linares 1987).


#### 12 ... f6

Or 12... 2d6 13 b3 Wa5 14 Wc2 Ifd8 15 Iad1 with somewhat the better chances for White (Ivanovic-Watson, Bor 1986) – Game 37.

Psakhis-Tukmakov (54th USSR Ch 1987) now continued 13 包f3 单f7 14 豐c2 包d6 15 单d3 b5 16 b3 bxc4 17 bxc4, and White's spatial advantage gave him the better chances.

9.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6)

#### 7 **&c4**



White calmly continues his development.

Here too 8 ②e5 e6 9 ②b3 ②d6 10 We2 Wc7 is possible, with a double-edged game. One of Petrosian's first attempts went 10...②d7 11 ③d2 a5? (11...②xe5 12 dxe5 Wc7 is correct) 12 ②xf7! ③xf7 13 g4 with a very strong attack for White (Gligoric-Petrosian, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1957) – Game 38.

The plan with queenside castling is also encountered: 8 We2 e6 9 Qg5 Qe7 (the energetic 9...Wa5+ is also interesting: 10 c3 Qe4 11 0-0 Qxg5 12 Qxg5 Qe7, and here in Xie Jun-Adams, Amsterdam 1994, White could have sacrificed a knight - 13 Qxf7!? Qxf7 14 g4 Qg6 15 f4! Qe8 16 f5 Qf7 17 Zae1 with a dangerous initiative, Adams) 10 0-0-0 Qg4!

(Black can also consider 10...b5!? 11 \( \text{\tint{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t

- (a) 11 h3 \(\text{2xf3}\) 12 \(\text{Wxf3}\) \(\text{\Q}\) d5 13 \(\text{\Q}\) xe7 \(\text{Wxe7}\) 14 \(\text{Zhe1}\) (or 14 \(\text{\Q}\) b1 \(\text{Zd8}\) 15 \(\text{We4}\) b5 16 \(\text{\Q}\) d3 a5 17 c3 \(\text{Wd6}\) 18 g3 b4 19 c4 \(\text{\Q}\) f6 and Black maintains the balance, Fischer-Petrosian, Bled 1961) 14...0-0 15 \(\text{\Q}\) b1 \(\text{Zad8}\) with equal chances (Matanovic-Petrosian, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1959) Game 1.
- (b) 11 \$\delta b1 0-0 (if 11...\( \tilde{\ti

Initially 9 Le1 was played, but in this case Black can prevent the advance of the knight: 9... 24 10 c3 26 (or 10... 27 11 h3 2xf3 12 xf3 0-0 13 g3 b5 14 2f1 2d5 15 h4! 2f6 16 2d3±, Ehlvest-Kharitonov, 55th USSR Ch 1988) 11 2e2 c7, and now if 12 2e5 Podgaets recommends 12... 2xe5!? 13 dxe5 dx 4 xa4 xa5 15 2f4 c7 16 2c7 d7 17 xa7 0-0 18 2xg4 xg4 19 f3 2f2!? with chances for both sides.

In Short-Gulko (match (1), New York 1994) White played 9 h3 \$\(\textit{2}\)e7 10 c3 0-0 11 \$\textit{W}\)e2 c5 (11...b5!? 12 \$\(\textit{2}\)b3 \$\(\textit{2}\)e4 came into consideration) 12 \$\(\textit{2}\)f4! \$\(\textit{2}\)e4 13 \$\(\textit{Z}\)ad1, and here with 13...\$\(\textit{W}\)b6!? Black could have gained a good game.

#### 9 ... **L**d6

After the more passive 9...\$\&\delta 7 10 c3 \( \frac{10}{2}\)d7 11 \( \delta f4 0 - 0 \) 12 \( \delta e2 \( \delta \)b6 13 \( \delta b3 \) a5 14 a3 \( \delta d5 \) 15 \( \delta g3 \) \( \delta e8 \) 16 \( \delta ad1 \) White's position is slightly preferable (Rozentalis-Epishin, Vilnius 1988).

#### 10 ₩e2

Or 10 c3 \(\mathbb{e}\)c7 11 \(\mathbb{e}\)e2 0-0-0 12 \(\mathbb{e}\)e1 \(\mathbb{e}\)b8 13 \(\mathbb{e}\)f4 \(\mathbb{e}\)d5 14 \(\mathbb{e}\)g3 h5 with chances for both sides (Akopian-Adams, Manila OL 1992).

11 h3

Preparing in the event of 11...0-0 the pawn attack 12 g4 \(\mathbb{L}\)g6 13 f4.

11 ... h6

12 **E**e1

12 g4 ♣h7 13 ♠xf7 ♣xf7 14 ♠xe6+ ♣f8 is dubious for White.

12 ... 0-0-0

13 **♠b3** ②d5


14 **≜**d2

White's chances are preferable (Yakovich-Hoogendoorn, Amsterdam 1995) – Game 39.

## Game 37 Ivanovic-Watson Bor 1986

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5

3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>Ød7</b>
5	<b>D</b> 13	Øgf6
6	<b>②xf6+</b>	<b>包xf6</b>
7	②e5	<b>≜</b> e6
8	ı⊈e2	g6
9	00	<u>_</u> <b>g</b> 7
10	c4	0-0
11	Q 43	




11 ... ②e8
11...②e4 is more active, although after 12 f4 ②d6 the same position is reached.

12	f4	<b>∕</b> 2)d6
13	<b>b3</b>	₩a5
14	₩c2	<b>≖</b> fd8
15	<b>Z</b> ad1	<b>Z</b> ac8
16	g4	f6
17	Ø)d3	f5

After 17... \$17 White has the opportunity to strengthen his position by 18 \$13.

18	<b>Dc5</b>	<b>⊈f</b> 7
19	h3	<b>b6</b>
20	<b>Ød3</b>	<b>De4</b>
21	<b>包e5</b>	₩c3
22	<b>≜</b> d3!	



#### 22 ... \wxc2?!

White has a spatial advantage, and going into an endgame merely aggravates Black's problems. His pieces are well enough placed for play in the middlegame, and it would have been better to attack the centre: 22...c5! 23 gxf5 cxd4 with adequate counterplay.

23	≗xc2	<b>Dc3</b>
24	<b> ■</b> de1	≜xe5?

Watson considers 24... ♠xa2 25 gxf5 ♠b4! 26 ♠b1 ♣d6 to be best, when, although Black's position is still inferior, he can defend.

An important intermediate move, after which White wins a piece.

26	• • •	4)xa2
27	e6!	≜xe€
28	<b>E</b> xe6	<b> ■</b> xd4
29	<b>≜</b> .h6	<b>ᡚb4</b>
30	<b>E</b> xe7	gxh3
31	<b></b> g7+	<b>₽</b> h8
32	Xff7	h2+
33	⊈h1	1-0

# Game 38 Gligoric-Petrosian USSR v. Yugoslavia 1957

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	<b>Dxe4</b>	<b>⊘d7</b>
5	<b>D</b> f3	Øgf6
6	②xf6+	<b><b>②</b>xf6</b>
7	<b>≜c4</b>	<b>≜</b> f5
8	<b>Де5</b>	e6
9	<b>♠</b> b3	


Now White threatens to pursue the bishop: 10 g4 &e4 11 f3 &g6 12 h4.

#### 11 🙎 d2

The idea of the knight sacrifice at f7 is, as they say, in the air, but for the moment it is ineffective: 11 ②xf7 ②xf7 12 g4 ②f6! 13 gxf5 ③a5+ 14 ②d2 ④xf5

11 ... a5?

But now the time is ripe! 11... xe5 12 dxe5 wc7 was essential.



12 ②xf7! ⊈xf7 13 g4 ∰f6

If 13... 2g6 there follows 14 \*\*Exe6+ and 15 \*\*Exd6.

Otherwise White plays 16 c4.

16 Ac4 Df6 17 Uhg1 Uae8

Black parries the threat of 18 2xe6+ \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xe6 19 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xg7+ while leaving his rook at h8 for the defence of the kingside. White's position is so impressive, that it seems a miracle that Petrosian was able to hold out for a further 55 moves.

> ₩e4 18 **Eg**5 19 **\( \text{\text{e}} \) e3 a3** 20 **■**dg1 **g**6 21 \( \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \) ₩h4 22 Wf3 axb2+ 23 **\$**b1 **⊈**e7 **¤**a5 **¤**a8 24 25 **E**e5 ¤hf8

After 25... xa2 26 xa2 xe5 White can play 27 c3.

26 \( \text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$

27...₩c3 fails to 28 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xe6+! \( \mathbb{Z}\)xe6 29 \( \mathbb{L}\)5+.


#### 28 Wh3

As shown by Gligoric himself, here he chose an inexact move order (28 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\$}\$ d was more accurate), since now Black could have played 28...\( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$w}\$}\$} f5! \)

28 ... e5 29 2c4 2d8 30 4e6 2c7

If 30... 2e7 there follows 31 \( \mathbb{I}\)d1+ \( \psi\)c7 32 \( \mathbb{I}\)xe5.

31	<b>≜</b> xf6	₩xf2
32	ដ្ឋា	₩g2
33	<b></b> Ig4	₩h3



#### 34 **Z**d1?!

After the simple 34 **\( \)** Igg1 Black would have been defenceless. Now in a severe time scramble Petrosian as though gains a second wind.

**X**xf6 34 35 ₩xg4 ₩xf6 ₩xd6+ 36 **\$**0 37 **≜e**6 ₩e4 38 **\$**xb2 **g**5 **≜**b3? 39


After 39 **Zd3!** the game would have concluded much more quickly.

39 ... g4 40 If1 h5 41 If7 Wd4+ 42 Wxd4+ exd4 43 If4 Id8

44	<b>≗c4</b>	<b>\$</b> c5
45	<b>\$</b> b3	<b>b5</b>
46	<b></b> If5+	<b>\$</b> b6
47	ណ្ឌ	c5
48	Xxh5	c4+
49	<b>Ġ</b> b4	d3
50	<b>Exb5+!</b>	<b>⊈</b> a7
51	cxd3	

51 c3 does not work, since the loss of the h-pawn leads to a rook ending with a- and c-pawns, which is well known for its drawing tendencies.

51	• • •	cxd3
52	<b>Eg5</b>	d2
53	⊈e2	d1=₩
54	≜xd1	¤xd1
55	Exg4	<b></b> d2
56	h4	<b>¤</b> xa2
57	<b>\$</b> c5	∏h2



#### 58 **L**b4!

Cutting off the king at the maximum distance from the passed pawn. After the complacent 58 \$\display\$ d6 \$\display\$ 59 \$\display\$ e6 \$\display\$ c7 60 \$\display\$ f6 \$\display\$ d7 61 \$\display\$ g5 \$\display\$ e7 the black king is in the drawing zone.

58 ... **\$**a6

<b>59</b>	<b>\$</b> c6	<b>Ec2+</b>
<b>60</b>	<b>\$</b> d6	<b>E</b> c1
61	фе6	<b>Ec5</b>
62	<b>⊈</b> f6	<b>⊈</b> a5
63	<b></b> If4	<b>⊈</b> b6
64	<b>⊈</b> g6	<b>E</b> c1
65	h5	<b></b>
66	<b>⊈f</b> 7	<b>\$</b> c7
67	<b>1</b> f6	<b>\$</b> d7
<b>68</b>	h6	<b>∐</b> h1
69	<b>⊈</b> g7	<b>⊈e</b> 7
<b>70</b>	IIg6	Ξf1
71	h7	<b> I</b> f7+
72	<b>⊈</b> h6	1-0


Game 39
Yakovich-Hoogendoorn
Amsterdam 1995

1	<b>e4</b>	<b>c6</b>
2	<b>d4</b>	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>⊘d7</b>
5	<b>D</b> f3	Øgf6
6	②xf6+	②xf6
7	<b>≜c4</b>	⊈f5
8	<b>Де</b> 5	<b>e6</b>
9	0-0	<b>≜</b> d6
10	₩e2	₩c7
11	h3	<b>h6</b>
12	<b></b> ■e1	0-0-0
13	<b>≜</b> b3	<b>包d5</b>
14	<b>≜</b> .d2	g5
15	₩h5	■h7

In the event of 15... Idg8 White follows the same plan as in the game: 16 2xd5 cxd5 (16...exd5? 17 17xf7) 17 c4! dxc4 18 Id 2xe5 19 Ixe5 b8 20 b3, opening lines for an attack on the castled position.

16 **Lad1 Lg8**17 **2xd5!** exd5
18 c4 **2e4**?

Allowing a decisive exchange sacrifice. 18...dxc4!? 19 ②xc4 2e6 was essential.




19 **Exe4!** dxe4 20 **Exe4!** dxe4

If 20... \$\displays b8\$ there follows 21 \$\displays d7+\$ \$\displays a8 22 \$\displays f6\$. But now White strikes a blow from the flank.

21	<b>≗</b> a5!	<b>b6</b>
22	₩xe4	f5
23	②xc6+	Ġct
24	We6+	1_0

### 10: 6 **②**g3 e6

1	e4	c6
2	d4	d5
3	<b>€</b> )c3	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>⊘d7</b>
5	<b>D</b> f3	Øgf6
6	4)g3	



This knight retreat leads to more complicated play. From here it can in some cases be included in the attack on the king (2g3-h5). Black's main counterplay again involves undermining the centre by ...c6-c5.

#### 6 ... e6

6...c5 is examined in Chapter 11.

 initiative (Gurgenidze-Kopylov, USSR 1958).

#### 7 **≗d3**

The more modest 7 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}}\$} \) **2** \( \text{\$\text{\$c}} \) **8** 0–0 is no less dangerous:

- (a) 8... \$\mathbb{w}\$c7 9 c4 cxd4 10 \$\mathbb{w}\$xd4 b6 11 \$\mathbb{w}\$f4 \$\mathbb{w}\$c5 12 \$\mathbb{w}\$c3 \$\mathbb{w}\$b7 13 \$\mathbb{w}\$ad1 \$\mathbb{w}\$e7 14 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$d4! (after 14 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$g5? 0-0 15 \$\mathbb{w}\$c2 \$\mathbb{w}\$fd8! 16 b4 \$\mathbb{w}\$c6 Black gained the better chances in Conquest-Speelman, Hastings 1995) 14...e5 (or 14...0-0 15 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$b5) 15 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$b3 \$\mathbb{w}\$c7 16 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$e3 0-0 17 \$\mathbb{\infty}\$f5 and White retains a slight, but enduring advantage;
- (b) 8...cxd4 9 \(\times\)xd4 (also interesting is 9 \(\times\)xd4 \(\times\)e7 10 \(\times\)f4 0-0 11 c4 b6 12 \(\times\)e4 \(\times\)b7 13 \(\times\)c3, and here in Westerinen-Christiansen, Wijk aan Zee 1976, Black could have maintained equal chances by 13...\(\times\)c5) 9...\(\times\)c5 10 b3 0-0 11 \(\times\)b2 a6 12 c4 \(\times\)c7 13 a3 b6 14 b4 \(\times\)e7 15 \(\times\)f3 (or 15 \(\times\)e1 \(\times\)b7 16 \(\times\)d3 \(\times\)f8 18 \(\times\)ac1 \(\times\)D6 19 \(\times\)c2 \(\times\)f4 20 \(\times\)f1 \(\times\)d3\(\times\), Waitzkin-Serper, New York 1996; 17 \(\times\)h5!?) 15...\(\times\)b7 16 \(\times\)xb7 \(\times\)xb7 17 \(\times\)e2, and White's chances are slightly preferable.


#### 7 ... c5

advantage to White (Tal-Miles, Porz 1981/2).

#### 8 0-0

Accurate play is also required of Black after the modest 8 c3 cxd4 9 2xd4 2c5 (the less active 9...2e7 10 0-0 2c5 11 2c2 2d7 12 2c1 2c6 13 2f3 2c7 14 2e2 allowed White the better chances in Bronstein-Petrosian, Moscow 1967 – Game 3) 10 2c2:

- (a) 10... 包e5?! 11 0-0 0-0 12 皇g5 h6 13 皇xf6 豐xf6 14 星e1 包d7 15 包h5! 豐g5 16 h4! 豐xh4 17 星e4 豐e7 18 包f5 with a strong attack for White (Tseshkovsky-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);
- (b) 10...b6 11 ②e4 ♠b7 12 ②xc5 ②xc5 13 0-0 0-0 14 Ie1 and White's chances are preferable (Mark Tseitlin-Bagirov, Telavi 1982);
- (c) 10...0-0 11 0-0 \(\mathbb{e}\)c7 (or 11...\(\mathbb{E}\)e8 12 \(\mathbb{L}\)g5 a6 13 \(\mathbb{E}\)f3 \(\mathbb{L}\)xd4 14 cxd4 \(\mathbb{E}\)a5 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3 \(\mathbb{E}\)d5 16 \(\mathbb{E}\)e2 b6 17 \(\mathbb{L}\)b3\(\mathbb{L}\), Taulbut-Speelman, Hastings 1981/2) 12 \(\mathbb{E}\)e1 \(\mathbb{E}\)d8 13 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3 b6 14 \(\mathbb{E}\)e2 \(\mathbb{L}\)b7 with equal chances (Thipsay-Speelman, British Ch 1984) Game 40.




Now Black's main continuations are 8...cxd4 (10.1) and 8...2e7 (10.2).

He can also consider the littlestudied 8... 2d6 9 dxc5 \(\text{\psi}\xc5\) (9.... \( \bar{2}\) xc5 10 \( \bar{2}\) b5+) 10 b3 0-0 11 ≖ad1 ∰c7 (14...②d5 15 ♠b5!) 15 Deg5 Dc5 16 2e5 ₩c8! (this is more accurate than 16... #c6 17 \$\dagger\$ to 8 18 b4 ②ce4 19 ②xe4 ②xe4 20 ③xf6 2xf3 21 ₩xf3 2xf6 22 2c6±) 17 **≜**xf6 gxf6 18 **€**)xh7 **■**d8 (18...**ਓ**)xd3? 19 Ixd3 Id8 20 De5!±) 19 De5! fxe5 20 \(\mathbb{g}\)g4+ \(\mathbb{g}\)h8 21 \(\mathbb{h}\)h5 \(\mathbb{g}\)g8 22 ₩g4+ ½-½ (Tiviakov-Kamsky, Groningen 1994). Instead of 10 b3 Tiviakov recommends 10 We2!? with the idea of De4.

10.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{2} \) c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{2} \) xe4 \( \tilde{2} \) d7 5 \( \tilde{2} \) f3 \( \tilde{2} \) gf6 6 \( \tilde{2} \) g3 e6 7 \( \tilde{2} \) d3 c5 8 0=0)

8 ... cxd4



A radical decision. Black eliminates the pawn centre.


If 9... c5 there is the good reply 10 c4.

Now White's knight is attacked and his main continuations are 10 c3 (10.11), 10 公b3 (10.12) and 10 公f3 (10.13).

The drawbacks to 10 2e3 are emphasised by the manoeuvre ... 2d5, e.g. 10...0-0 11 We2 2d5! 12 Zad1 2xe3 13 fxe3 g6 14 2e4 2e7 15 2b5 Wb6, and Black's position is already preferable (Cherepkov-Petrosian, 28th USSR Ch 1961).

10.11 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ②xe4 ②d7 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②g3 e6 7 ②d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 ②xd4 ②c5)

#### 10 c3



White defends his knight.

10 ... 0-0

Black can give his opponent an isolated d-pawn by 10... 2xd4 11 cxd4 0-0, but he has to defend carefully:

(a) 12 \$\times f4 \$\Delta b6\$ (if 12...\$\Delta d5?! 13 \$\Delta d6 \$\Delta e8\$ 14 \$\Delta e1\$ \$\Delta 7f6\$ 15 \$\Delta e5\$ \$\Delta d7\$

16 a4 全c6 17 里a3 with an attack, Varavin-Komarov, Novosibirsk 1989) 13 里e1 全d7 14 包h5 全c6 15 全e5 包bd7 16 ②xf6+ ②xf6 17 里e3 g6 18 里h3 里e8! with an equal game (Plachetka-Meduna, Kralove 1981);

(b) 12 \( \text{2g5} \) \( \text{Wa5} \) (or 12...h6 13 \( \text{2f4} \) \( \text{2b6} \) 14 \( \text{2c2} \) \( \text{2bd5} \) 15 \( \text{2e5} \) \( \text{Wb6} \) 16 \( \text{Wd3} \), and here in Tal-Flesch, Lvov 1981, Black risked 16... \( \text{2b4?} \) 17 \( \text{Wd2} \) \( \text{2xc2} \) 18 \( \text{2xf6!} \) \( \text{2xa1} \) 19 \( \text{2h5} \) and came under a strong attack) 13 h4 h6 14 \( \text{2f4} \) b6 15 \( \text{Ze1} \) \( \text{2b7} \) with equal chances (Howell-Kumaran, British Ch 1990).

#### 11 ₩e2

Or 11 **Ze1** a6 12 ②h5 ②xd4! 13 cxd4 **W**a5 14 ②xf6+ ②xf6 15 ③d2 **W**b6 16 ②g5 ②d5 17 **W**h5 f5 with equality.

#### 11 ... b6!

11... **2xd4** is premature: 12 cxd4 **2**b6 13 **2**d1 **2**bd5 14 **2**h5!±.

#### 12 De4


Weaker is 12 \(\mathbb{U}\)f3 \(\tilde{Q}\)d5 13 c4 \(\tilde{Q}\)xd4 14 cxd5 \(\tilde{Q}\)c5! 15 dxe6 \(\tilde{Q}\)xe6 with slightly the better chances for Black.

12 ... \( \Delta b7 \)
13 \( \Delta xc5 \)
14 \( \Delta c4 \)
a6

The game is equal (Dvoiris-Epishin, 58th USSR Ch 1991).

10.12 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 dxe4 4 ③xe4 ②d7 5 ②f3 ②gf6 6 ②g3 e6 7 ②d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 ②xd4 ③c5)

#### 10 **Db3**



10 ... **≜**e7

This is considered the soundest move.

10....\$\text{2}\$d6?! involves a loss of time:

11 \$\mathbb{L}\$e1 \$\mathbb{W}\$c7 12 \$\overline{\Delta}\$d4 \$\overline{\Delta}\$c5 13 \$\overline{\Delta}\$b5

\$\mathbb{W}\$b6 14 \$\mathbb{W}\$f3 0-0 15 \$\overline{\Delta}\$c3 \$\mathbb{L}\$e8 16

\$\overline{\Delta}\$ce4 \$\overline{\Delta}\$e7 17 b3 \$\overline{\Delta}\$e5 18 \$\overline{\Delta}\$xf6+

\$\overline{\Delta}\$xf6 19 \$\mathbb{L}\$xe5!, and White gains the advantage (Vogt-Konig, Berlin 1990).

#### 11 He1

11 \( \hat{2}\)f4 can be met by 11...\( \hat{2}\)d5 12 \( \hat{2}\)d2 0-0 13 c4 \( \hat{2}\)5f6 (not 13...\( \hat{2}\)b4?! 14 \( \hat{2}\)xb4 \( \hat{2}\)xb4 \( \hat{2}\)xb4 \( \hat{2}\)xb4 \( \hat{2}\) 15 \( \hat{2}\)c2 \( \hat{2}\) 6 16 \( \hat{2}\)ad1 \( \hat{2}\)b7 17 \( \hat{2}\)fe1

₩c8 18 De4 Dxe4 19 2xe4 Df6 20 2xb7 ₩xb7 with an equal game (Glek-Epishin, Russian Ch 1995).

Tiviakov recommends 11 a4!?, and if Black does not prevent the pawn's further advance (by 11...a5), but plays, for example, 11...b6, then 12 a5 \(\Delta\)b7 13 a6 \(\Delta\)d5 (13...\(\Delta\)c6 14 \(\Delta\)d4\(\Delta\)) 14 c4 \(\Delta\)c6 15 \(\Delta\)d4 and White gains a spatial advantage.

#### 11 ... 0-0 12 \(\psi f3\) a5

12...單e8, preparing ...e6-e5, is also possible, e.g. 13 单d2 单d6! 14 单a5 (or 14 单c3 豐c7! 15 包h5 e5!?) 14...单c7 15 单c3 包d5 16 单d2 包5f6 with an equal game (Golubev-Solozhenkin, Le Touquet 1994).


#### 13 a4 ②d5

Tiviakov-Adams (match (1), New York 1994) went 13... \( \tilde{\D}b6 \) 14 \( \tilde{\D}d2 \) \( \tilde{\D}b5 \) \( \tilde{\D}d7 \) (15... \( \tilde{\W}c7 \) can be met by 16 c4 \( \tilde{\D}b4 \) 17 \( \tilde{\D}f4 \) \( \tilde{\D}d6 \) 18 \( \tilde{\D}xd6 \) \( \tilde{\W}xd6 \) 19 \( \tilde{\D}ad1\tilde{\D} \) 16 c4 \( \tilde{\D}xb5 \) (weaker is 16... \( \tilde{\D}b4 \) 17 \( \tilde{\D}xb4! \) \( \tilde{\D}xb4 \) 18 \( \tilde{\W}c7 \) 19 \( \tilde{\D}c4! \) \( \tilde{\D}xb5 \) 20 \( \tilde{\D}xf6+ \) gxf6 21 cxb5 with advantage to White, Tiviakov) 17 axb5?! \( \tilde{\D}b4 \) 18 \( \tilde{\W}xb7 \) \( \tilde{\D}c2 \) with chances for both sides, but, as shown by Tiviakov, by playing 17 cxd5 \( \tilde{\D}c4 \) 18 dxe6 \( \tilde{\D}xe6 \) 19 \( \tilde{\D}f5 \) White would have retained the better game.

## 14 \$b5 Db4 15 We2 Df6

Leko-Epishin (Dortmund 1994) now continued 16 c3 ②bd5 17 ②d4 豐b6 18 ②f3 单d7 19 单d3 單fd8 20 ②e5 单e8 21 ②e4 ②xe4 22 豐xe4 ②f6 with an equal game. 10.13 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 e6 7 2d3 c5 8 0-0 cxd4 9 2xd4 2c5)

10 **Df3** 



White maintains control over e5.

10 ... 0-0

11 we2 b6

12 🙎 f4

12 ②e4 ②b7 13 ②xc5 ②xc5 14 ②c4 Wc7 15 ②e5 ②d5= is harmless for Black (Paunovic).

> 12 ... ♠b7 13 ℤad1 Ψc8

13...②d5? is not good on account of 14 鱼g5! 豐c7 15 ②h5 鞏h8 16 鱼e4 f6 17 鱼h4 鱼d6 18 c4 鱼a6 19 ②xg7! with a strong attack for White (Tal-Vasyukov, 32nd USSR Ch 1964/5).

14 \$\dd8 15 වි5


Or 15 ②g5 ②e7 16 ②f5 ②f8 17 ②d4 ဩe8 18 ②b5 e5 with a good game for Black (Chandler-Wells, England 1985).

Now 15... ②xe5 16 ≜xe5 ₩c6 17

f3 \( \text{2}e7 \) 18 \( \text{De4} \) \( \text{Dd7} \) 19 \( \text{2}c3 \) \( \text{Dc5} \) leads to an unexplored position (Karpov).

10.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 2c3 dxe4 4 2xe4 2d7 5 2f3 2gf6 6 2g3 e6 7 2d3 c5 8 0-0)

8 ... **≜**e7



Black does not hurry to release the pawn tension, and retains the option (after dxc5) of recapturing on c5 with his knight.

#### 9 ₩e2

The alternative plan involves the fianchetto: 9 b3 0-0 10 \( \text{\$\text{\$ab}\$} \) (or 10 c4 cxd4 11 \( \text{\$\t

to White (Tiviakov-Adams, match (11), New York 1994).


The plan of strengthening the centre by 10 c3 b6 11 De5 Lb7 12 f4 was discredited in the game Evseev-Flohr (USSR 1949), where after 12...cxd4 13 cxd4 Dxe5 14 dxe5 Dg4! 15 Lxh7+ xh7 16 xg4 dd+ 17 xh1 Lac8 Black gained fine play for the pawn.

10 ... ₩c7

10...cxd4 11 \( \Delta\)xd4 is less good for Black:

- (a) 11... ■e8 12 b3 ₩b6 13 ♠b2 ②f8 14 ②f3 with the better chances for White (Tal-Filip, Moscow 1967);
- (b) 11...②c5 12 এc4 ₩c7 13 ②b5 ₩b8 14 ②f5! with advantage to White (Schaefer-Szabolcsi, Budapest 1991).

11 c4



11 ... **Z**e8

After 11...cxd4 12 2xd4 White has active piece play:

(a) 12...a6 13 b3 (13 a3!? b6 14 b4 \$\displaybreakb7 15 \$\displaybreakb2\pm\$ also comes into con-

sideration) 13... 🗷 e8 14 🕭 b2 b6 15 🖺 h5 🖺 b7 16 🖾 xe6 with a very sharp game (Kasparov-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988) – Game 41. However, the piece sacrifice is not obligatory. Karpov and Zaitsev recommend 16 🗷 ac1!? 🗷 ac8 17 c5!? (vacating a square for the bishop) 17... bxc5 18 🖾 xe6 📽 c6 (after 18... fxe6? 19 📽 xe6+ &f8 20 &c4 or 19... &h8 20 📽 f7 Black loses) 19 🖾 ef4, when White's chances are preferable;

- (b) 12...2c5 13 2b5 \$\cong c6 14 \( \text{2} \)c2 b6 15 2f5! exf5 16 \$\cong xe7 \( \text{2} \)b7 17 f3 \$\cong ae8 18 \$\cong d6\$ with advantage to White, who effectively has an extra pawn on the queenside (Aseev-Arkell, Leningrad 1989);
- (c) 12...b6 13 ②b5 ₩c6 14 Ձg5 a6 15 ②e4 Ձb7 16 ②d4 ₩c8 17 ၗac1± (Karpov, Zaitsev).

Black takes control of e5 and brings his knight to the defence of the kingside. After 13...b6 14 ②e5 ②b7 15 ③f4 White has a solid initiative.

14 **Dg5** 

Preventing 14...b6 due to 15 2 xh7!

14 ... 2f8 15 53e4 5xe4

In the event of 15...2d7 16 2xf6+ 2xf6 17 \dd 2xg5 18 2xg5 White has a slight but enduring advantage:

- (a) 18... we5 19 wd2 \( \alpha \)c6 20 b3 with the better chances (Tiviakov-Adams, match (9), New York 1994);
- (b) 18... Lack 19 Lac1 We5 (risky is 19... Lack 20 2d2 Wxa2 21 2b4 2c6 22 2a3±, Adams) 20 Wd2 2c6

#### 16 9 xe4

Both sides have chances.

16 wxe4!? is weaker on account of 16...f5! 17 we2 ad7 18 af6, when Black's chances are preferable (Leko-Lutz, Horgen 1994).

# Game 40 Thipsay-Speelman British Championship 1984

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>Dc3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7
5	<b>DB</b>	Øgf6
6	<b>∳</b> 2g3	e6
7	⊈d3	<b>c</b> 5
8	c3	cxd4
9	②xd4	<b>⊈</b> c5
10	<b>≜</b> c2	0-0
11	00	₩c7


Otherwise the pin 10 \( \text{\mathbb{Q}} g5 \) is unpleasant.

12	<b>≖</b> e1	<b>Zd8</b>
13	<b>≜e3</b>	<b>b6</b>
14	₩e2	<b>⊈</b> b7
15	<b>Z</b> ad1	<b>a6</b>
16	<b>≜b1</b>	<b>¤</b> ac8
17	₩c2?!	

A loss of time -17 (2)h5 is better.

17		<b>Ð</b> 18
18	₩e2	<b>I</b> d7
19	9)f3?!	

19 ≜g5 is more active, although after 19...≜xd4 20 cxd4 White is obliged to play with an isolated pawn.




19		<b>≜</b> xe3
20	₩xe3	<b></b> ⊈cd8
21	¤xd7	

White should not have conceded the d-file. 21 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{w}}\)e2 was more logical.

21	• • •	<b>X</b> xd7
22	<b>Ø</b> d4	<b>4</b> 2d5
22	11111 - 4	

White sounds the retreat, but whereas 'activity' by 23 we5 wxe5 24 xe5 14 is clearly unfavourable for him, 23 wg5!? looks perfectly reasonable (Speelman).

23 ... Df4



#### 24 \( \text{\text{e}} \) e4?

An oversight, but of course even after 24 f3 White would have been in difficulties.

24		¤xd4!
25	cxd4	Wxc1
26	Tvc1	₫ ve4

White does not even have the consolation of any pawns in return for his material deficit.

27	f3	≗d5
28	a3	f5!
29	<b>ℤc8</b>	<b>∲f</b> 7
<b>30</b>	<b>E</b> c7+	<b>\$</b> f6
31	<b>b4</b>	<b>€</b> )8g6
32	<b></b> a7	<b>≜c4</b>
33	<b>H</b> b7	<b>b5</b>
34	<b></b> □b6	�h4
35	<b>¤</b> xa6	<b>⊘hxg2</b>
36	Du (	De1
<b>37</b>	<b>€</b> )d2	<b>Ðh3</b> +

In conclusion Black weaves a mating net.

# Game 41 Kasparov-Karpov Amsterdam 1988

1	e4	с6	
2	d4	d5	
3	<b>€</b> )d2	dxe4	
4	②xe4	<b>€</b> )d7	
5	<b>D</b> f3	Øgf6	
6	<b>€</b> )g3	e6	
7	≜d3	<b>⊈.e</b> 7	
8	0-0	<b>c</b> 5	
9	₩e2	0-0	
10	W.41	W-7	

#### 11 c4 cxd4

In recent times Karpov himself has preferred the restrained 11... **Ze8**.

12 **②xd4** a6

13 b3


13 ②e4 gives only an equal game after 13...②xe4 14 ₩xe4 ②f6 15 ♠f4 ₩xc4!

#### 13 ... **ℤ**e8

13...b6 14 ♠b2 ♠b7 is weaker in view of 15 ②df5! exf5 16 ₩xe7.

An experimental knight sacrifice, which has not been repeated as yet in any high-level games.

16	• • •	fxe6
<b>17</b>	₩xe6+	<b>\$1</b> \$
18	<b>≜</b> xh7	<b>包c5</b>
19	₩h3	(A)xh



#### 20 \(\preceq\xg7+?!\)

White has already sacrificed two pieces, and although the black king is exposed, there are no real threats. It was time to regain some material: 20 b4!? g6! 21 2g7 2f6 22 2xe8 2xe8

23 2xf6 2xf6 24 bxc5 2xf5 with chances for both sides (Karpov, Zaitsev).

20 ... ⊈g8 21 ≜b2

21 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{2}}}\) d4!? was somewhat stronger: 21...\(\textit{\textit{\textit{2}}}\) c6 22 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) xc5 bxc5 23 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) d7\(\textit{\textit{\textit{7}}}\). Now, however, Black creates counterthreats and exchanges several pieces.

₩c6! 21 . . . **I**d4 22 ②e4! 23 2eg5 **≖**e1 24 \#g4 **≜a3!** 25 **≜c3** Exe1+ 26 \(\mathbb{L}\)xe1 Ïe8 27 ⊈d2 **⊈c1!** 28 h4 ≜xd2 29 **X**xd2 ¤e1+


29... we6 is simpler, forcing the exchange of queens.

30 \$\dot{\$\dot{\pi}\$h2 \ \ \mathbb{\pi}\$e4?

A mistake, after which White gains a second wind. This move should have preceded by 30... \$\mathbb{W} c7+-31 \$\overline{D} f4\$\$\$\$\mathbb{Z} e4\$.

Now even Black's two extra pieces are unable to compensate for his two


successive mistakes. He should have reconciled himself to 31...\$\text{\omega}\$c8 32 \$\mathbb{I}\$d8+ \$\mathbb{I}\$e8 33 \$\mathbb{I}\$xe8+ \$\mathbb{I}\$xe8 34 \$\mathbb{I}\$xg5+! \$\omega\$xg5 35 \$\omega\$f6+ \$\ddots\$f8 36 \$\omega\$xe8, when even so White has four pawns for the piece.



32	<b>I</b> d8+!	<b>∲f</b> 7
33	<b>Zd7</b> +	<b>\$18</b>
34	₩xeб	<b>E</b> xe6
35	hxg5	<b>⊑</b> e7
36	Exe7	<b>\$</b> xe7
<b>37</b>	g4	êe4
38	⊈g3	<b>≜</b> b1
39	a3	1-0 (time)

### 11: 6...c5

1	e4	<b>c6</b>
2	d4	d5
3	<b>②c3</b>	dxe4
4	②xe4	<b>包d7</b>
5	<b>Df3</b>	Øgf6
6	E)~3	o <b>5</b>



A fashionable continuation, by which Black hopes to manage without having to play ...e7-e6 (in the event of 7 2d3).

White's main continuations here are 7 dxc5 (11.1) and 7 \(\hat{L}\)d3 (11.2).

After 7 \( \text{2c4}\), apart from the simple 7...\( \text{2b6}\) 8 \( \text{2b5} + \text{2d7}\), Black can also implement the extended fianchetto with 8 \( \text{2e2}\) e6 9 0-0 a6 10 c4 bxc4 11 \( \text{2xc4}\) \( \text{2b7}\) 12 \( \text{2e1}\) \( \text{2e7}\), after which his pieces are well mobilised:


(a) 13 b3 0-0 14 \( \text{\te}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tex{

18 ₩xd4 ¤xc1 19 ¤xc1 ₩a8 20 ②c4 a5 with equal chances (Georgiev);

(b) 13 ②g5 0-0 (if 13...h6 Black has to reckon with the attack 14 ②xf7!? ③xf7 15 ③xe6+ ⑤f8 16 ②f5) 14 〖xe6 ⑥d5 (after 14...fxe6 15 ②xe6 ⑥b6 16 dxc5 ②xc5 17 ②xc5+ White has the initiative: 17...⑤h8 18 ②xb7 ⑥xb7 ⑨xb7 19 ⑥e3 ⑥xb2 20 〖b1 〖ad8 21 ⑥e1!, Golubev) 15 ⑥xd5 ②xd5 16 dxc5!, and White's position is preferable (Golubev-Savchenko, Bucharest 1996).

11.1 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q} \)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q} \)xe4 \( \tilde{Q} \)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q} \)f3 \( \tilde{Q} \)g6 6 \( \tilde{Q} \)g3 c5)

#### 7 dxc5



The critical reply, with which White hopes to extract positional gains.

7 ... e6

6...*c*5

#### 8 c6

Black's idea is justified if White tries to defend his pawn: 8 b4 b6 (8...a5?! 9 c3 axb4 10 cxb4 b6 11 a4 bxc5 12 b5! favours White) 9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 b5! favours White) 9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}}\) 2 (9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}}\) 5! favours White) 9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 (9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 5! favours White) 9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 (9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 5! favours White) 9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 (9 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 5! favours 5 10 b5 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 5 11 c4 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\) 6 12 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 6 13 a4 a5 14 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\) 6 15 \( \text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 5 15 \( \text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\) 6 11 (15 0-0-0 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 6 \( \text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 1 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 5 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 2 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}\) 3 \( \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$

Instead of 17 ②b3? Adams suggests 17 ②c3, but here too after 17...g5 18 ②b3 g4 19 ③xa5 ¥b8 20 ④xd8 基xd8 21 ②h4 ②g5 22 0-0 ③xh4 Black has a good game.

8 ... bxc6

9 🖳 e2

If 9 **≜d3** Black has the good reply 9... ②c5.


#### 9 ... ₩c7

9...h5, threatening a flank attack, is also interesting, e.g. 10 ②f1 ②c5 11 ②e3 ②g4 12 h3 ②xe3 13 ③xe3 ③xe3 14 fxe3 Wb6 15 Wd4 e5? 16 Wc3 Ib8 17 0-0-0, and White's control of the d-file gives him the advantage (Vogt-Speelman, Altensteig 1994). 15...Wxd4 16 ②xd4 is sounder, although here too White has the better endgame.

Tiviakov-Gulko (Groningen 1994) now continued 10 0-0 全e7 11 c4 0-0 12 全d2 a5 13 全c3 全b4 14 豐c2 全xc3 15 豐xc3 全b7 16 公d4 c5 17 公b5 豐e5 18 豐xe5 公xe5 19 f4 公eg4 20 \( \text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}\$}}}}}} \eximiniminfineset}} \exittendet{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\}\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}} \eximiniminfineset}} \exittend{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}} \exi

11.2 (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \tilde{Q}\)c3 dxe4 4 \( \tilde{Q}\)xe4 \( \tilde{Q}\)d7 5 \( \tilde{Q}\)f3 \( \tilde{Q}\)gf6 6 \( \tilde{Q}\)g3 c5)

#### 7 **≜**d3



As in the main variation, White continues his development.

#### 7 ... cxd4

After 7...g6 8 0-0 \( \text{\t

#### 8 ②xd4 g6

An alternative is **8...42c5** 9 **2**b5+ **2**d7 10 0-0 a6 (less good is

10... \( \text{xb5}?! \) 11 \( \text{Dxb5} \) a6 12 \( \text{Dd4} \) g6 13 \( \text{ae3} \) \( \text{Dd5} \) 14 \( \text{wf3} \) e6 15 \( \text{Lad1} \) \( \text{wf6} \) 16 \( \text{Ddf5}! \) with advantage to White, Hausner-Luce, Prague 1992) 11 \( \text{2xd7} + \text{wxd7} \) 12 b3 g6 13 \( \text{2b2} \) \( \text{ag7} \) 14 \( \text{we2} \) 0-0 15 \( \text{Lfe1} \) \( \text{Lfe8} \) 16 \( \text{Lad1} \) with slightly the better chances for White (Luther-Arkell, Leningrad 1989).

9 0–0 **≜**g7

10 c3 0-0 11 **Z**e1 a6

Or 11... 2c5 12 2c2 2g4 13 Wd2 2c8 with equal chances (Zapata-Spiridonov, Moscow 1989).

12 &c2 **Le8**13 &g5

Here in Aseev-Lutz (Budapest 1989) Black could have maintained the balance by 13... \#c7.

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- 2 8 ₩e2 h6 9 ②e4 ②xe4 10 ₩xe4 ②f6 11 ₩e2 b6 12 ೩d2 ೩b7
  - 13 0–0–0 **₩**c7 *25*
  - 2.1 14 De5 28
  - 2.2 14 \( \mathbb{H}\text{hel} \) 29
  - 2.3 14 **★**b1 30
- 3 10...₩c7 43
  - 3.1 11  $\frac{11}{9}$ g4  $\frac{1}{9}$ f8 12 0-0 c5 43
    - 3.11 13 **≝**e1 − *44*
    - 3.12 13 c3 44
  - 3.2 11 **≜**d2 − 45
  - 3.3 11 0-0 46
- 4 5...Ødf6 − 51
  - 4.1 6 **A**d3 51
  - $4.2 6 \triangle c4 52$
  - 4.3 6 包1f3 53

PART II: 5 **≜**c4 **②**gf6 6 **②**g5 e6 7 **₩**e2 **②**b6 − 58

- 5 8 2d3 h6 9 25f3 c5 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 2e5 2bd7 12 2gf3 61
  - 5.1 12...**₩**c7 *62* 
    - 5.11 13 0-0 *62*
    - 5.12 13 \( \text{13} \) f4 64
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7 8 ♠b3 h6 9 ♠5f3 a5 - 82 7.1 10 c3 - 82 7.2 10 a3 - 84 7.3 10 a4 - 85

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11 6...c5 − 122 11.1 7 dxc5 − 122 11.2 7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 − 123



# Caro-Kann Smyslov System 4...Nd7

The Smyslov Variation of the Caro-Kann is one of the most solid and dependable openings for Black. It is a favourite of many top players, including FIDE World Champion Anatoly Karpov and the British No. 1, Michael Adams, both of whom have used the system to defeat many top-class opponents.

This book presents an objective, detailed coverage of all the lines of the Smyslov System, with special attention devoted to the most dangerous attacking systems available to White - such as that used in Deep Blue's sensational match-clinching victory over Garry Kasparov.

Grandmaster **Eduard Gufeld** is one of the most colourful characters in international chess. His entertaining style of play and lively annotations have gained him many fans around the world. His previous books for Cadogan include *The Modern French Tarrasch* and *An Opening Repertoire for the Attacking Player*.

**Oleg Stetsko** has earned a reputation as a researcher and theoretician of the highest order.



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